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Certainty

EDGAR P. DICKIE

THOSE whose lifework it is to preach the gospel; to comfort or to convince where faith is imperiled, whether through weakness within or through attack from without; are aware of their need of some sheet-anchor, some sure word of God, some *certainty*. It is their aim, Sunday by Sunday, to send their hearers out again "into a world transformed." How is it to be accomplished? Not by eloquence. We appreciate Verlaine's recipe for poetry, "Take eloquence and wring its neck!" The most moving appeal to the imagination may leave no more permanent impression than the "wind blowing in a horse's ear." If, from the scholar we expect first erudition, and from the artist vision, from the preacher we expect certainty. Without that, his sermons are likely to share with Hood's "Song of the Shirt" the reputation of having "great success and no results."

Yet to-day many are concerned because the certainties are shaken. They confess themselves not finders but seekers. They are aware of the tentativeness of their beliefs. This is the crisis of religion. For, as Pauck says, a religion cannot be tentative.

Is this certainty attainable outside religion?

1. *In Aesthetics?* When we repeat the words

At my back I alwaies hear
Time's winged chariot hurrying near

we are *sure* that there is beauty there. When we read, "Intreat me not to leave thee, or to return from following after thee," once again we are *certain*. And yet our certainty seems to build on a flimsy foundation. Were it challenged, it could give no reasoned defense of itself. Indeed, so precarious is æsthetic criticism that a great Professor of English Literature can say only guardedly, "If I were shown a new poem as great as Keats' last sonnet, *I think* that I should recognize its merit. I am not sure."

2. *In Metaphysics?* What is truth? asks the doubting philosopher, and he appears to give innumerable answers—all mutually destructive.

a. Perhaps he says that truth is the correspondence of thought with the real world. But consider the implications. To attain certainty, then, you are required to know three things—the contents of your thought, the nature of reality, and the degree of correspondence between the first and the second. Even then, who shall say that our minds are capable of pronouncing a verdict on this correspondence, or lack of it? b. Perhaps the philosopher says that *truth is that which works*; successful action is the criterion of truth. Here the difficulty is that problems may be solved by falsehood or illusion, and this is the obstacle which pragmatism has not surmounted. (In Hermann Melville's *Moby Dick*, Queequeg, on first seeing a wheelbarrow, puts his sea-chest on it; lashes it fast; and then shoulders the barrow and marches up the wharf. As a pragmatist, he had proved the truth about wheelbarrows, because his theory had worked. He had brought his sea-chest safely home!)

If the emphasis is laid on feeling instead of action, the case is no better. "Needs and desires of themselves give us no standard of value. It will not do to alter the multiplication-table because we are getting into debt."

c. Again, it may be that the metaphysician takes some simple, axiomatic principle, and builds thereon an inverted pyramid of truth. It may be the Cartesian principle, *Cogito, ergo sum*. Or he may proclaim himself a Solipsist, believing that nothing exists except himself and the states of his own mind. ("I am so glad to hear," wrote an old lady once to Bertrand Russell, "that you are a Solipsist. There should be more of us.") Perhaps, like Kant, he begins with the fact that pure mathematics is possible, and proceeds to build up a monumental pyramid in the shape of a Critique of Pure Reason. Or, if he belongs to the Coherence-school, he builds on the axiom that truth can never be self-contradictory. From that he deduces the positive criterion that truth is proved to be true by showing itself at once comprehensive and systematic. Here he feels himself unassailable. This criterion of Reality is shown to be infallible by the surest of methods. The truth of it has to be assumed in the very process of calling it in question.

This last appears to be a very satisfying theory. Yet even here a difficulty remains. Who is to decide whether a theory of Reality is self-contradictory? Who is to weigh up the evidence and give the verdict? *Quis custodiet ipsum custodem?* How are we to criticize the mind, which is

itself the organ of criticism? And, unless such criticism is possible, how are we to arrive at certainty?

In a word, the *ultimatum* of metaphysics is, at the very least, no more sure than the *ultimatum* of religion—namely, that the Reality which we are endeavoring to apprehend is personal, and is seeking to reveal itself to us.

3. Can we have certainty in *Ethics*? The age in which we live is facing the perplexing problem of the relativity of knowledge. The lack of any absolute standpoint from which space and time can be measured compels the metaphysician to relegate these to the sphere of the relative. The same problem is then attacked by the physicist and mathematician. Lastly, Oswald Spengler carries the investigations of Einstein to a more alarming conclusion, when he applies the same methods to ethics. In ethical matters, he claims to have brought about a revolution comparable to that of Copernicus in astronomy; to have removed the center-point of ethical orientation. The sense of "duty," which has hitherto been regarded as absolute, and universal in all men, is, he would say, quite as naïve a piece of self-deception as any to which the geocentric astronomers were prone. To-day men are prepared to die for that which they consider right. But rightness can be determined only by an omniscient spectator of all time and all experience. Not being that, we have no guarantee that our view of the ethical obligation is anything more than a parochial prejudice. The man of the future may feel it his duty to die for the very opposite of that for which men to-day are ready to die.

It is an alarming application of the theory of relativity. In all our thinking we must have some fixed point, whether it be axiom or value. If Spengler takes this away, we have lost all. Nor is it sufficient to answer, "But, if you take away every ideal that sheds its light on reality, then life loses all meaning." For his reply is that we are returning to the Ptolemaic standpoint. To declare that life has a meaning may itself be only a parochial prejudice.

According to Spengler, therefore, all ethical systems are relative. They will decline when their day is done. None is better than another. (And we might as well add, None is any worse than another.) Value, in fact, disappears from the world.

It seems that certainty is not to be found in æsthetics, in metaphysics, or in ethics. In the last of these we might confidently have expected to

find some bridge leading over into the country of certain knowledge which we believe to be ours in religion. But the bridge is mined.

Here, then, is the challenge with which Christianity is faced in our day. Let us consider two ways of answering it, that of the Barthian School, and that of Karl Heim, of Tübingen.

In both cases we have a new emphasis on what is called "existential thinking." The word "existentiell" punctuates every page. Science, says Brunner, in *The Theology of Crisis*, makes only observations and timetables. Metaphysics, unable to shake free from Aristotle's "world spectatorship" or *bios theoretikos*, gives an æsthetic view of God, without passion or personal decision. But religion represents the search for truth, with the whole soul and the whole of existence at stake. Faith is not perception: it is decision. Doctor Willy Breml, in his recently published, *Was ist das Gewissen?* has a similar caution to make in the realm of ethics. Much work on this subject, he says, has been vitiated because the authors have treated conscience as *Verständnis*, when it ought to be treated as *Stellungnahme*.

1. First, *the Barthian School*. Barth is vividly conscious of the danger to theology from the familiar idea of relativism, the lack of any absolute. Einstein has made the world aware of the idea that time is relative and means one thing by our clocks and a wholly different thing from the viewpoint, say, of the star Sirius. History possesses no absolute. "Accidental truths of history," said Lessing, "can never be evidence for necessary truths of reason." Troeltsch reached the same conclusion. In philosophy and religion "the final synthesis does not lie within the scope of human thought, and all attempts to reach it lead to contradiction." Herrmann, Barth's own teacher, felt the same difficulty. ("It is a fatal drawback that no historical judgment, however certain it may appear, ever attains anything more than probability.") Spengler sees no God nor purpose at work in the decline of present-day civilization: blind fate rules the destinies of men. Barth challenges this pessimism with his declaration that the perilous seas of relativity may be safely voyaged on, because we have the raft of the Divine Word; and with his claim that revelation gives a fixed point, an absolute. We may note the three leading thoughts—God's transcendence; man's brokenness; God's Word.

i. *God's Transcendence*. God is the "completely other," the absolute over against all relative. Because man is fallen from God, therefore "the finite is incapable of the divine." Modernism is older than Christianity.

The Stoics and the Neo-Platonists were modernists. They held to the fatal error that "man is good: his spirit is divine." And modernism, says Brunner (*Theology of Crisis*), is the antithesis of Christianity. All immanence-religions break down on the fact of sin—which is more than a "not-yet." In religion, God is the central thing, not man's emotions. The supreme heresy is to make man the measure of all things. The axiom from which the school starts is "the infinite qualitative difference between time and eternity." It is opposed to any kind of theology which finds God in inner experience or in history. Psychologism finds him in personal experience. Historism finds him in history. Both must go. God is radically different from that which we find *a priori* or *a posteriori*. He is unknown except as he reveals himself. (Pauck, *op. cit.*, p. 215.)

ii. *Human Brokenness.* An unbridgeable gulf separates man from God. For man to venture a way to God is pride, Promethean titanism. To build a theology on the religious data supplied by human experience (the way of Schleiermacher) is *hybris*, presumption. a. Religion fails. (Though it might be fairer to use the term "religiosity.") It brings man no solution of his problems. It only discovers to him his helplessness. b. The church fails. (Though it might be fairer to point out that, by the term in this connection, the school indicates the church as it is organized by fallible men.) Like this world, the church is under judgment. In it, revelation is turned from the eternal into the temporal. "The lightning of heaven is converted into a domestic slow-combustion stove." Herein is the sin of the church that it attempts to bring about the kingdom of God through the æsthetic cleverness of its worship. The church, like religion, is only the way of bringing home to man his fatal sickness. (Cf. *Hibbert Journal*, April, 1927; Barth's *Römerbrief*, and *Das Wort Gottes*.)

iii. *The Word of God.* The eternal breaks into time. The first gleam of hope is seen in the ethical consciousness of men; in Kant's categorical imperative. But this is an abstraction, not a Person. A command of God is a form of speech and implies an answer. "Conscience is the boundary-fence of immanence." (*Der Mittler*.) Yet Barth will not have it that in conscience man has apprehended God. Ethics has its place. It brings man into the deep despair and distress of finding that he is incapable of doing God's will. Yet God is not to be found in nature, in history, or in human experience of any kind, but only in revelation as it has reached us in the Bible. And the distinctive feature of the Bible is not its

ethics, nor its religion, nor its history, but the breaking through of the Divine into human life. As God is not to be made identical with the depths of the world (as by Otto), so he is not to be made identical with the depths of the human soul. "The ethic of conscience is based on the conception that God reveals himself above all in the sphere of the ethical, whereas God reveals himself supremely in the forgiveness of sins, and forgiveness of sins is not an ethical principle, but a breach with the reality of the ethical." "The right human thoughts about God," says Barth, "do not constitute the content of the Bible, but the right divine thoughts about men. Not how we should speak to God stands in the Bible, but what he says to us. The Word of God stands in the Bible." This Word of God finds its complete expression in Christ. "He is the breaking through and the appearing of the world of God in the profane life." (*Das Wort Gottes*.) Barth admits the paradox, the impossibility, of Christ; the miracle of the God-man in Jesus. Time is joined with eternity, man with the Altogether Other, only by an inexplicable mystery.

2. *Some Points of Criticism.* a. Consider Barth's attack on Historicism and Psychologism. May it not be that God has so made us that we *do* recognize when, in history or in the states of our own soul, we are in touch with God? We may be making man the measure of all things, but, on the other hand, Barth's depreciation of man is really distrust of man's Creator. The doctrine argues from the Unknown to the Known, but we cannot begin save from experience. This is not *hybris*, but commonsense! This school sets up, as an absolute standard against the relativity of knowledge, God apart from man, but that is a standard which we can never reach, without jumping off our own shadow. The standard is certainly God, but nevertheless it must somewhere include man, or it can mean nothing to man; it would be an *imposed* standard, which he could never understand; to conform to which would be submission to the magical. There is nothing sacred for man that is not mixed with man. In speaking of a transcendent God, Barth is speaking of a God of whom we can *never* know anything. The only God we can know is God as he enters into relationship with man, namely, "God in experience." It is not a God far off whom we know, but a God who has drawn near. That is one fact of which we can be certain. All the rest is mythology. Even the old phrase, "the finite is not capable of the infinite," is ambiguous. For it puts the "capacity" only a stage later. It does not seem to matter greatly which is true, 1. God

made man "capax infiniti," or 2. God, when he sends his revelation, *makes* man "capax infiniti." Brunner attempts to escape from this by his famous qualification, The transcendence of God is not cosmological, but epistemological. But this will not do. It means that our knowledge gives us a finding which is not true to fact! God as known is entirely different from God as he is. This makes all knowledge of God impossible. God's Word is made to speak of him what is not true, to say that he is transcendent when, in reality, he is immanent. But, most fatal of all, though we hear of infinite power and infinite wisdom, we miss the note of infinite love. Now, if there is one thing we can be sure of in our knowledge of God, it is that the unworthy may come into his presence.

b. That brings us to a word of criticism on "Human Brokenness." A doctrine is fallible which sees in the doing of good, and the turning from evil; in the keeping of the pure heart, in prayer, in the public worship of God, only human titanism and not the coming of God to man. If there is one certainty in human life it is that God is speaking in conscience. A conscience stabbed awake ("erschrockenes Gewissen") is God's voice; is man in touch with very God. And, because this is the Father of Jesus, the last word of the stricken conscience is *not* man's "Depart from me," but God's "Come unto Me." There are both words in the voice of conscience, and each is an essential part of the experience.

c. A note of hesitancy concerning the doctrine of "the Word of God." What is the criterion by which it may be recognized? "He scarcely explains," says Professor Mackintosh (*Expository Times*, 1926, p. 283), "why we believe one thing to be revelation rather than another; and when he tells us, truly enough, that faith affirms paradoxes, he offers no criterion to decide why it is only some paradoxes that are affirmed. We don't believe *every* paradox: not even Mr. Chesterton does." In spite of the protestations of the whole school, one is inclined to suspect that this severe doctrine of the Word of God *can* only end, logically, in verbal inspiration. If the mind of man plays *no* part, then only a mechanized inspiration, magically enforced, is left to us. Once more, Barth appears only to be pushing the difficulty one stage back. For the Bible is the record of those who *did* find God, where Barth says he is not to be found, in nature, in history, and in personal experience.

3. *The Theology of Karl Heim.* Heim is very frequently concerned with the question of Certainty. (One of his most famous books is *Faith*

as *Certainty—Glaubensgewissheit*.) His latest work is *Der evangelische Glaube und das Denken der Gegenwart*, a trilogy, of which the first part, *Glaube und Denken*, is chiefly concerned with epistemology. From this, and from his *Weltanschauung der Bibel*, a few paragraphs are here translated and abbreviated.

"Previous generations," says Heim, "in their struggle with life, were aware that they were wandering in a land that could be surveyed, in which it was possible for them in some measure to find their way by the aid of a map. We have the feeling of those who walk in mist. We see no more than a few steps ahead of us. This can be endured if we have a road under our feet, which will somehow lead us upwards, even though it be in wearisome curves and tortuous windings. . . ." At the least we must have someone going ahead—it may be with a wide space intervening—whom we may assume to be familiar with the direction, and to whom we can say,

"The way I know not, yet—Thou knowst it well!"

If everything fails, we can indeed live on when all goes well. But as soon as we have a difficult choice to make, as soon as we find that some overwhelming stroke has frustrated all our plans, and that we are torn from our safe moorings, then our confidence collapses. All world-views have to-day collapsed; have failed to give us this certainty which we need. From that we learn at least this, that, if there is certainty, we cannot have produced it ourselves. It must have its home in the beyond. (In ethics, for example, it is quite clear that no decision of *my own* could carry me to the point of sacrificing myself. Only a command which I have not laid upon myself can be obligatory for me when it threatens my existence.)

How do we become aware of this other Power which can command us? Not in the way by which science acquires its knowledge. Science is like the doctor, who can test the heart, the pulse, the respiration, but cannot see into the soul. It is our Christian conviction that we have another mode of knowing the Power which is over us. It frequently happens, in the case of some person, that we know him first only by his appearance, his step, his movements. Suddenly, by a look in his eyes, or a word spoken, we see his soul. There springs up between us a different relation altogether, a relation of "Trust" (*Vertrauen*) which abides.

Now let us see how these premises apply to our problem. Deliberately and confidently, Heim places Christ at the center of metaphysics.

Ethical systems and ethical problems are bound up with our attitude toward three entities—I, Thou, and the World. And our philosophy of these has hitherto been invalidated by spatial metaphors. Consider the relation between "I" and "Thou." They each exist in a world with which space has nothing to do. There may, therefore, be an immediate connection between them, which overleaps all spatial separation. There may be a secret unity behind the duality. Consider this as it applies to the relation of a man with Christ. In the pages of the New Testament we find that which shatters philosophy—a man who has now passed from the world, and yet is not only present, but is the master of the world's fate! Place the reality of Christ in the midst of our other ideas of Reality, and it shatters them. Logic must bow under Reality. He puts it elsewhere in another way. According to Spengler, the most intense problem presented to us by life is the problem of why we should be living "here" and "now," instead of in any other of the innumerable ages and places. In this he finds the most deadly manifestation of relativity. Both space and time being relative, my standpoint in space and time can have no absolute value in the universe. I am forced back on the conception of Fate (*Schicksal*)—that is, Chance, *Moirai*, *Heimarmene*, *Ananke*. (Cf., Heim: *Glaube und Leben*: Essay on "Der Schicksalgedanke als Ausdruck für das Suchen der Zeit.") My position, in this "here and now," is casual, not causal. And this, says Heim, we should have to admit, if we regarded solely my position. Any man's existence is relative. From his own standpoint alone he can be certain of nothing. Not even his values are absolute. But, when we set alongside his existence the existence of Christ, everything is changed. Our minds are necessarily involved in and infected by relativity. To pass beyond this and into the realm of the absolute, we have to come face to face with Christ. *He* is our *Schicksal*, our destiny, our "fate."

The person of Christ, then, is placed at the heart of metaphysics. Christianity is no longer an "organization intended to lighten the work of the police, or to make the workingman comfortable. It claims to be the one true interpretation of existence in space and time; it claims to give the genuine, eternal values of all transitory experience." (Cf., Inge, *Truth and Falsehood in Religion*, p. 129.)

From this standpoint, Heim is able to see revelation in history. The Barthians strive their hardest against "Historismus." History, they declare, is not merely the life-process of the Absolute. "History," says

Gogarten, "is not a shadow of eternity, but a place of decisions." Heim would agree, but with this caution, that every historical situation is in the hands of God. Before he makes each decision, a man is free, and, after it is made, he acknowledges it as his own free decision. Nevertheless, the situation, both before and after, is God's. The Divine is given in God's dealings with the historical situation left by man's action. God takes the situation, *with all the complications we have introduced*, and deals with it, still in love. This is not only revelation, but redemption, entering history, and this *is* revelation of the Divine. Creation is built on redemptive lines. We go farther: history too evolves on redemptive lines.

It will be seen that both Barth and Heim begin from the helplessness of man. But Heim recognizes in this sense of brokenness the advent of God, the soul's communion with him. Both make the central point the forgiveness of sins. But Barth makes this a sheer irrationality, the breaking-up of the ethical system. Heim makes it the point *par excellence* in which the soul touches God and gains knowledge of God. Barth refuses to count human religious experience as giving knowledge of God. But redemption *is* a human experience, and evidence for the nature of God. To Barth, the apprehension of God is only the apprehension of the apparent impossibility of redemption: with Heim, however, it is part of the redemptive process. Psychologism, like Historism, is for Heim a name for one of the ways of bringing a man face to face with his "fate," which is Christ.

With Barth, the unit of knowledge is the Divine alone. When we believe savingly, he is really compelled to say that it is Christ who believes for us. With Heim, the unit of religious experience is God *and* man. In a striking passage in *Die Weltanschauung der Bibel* Heim says, We can experience the redemptive love of Christ only through conscience—"it may be in a moment of mortal danger, when we feel that we are going to face God with all the burden of conscience heavy upon us. There is perhaps only one proof of Christian faith—the experience of thousands of Christian people in the hour of death, who take refuge in the work of Christ, and know that the accuser is silent."

As the best human analogy for that unassailable certainty between the believer and Christ, Heim takes the relationship of trust between husband and wife. It is of the same quality—"I am my Beloved's, and my Beloved is mine." It is a relation which is in possession of absolute certainty, because

it is a relation of trust. God trusts me beyond that which I now am: I trust him beyond that which I now see.

The ultimate datum of Christianity is a historical fact which transcends history. "In the long succession of historical personalities who rise up majestically like pillars of smoke, and then disappear in a higher stratum of air, leaving behind only the luster of memory, there is one sole exception. There is One who can say, 'I am with you alway.'" (Heim: *The New Divine Order*, English Translation, p. 114.) We attempt intellectually to examine his Person: we find that he is spiritually examining us. Nineteen centuries have bowed before that scrutiny. Stand outside the personal relationship with Jesus, and Christology is an insoluble problem. Cross the threshold, and it is the solution of all problems. "God is the God who sent Jesus. Given that as an axiom, faith can work out anything." (*Op. Cit.*, p. 107.)

Barth's fixed point, his absolute, is revelation, God breaking through, God's Word. But he is hampered by the fact that we cannot know when it is revelation. Heim's fixed point is that "Fate," "Destiny," which is the meeting of a man with Christ.

Both theologians take their starting-point from the challenge of Spengler and the other relativists. Spengler's might be called *the horizontal theory*. Here there is *no* fixed point. One man's center is for another only the horizon. All is a level plain. All values are equally valueless.

Barth's may be called *the vertical theory*. God comes straight down from above. The eternal breaks through into the temporal.

Then Heim's may be called *the Bethel theory*. "Behold a ladder set up on the earth, and the top of it reached to heaven: and behold the angels of God ascending and descending on it." There is traffic between earth and heaven. This is not *hybris*, pride, presumption, Titanism. It is simply that God has made us so. We have to accept it in humility and thanksgiving. It would be wrong to ignore this, that in the relationship described by the words "en Christo" there is offered to us that viewpoint which the relativist denies to be possible, the non-temporal, non-spatial, universal, and, in so far, omniscient. God breaking through is the *only* God we know. The Word from which we must begin is the Word made flesh.

For this reason it appears that the oft-reiterated definition of faith given by Dean Inge is wrong—"Faith is an experiment which ends in an

experience." The truth is rather that we begin with an experience. "Thy love unknown hath broken every barrier down." This means that the real creed of the Christian believer is the prayer uttered in the moment of experience. It is not surprising that the experience defies creedal expression. The "unio Mystica" is a momentary thing, but it is a living thing. To dissect it; to ask reasons for it; is to destroy the life and to alter it. Yet in it is to be found absolute certainty.

"It is always wrong," it has been said (Clifford, quoted in Galloway: *Faith and Reason in Religion*, p. 9), "to believe anything on insufficient evidence." But the question at once arises, What is to be counted as evidence? The psychological ground of confident action is rarely to be found in reason. Professor John Baillie quotes happily from Jeremy Taylor—men "were sure of the thing, when they were not sure of the argument." (*And the Life Everlasting*, p. 86.)

In the realm of metaphysics, confidence in any judgment is made to rest on that which is not purely rational. To take two broadly contrasted types of theory—Idealism takes the leap of faith in believing that the mind is self-authenticating: Realism also moves *per saltum* by its affirmation that appearance and reality correspond. In each case it is a necessary leap. And the leap is no less certain than the ratiocination, in all the course of which it is involved. Once more, certainty belongs, not to the process, but to the hidden order by which the process is sustained.

In ethics we find the same. The ethical decision is very different from subsequent reasoning about the decision. It is self-authenticating. A like distinction is rightly drawn between a religious experience and the dogma in which it may be enshrined.

Saving truth is manifested in, and preserved by the community. To his final revelation in the Person of Christ, God adds a personal assurance of its truth to every sincere believer. Nevertheless that assurance comes in the way by which it came to the original believers and by the same means of grace, including the community, the Word, and conscience.

To sum up: 1. *Epistemologically*. The Reality which we are endeavoring to apprehend is *personal*, and is searching for us: we are so made as to be capable of apprehending it, and only as we so apprehend, do we ourselves become real.

2. *In More Religious Terminology*. The Certainty being that of a personal relationship, we can say, with Augustine, "O Thou Good Omnip-

otent, who so carest for every one of us, as if Thou caredst for him alone, and so for all, as if they were but one!" Our "interest" in the Cross of Christ is intimate and personal.

3. *Practically.* "For men who pray, the history of the world when seen from within is Will. . . . Miracle is the victory of God in this strife of spiritual powers. Everyone who prays knows that this victory is possible at any moment and in any situation." (Heim: *New Divine Order*, English Translation, p. 50.)

4. *Homiletically.* The appeal in preaching, whether it be to reason, to imagination, or to the ethical will, is null and void if it does not first lead toward a closer communion with Christ. Revelation being personal and incommunicable, it is possible for the preacher to come between the convert and God. There may be times when he is best left alone—with God.

The word "Certainty" perhaps best expresses this conclusion, for the word has two sides. It is, first, convincing truth, and, second, personal conviction. Only from truth that is certain can we produce certainty about the truth. We preach for a verdict, urgently, as dying unto dying men. And we are able so to preach only because we can say, "It pleased God to reveal his Son in me."

Karl Marx and Friedrich Nietzsche¹

A Study of Ways of Salvation

GEORGE W. RICHARDS

WHAT is there between Marx and Nietzsche? Much in every way; nothing in any way. In the wake of this twofold answer, I shall discuss the agreement and the difference of the two men, with a concluding criticism of each. I concede without argument that neither of them would turn in his grave if by any chance he would learn that I disagreed with him.

They were antagonists not through personal encounter, for they never met, but in their fundamental premises and conclusions, which are diametrically opposed and beyond all possibility of reconciliation. It is not probable that Marx read the writings of Nietzsche, for they were like a strange planet that swept beyond the reach of his vision and interest. It is far more plausible that Nietzsche read articles of Marx in the *Rheinische Zeitung*, the *Communist Manifesto* of 1848, and the first volume of *Kapital*, 1867. Whether or not they met personally or read each other's writings, we may be certain that they were at heart mortal opponents, each a foeman worthy of the other's steel. Both had the trait in the blood of ruthless, fanatical concentration on a definite ideal for which they fought with equal determination, rising in revolt against man as he is and casting Promethean defiance into the teeth of all gods as they have been or are.

I

Compare their birth and training. Marx and Nietzsche were children of the nineteenth century and direct heirs of the eighteenth with its philosophical theism which was content with a polite and non-committal belief in a supreme being, a last tribute of the Age of Reason to the ancestral religion of Jew and Christian. The active life of each belonged to different decades. When Nietzsche was born in 1844, Marx was a young man of twenty-six. Nietzsche lived fourteen years after Marx's death in 1875. Both were Germans. Marx, the son of Jewish parents,

¹In the preparation of this article I have made use of writings of Marx and Nietzsche, several expositions of their life and thought; but I am especially indebted for facts and certain interpretations of facts to *Karl Marx*, by E. H. Carr, 1934, and to *Friedrich Nietzsche*, by George B. Foster, 1931.

was born May 5, 1818, in Treves, a descendant of a long line of rabbis. His father practiced law. In 1824, when Karl was six years of age, the whole family received Christian baptism, the same year Heinrich Heine was converted. The motives were largely economic and social. If we may trust his biographer, the father of Karl can scarcely be said to have abjured Judaism, which he never professed, nor to have embraced Christianity, which he never believed. In addition to religious indifference, the family achieved national indifference to which the spirit of the times and the democratic trend in the Rhineland lent themselves. Mr. Carr says: "The one inheritance which Karl Marx may be said with certainty to have derived from his parents was an international outlook."

Nietzsche was born in 1844 in Prussian Saxony, where the monarchic and aristocratic spirit prevailed. His father was pastor of the village church. The son, Friedrich, the future apostle of Antichrist, was a scion of generations of ministers. In his boyhood he was bent on becoming a minister—his playmates dubbed him "parson." He was precocious, conscientious, earnest, proud. It is somewhat paradoxical that the boy who was hedged in by women companions—mother, sister, grandmother, two aunts—became the pronounced anti-feminist of his time. His sister, Elizabeth, turned into the chronicler of his life and the apologist of his philosophy.

Marx and Nietzsche were taught in German schools with the rigor and vigor of the masters and pupils of that period—Marx at the Gymnasium of Treves for five years; Nietzsche at the private Classical School of Pforta, where Novalis, Schlegel, and Fichte preceded him. Marx entered the University of Bonn as a student of law in 1835 at the age of seventeen. A year later he matriculated in Berlin. He submitted his doctor's thesis on "Democritus and Epicurus," in 1841, to the Faculty of Jena and received the degree of Doctor of Philosophy at twenty-three.

Nietzsche also entered the University of Bonn in 1864 at the age of twenty; enrolled as a student of philology and theology, discontinuing the latter at the end of the first semester. The next year, 1865, he followed his favorite professor of philology, Friedrich Ritschl (not Albrecht Ritschl, the theologian), to Leipzig. There he completed his academic work. Even before he was granted his doctor's degree, the University of Basel, Switzerland, elected him, at the recommendation of Ritschl, to the Chair of Classical Philology. Not yet twenty-five, he was one of the youngest

men ever chosen to a professorship *ordinarius* in a German or Swiss university. Ritschl wrote to the Basel Senate: "Nietzsche will be able to do anything he wants."

Marx and Nietzsche, in their student days, forsook the faith of their fathers. Strange to say, Marx, in his last year in the gymnasium, wrote an essay on church union with the lengthy title, "On the Union of the Faithful in Christ according to John 16. 14, portrayed in its Origin and Essence, in its unconditioned Necessity and in its Effects." The professor who reviewed it marked it as "a thoughtful, copious, and powerful presentation of the theme." Even at Berlin Marx attended lectures on divinity. But here, also, he joined the Doctor's Club, among whose leaders were Adolf Rutenberg, Bruno Bauer, and Friedrich Koeppen, men ten years older than he and radicals of the "young Hegelian" school. In this atmosphere Marx, in his views on religion, philosophy, and politics, took a sharp turn to the left. In the preface of his Doctor's thesis (he was then twenty-three) he wrote: "In a single word, I hate all gods." Henceforth he was a militant foe of the God of the contemporary bourgeois society.

Nietzsche, an offspring of generations of ministers, reared in the orthodox faith of the state church, writing in his diary while a boy at school, "May God always have me in his keeping," shows evidence of a wavering faith even at Pforta. He read Schiller, Hoelderlein, Byron, and books on higher criticism. At Bonn he drifted farther away from the religious moorings of his boyhood. He shocked and grieved his mother, when on Easter, 1865, he refused to partake of the Lord's Supper, as his custom was. A while later he wrote to his sister Elizabeth: "If you desire peace of soul and happiness, believe! If you want to be a disciple of truth, search!" His breach with Christianity was completed when he read Schopenhauer's *Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung*. When the youth became a man he wrote the bitterest and most biting invective against Christianity that was ever spoken or penned. To illustrate, the concluding paragraph of *The Antichrist* will suffice:

"I call Christianity the one great curse, the one great intrinsic depravity, the one great instinct of revenge, for which no means are venomous enough—I call it the one immortal blemish upon the human race."

II

Two young men of this sort enter active life, the one toward the

close of the first half; the other in the forepart of the second half, of the nineteenth century. Both had natural ability that allies them to genius, with an indefatigable zeal for work, limited only by their power of endurance, with an acknowledged mastery of science, art, and philosophy that qualified them for a doctorate in any European university; each was devoted without limit to a cause beyond himself, struggling with poverty while battling for ideals to the last gasp. Both are independent thinkers living apart from the multitudes, hampered by religious traditions, attacking without fear or favor the foundations of the existing moral, political, and social order, deeply sensitive of the futility of the struggle for life in the world as it is and of the need of a radical reconstruction of the world into what it ought to be, each offering a way of salvation; the way of each in direct opposition to the way of the other. The force of the impact on their generation is still felt in the mental vibrations and the social agitations of our time. Marx is dominant in Russia; Nietzsche is playing an important part in Germany and Italy.

They were born in an age pregnant with great possibilities. The time was ripe for their coming. Hegel died ten years before Marx entered the University of Bonn; and Hegel was the last of a quartet of German philosophers including Kant, Fichte, and Schelling. Schiller and Goethe were the stars in the classic period of German literature. Schleiermacher's "Discourses upon Religion," and the second edition of his *Glaubenslehre* were widely read. Strauss' *Life of Jesus*, Bruno Bauer's *Historical Criticism of the Synoptic Gospels*, and Ludwig Feuerbach's *The Essence of Christianity* appear in the fourth and fifth decades. Darwin's *Origin of Species* was published three years before Nietzsche's first book, *The Birth of Tragedy*, 1871. Comte's *Positive Philosophy* came from the press in 1853.

The Napoleonic era ended with the Peace of Vienna, which was followed by a reaction toward absolutism and Bourbonism throughout Europe. The young blood of the universities, especially in the Rhine lands and in the industrial towns and cities, was stirred to secret revolt by the vision and hope of a democratic state. The first evidence of class consciousness in the economic order and clashes here and there between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat appear like flashes on the horizon. The labor-saving machine, mass production, national and international corporations of capital, labor separated from the soil, organized, mobilized, selling its hands to the highest bidder, the utopian social theories of Robert Owen and the

Chartists in England, of Henry Saint Simon and Fourier in France, are the harbingers of a new era with new problems that require new solutions.

Such was the character of the world which Marx and Nietzsche faced and with which each grappled in his own way. With prodigious mental labor and travail of soul, they reached distinctive views of the world and of life—political, social, and moral. They were the disciples of epoch-making masters—Marx of Hegel; Nietzsche of Schopenhauer and Wagner; both later influenced by Darwin. Yet the creative genius of each would not permit him to remain a mere pupil and be bound by a book or a person. They became masters themselves, audaciously, if not viciously, turned against their teachers, and defiantly struck out upon new paths, each moving toward a point of the compass directly opposite that of the other. Yet neither could wholly divest himself of the ideas of his preceptors. For through all the writings of Marx one can trace the method of Hegel; and in his last stage Nietzsche was not free from Schopenhauer and Wagner, in spite of the biting and blistering words with which he denounced them.

III

When Marx left the university he was a brilliant young speculative philosopher of the Hegelian left. He clung to Hegel's radical method to disprove his conservative conclusions. By way of Strauss and Bruno Bauer he reached the materialistic views of Feuerbach's *Essence of Christianity*. Marx said Feuerbach stood Hegel on his head. For Feuerbach interprets the universe in terms not of an ideal absolute but of man, and interprets man in terms of matter. He put his premise into an arresting sentence, "Man ist was man isst"—man is what he eats. Man is not the image of a transcendent or immanent Supreme Being; but a creature of flesh and blood whose primary needs are food and drink, clothing and shelter—the necessities of physical life. Marx readily concluded that the legal and social institutions, not less than the religions and philosophy, of each age are the result of economic conditions. The system of production is the ultimate factor by which human relationships are determined. In the Introduction to his *Critique of Political Economy*, he makes the illuminating statement: "The mode of production of material subsistence conditions the social, political, and spiritual life-process in general. It is not the consciousness of men which determines their existence but on the contrary it is their social existence which determines their consciousness."

In his academic stage he was only groping after the controlling principle which he later applied to social conditions as they were in the mid-nineteenth century in Europe. Even as a candidate for the degree of doctor of philosophy, he was convinced that the primary issue was not political but religious.² The decisive question was, Did man make religion or did religion make man? True to his materialistic premise, he answered the former question in the affirmative. If it be granted that man made religion, then he can unmake it or, if need be, re-make it. He, therefore, had no need of God either as a transcendent person or as an immanent spirit. God and religion in his view were not an aid but a positive hindrance to man's welfare. To improve human conditions, social and economic conditions must be changed; and these change necessarily with the introduction of new modes of production, as, for example, the labor-saving machines and the ownership of the tools of labor upon which the modern industrial order is based.

In Paris, in 1843, the realistic conception of the causes and effects that prevail in the social life of men was re-enforced by Rousseau's romantic view of man. Rousseau assumed that character and conduct are the products of environment and that by changing the environment, by a return to nature, men can attain the perfection for which they are designed. This was the dream and hope of the utopian socialists in France and England who were prophetic forerunners of Marx.

To Hegel Marx owes the dialectic interpretation of history. It involves the evolution of one period out of a previous period and the emergence of the existing period into a new period, a kind of cosmic and historical rhythm, by way of thesis, antithesis, synthesis. To illustrate, each form of society is a thesis which begets its opposite, an anti-thesis. These two are in conflict until they blend in a syn-thesis, in which elements of the thesis and the anti-thesis continue, the characteristics of the anti-thesis predominating in the new order. Thus Feudalism begot its anti-thesis the Bourgeoisie, which came into power and destroyed Feudalism. The Bourgeoisie in turn produced its anti-thesis, the Proletariat, the workers of the world, which in time will destroy the thesis, that is, the Bourgeoisie; and then the final syn-thesis will come, the classless society in which the historical process reaches its goal—the reign of justice, peace, good-will, the social millennium. Lenin says: "Marx applied the philosophy of materialism not only

² Carr, p. 15 sq.

to the interpretation of nature but also of human society, showing that out of one set-up of social life, another higher one develops in consequence of the growth of productive forces; capitalism, for example, out of feudalism."³

IV

Our young aspiring speculative philosopher, in quest of "a foothold from which to survey the universe," was first brought face to face with the world, as it is outside of university halls, in the Rhineland. In 1842 a group of "young Hegelians" started the *Rheinische Zeitung*. Marx contributed articles and for a short time was editor. He now wrote on practical issues, ruthlessly attacked the Prussian government, declared war on society as well as on religion, denounced bitterly the press laws, marriage laws, and the prohibition of poor peasants from collecting dead wood for their fuel from state forests. He also attacked his former associates and monitors who fell behind in zeal for battle or who differed from him; among these were Bruno Bauer and Koeppen. The paper was suppressed in March, 1843. Marx, however, by his editorship had convinced the world of the brilliance of his intellect, his uncompromising courage, and his complete personal disinterestedness. After his short contact with the world as it was, he began to treat pure philosophy without a practical purpose with a shade of contempt.

When Marx left Germany for Paris he refused to be labeled as a "socialist" or "communist." Accused by a rival conservative paper of being a communist, he retorted that "while communism is a natural phenomenon in France or England, it can find no foothold among us," and added that "his studies hitherto had not allowed him to pass any judgment on the content of these French movements."

Lenin traces Marxism to three sources—German philosophy, French socialism, and English political economy. What did Marx receive in France? He came to Paris with his bride in 1843. Here he made new contacts with men and ideas. Though the Revolution was fifty years in the past, its spirit had not spent its force. The terms "Communism" and "Socialism" were in common use and persistent efforts were made to put their content into practice. Among the dreamers of a new world, the offspring of Rousseau, Saint-Simon and Fourier were outstanding. Their schemes were far more romantic than rational, too visionary to be practicable; for

³ Karl Marx, *Capital*, edited by Eastman, p. xxiii. Lenin's Essay.

they were not deep-rooted in philosophy and science. To the realistic Marx they appeared to be naïve and bootless attempts to better human conditions. He none the less is indebted to these utopian forerunners⁴ for two convictions which became permanent and formative in his thinking and action throughout his life: first, the laboring class is oppressed and wants to be freed; second, society, if it is to be saved, needs to be reorganized on an entirely different basis from that on which it has rested hitherto. These two ideas turned Marx not only into a socialist but also into a revolutionist.

In Paris, also, Marx modified the Hegelian idea of the state. Hegel made the state supreme and the individual in his corporate capacity merely a subject who exists for the state. In France society was put in place of the state; man was regarded as essentially a social animal for whom the state exists—not man for the state. These opposite notions of the state and society have continued for a century to furnish the key for understanding the fundamental difference between French and German political thinking. Marx accepted the French tradition and made society the fulcrum of his whole system. For the citizen according to Marxism is not the individual but the social man. Following this change in his political thought, Marx made a subtle modification of the materialism of Feuerbach. Feuerbach reversed Hegel's premise that consciousness determines being into the thesis that being determines consciousness. Marx went a step further and proposed the formula: "It is not the consciousness of man which determines his being, but his *social* being which determines his consciousness."

While Marx spent the greater portion of his life in London, where he wrote his master work, *Capital*, he came under the influence of English political economy when he was in Paris. He needed only a creative and organizing principle to co-ordinate and unify his ideas into a social system which in time he could proclaim to the world as the way of economic salvation. The person who served this purpose was Friedrich Engels, a born German, a business man residing in Manchester, England, destined to become the fidus Achates of Marx. He had read an article by Engels in the *Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher* in which the author proved that capital was only the accumulated product of labor, and that the division between capital and labor and the whole system of private property founded on it was an unnatural monstrosity.

From this idea Marx extracted the theory, then unknown in German

⁴ *Karl Marx*, by E. H. Carr, pp. 80-81.

political life and unfamiliar to German philosophers, that labor is the source of all wealth. From this proposition he drew the inference that capital is based on injustice and that the class-conscious proletariat must wage uncompromising war upon the capitalistic system until the classless society is established. The idea of the class-struggle, joined with the theory of society evolving from one stage to another by way of thesis, anti-thesis, and synthesis, became the key to the Marxian interpretation of history and the hope of the Marxian prophecy—a society without classes and without government by force; and one in which wealth shall be distributed according to the formula: "From each according to his abilities, to each according to his needs."

Thus the outlines of Marxism were complete. It included a metaphysics, a philosophy of history, a theory of economics, a political program, and a secular eschatology. For forty years, with prodigious labor, without sufficient means to support his wife and daughters, dependent largely upon his friend Engels for his living, he worked out his ideas—in the *Communist Manifesto* of 1848, in the *Capital* (in three volumes, volume one published in 1867), and in numerous articles in periodicals of Europe and America, in the organization of an international communist society, and a definite program of action to attain a classless social order.

Marx proposed a mode of operation as clear cut as his scheme of social reconstruction. He dismissed with contempt the utopian socialist trust in progress on the ground that man is inherently good, and when once delivered from the bondage of capitalism, he will advance by universal goodwill into a state of perfection. Marx was a prophet of hate, not of love. The workers of the world must be inspired with irresistible hate of their masters—a hatred rooted deeply in the conviction of the underlying injustice of the capitalistic system and the jealous resentment of the underdog. Class hatred was to be the driving force in the proletarian revolution—a hatred commensurate with the world-wide scope of the revolution.

"Love cannot redeem," writes Herwegh, "love cannot save us. Pronounce, O Hate, thy last judgment; break thou, O Hate, the chains. . . . Long enough have we loved; now at length we mean to hate."⁸

The first step in the program of the revolt is the violent seizure of political power, which is to be put to the service of economic ends. Three stages follow in rapid succession: 1. The disarming of the bourgeoisie;

⁸ Carr, p. 75.

2. The erection of a revolutionary terror to concentrate and shorten the hideous death agonies of the existing order; 3. The creation of a revolutionary army to force the communist program until all men and women and children will spontaneously live and labor in the classless society. In the final Armageddon, to be followed by a new heaven and a new earth, all the recognized forms and spheres of human life and action, politics, the family, religion, patriotism, and private property, must be made subservient to the one supreme purpose—social welfare of the workers of the world.

V

From the university as a student Nietzsche went to a university as a professor of classical philology. Thus he faced the world from a standpoint different from that of Marx, who became author, editor, social reformer. The decisive moment in Nietzsche's life was when, at the age of twenty-one, he bought in an antiquarian bookshop in Leipzig a copy of Schopenhauer's *Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung*. "My confidence in him," he wrote, "was instantly full and entire." What did Schopenhauer do for him? He revolutionized his outlook on life and finally separated him from Christianity. He taught him to see reality in its nakedness, with all its ugliness and its suffering. The world is assumed to be godless, chaotic, meaningless, goalless, controlled by an irrational blind will that drives us on into a futile search for peace and rest. Life is desire, and the desire, the will to live, in us is forever insatiable and unsatisfied. The good souls of the nineteenth century who believed in the dignity of man and in progress he considered dupes of superstition.

Accordingly in Nietzsche's first book, *The Birth of Tragedy Out of the Spirit of Music*, 1871, the keynote is in the following sentence: "Art supplies man with the necessary veil of illusion which is required for action; for the true knowledge of the awfulness and absurdity of existence kills action."

The way of escape from the misery and torment of an unsatisfiable desire for life, from the hopeless quest of peace and rest, is through the creation and the enjoyment of art—salvation by æsthetics. For art delivers one from the driving lash of the tyrannical will to live into the peace and joy of beatific vision; lifts man above himself and out of his pain, frees him from himself, makes him noble, good, and even holy. "Extinction of individuality and of will is the supreme goal of æsthetic gratification." One

has foretastes of the redemptive power of art, when for a brief moment one comes under the spell of a Greek sculpture, a da Vinci painting, a Wagnerian opera, or perhaps a modern movie.

In the first period of his life he was in full accord with Schopenhauer's view of life and way of salvation, with this difference, that he discovered in Richard Wagner and his music drama the supreme artist and the acme of art. He met Wagner in Leipzig, in 1868, and in a letter to his friend Rohde he refers to "the joy it was for me to hear him speak with such indescribable warmth of our master Schopenhauer—what a lot he owed to him and how he was the only philosopher who had recognized the essence of music."⁶ The first acquaintance ripened into friendship in Switzerland, where he frequently spent days and weeks with Wagner and Frau Cosima at Tribschen at the base of Mount Pilatus. He became intoxicated with the *Nibelungen*.

The æsthetic ideal of Schopenhauer he finds fulfilled in Wagner, who, also, believed that the artist, through his art, frees himself and his brothers from the torments and the torture of the will and of the illusion of life. For this Wagner named his house at Bayreuth *Wahnfried*—free from delusion.

These ideas are set forth in Nietzsche's three works of the first period: *The Birth of Tragedy*; *Thoughts Out of Season*; *Schopenhauer as Educator*.

Nietzsche entered the second period in his life when he was convinced that Wagner, the sovereign artist, betrayed and debased art in Parsifal by putting his genius at the service of the ideal of medieval Christianity, of Buddhism, of German patriotism, and departed from the life-affirming Greek ideal revived in the men of the Renaissance, humanists who could not forgive Christianity for causing the downfall of antique *Kultur*. In *The Birth of Tragedy*, Nietzsche attempted to fuse the music of Wagner with Greek art; and now that his master had turned from classicism to medievalism, he was deeply wounded and with wrath that flashed forked lightning he forsook and denounced his one-time bosom friend, adored artist, and the living embodiment of the philosophic spirit. This defection from Wagner, and we may add from Schopenhauer, is accounted for by the fact that Nietzsche more and more ceased to be a disciple and became an independent thinker; felt himself compelled by his own matured genius

⁶ Foster, p. 35.

to be true to himself. Of this he became fully conscious in 1874 when he began to lay the axe at the root of the tree of Wagnerian art. Their respective goals lay in different directions; Wagner turned ever more away from life; Nietzsche to life. Wagner believed that the deepest truths unveiled themselves only in art, in metaphysics, in religion; Nietzsche found refuge in scientific thought, purged of artistic, metaphysical and religious prepossessions, as the way to truth. Wagner became a mystic, Nietzsche a positivist. "The greatest event in my life," Nietzsche wrote later, "was a recovery. Wagner was only one of my diseases."

In the transition from the first to the second period he also broke with the fundamental hypotheses of Schopenhauer's whole system—the will as essence of the world, as the existence of a thing-in-itself, and his pessimistic conclusions: philosophic resignation, the exaltation of pity as the supreme virtue, and the annihilation of the will to live as the final aim of existence. In *Human, All Too-Human* he sounded a new note, declaring his deliverance from his friends and teachers and absolute loyalty to his own independent spirit. Of this book he said: "I thereby freed myself from all that did not belong to my nature; it is the monument of a crisis."

When he entered into the scientific period of his life, he rejects the ideal of the artist and pursues the way of the scientist. Through historical and natural science man is to free himself. He became a sober empiricist. His idols now are not Schopenhauer and Wagner but Socrates and Voltaire; he adored what he once burned; and he burned what he once adored. The Greek and the French philosopher sought victory in life through the intellect; through truth they sought the way to the good. Nietzsche relinquished pessimism and shared the optimism of the scientists. About this time he read Darwin, whose theory of the struggle for life and the survival of the fittest re-enforced the growing conviction that the superman was the crown of history.

In the third stage of his life, Nietzsche reverses himself, renounces science and philosophy, with significant modifications returns to Schopenhauer's doctrine of the will and his conception of a godless and meaningless world. He tries hard to look at nature without reading into it finality on the one hand or purpose on the other. In other words, Nietzsche surrenders the intellectualism of his second period and reverts to voluntarism, the supremacy of the will; but the will is no longer, as with Schopenhauer, the blind insatiable desire to live, the source of the evil and misery of man

from which he is to be delivered through the exercise of pity, through asceticism and the denial of the will to live. It is now the will to power, affirming life, the goodness, freshness, and joy of life, the power of the strong over the weak, the ability to struggle for life and the survival of the fittest. He does not forsake art, but gives it new values. For Schopenhauer, as at first for Nietzsche, art was a sedative, an escape from the tyranny of the will to live; in Nietzsche's last period art is a stimulant that strengthens the will to power. The brooding pessimist turns into a buoyant optimist. His voice is the voice of Nietzsche but his hands are the hands of Darwin.

Peter Gast, his friend and disciple, writes:

"Nietzsche saw in nature, not the 'will to life' (Schopenhauer), but a will to the exaltation of life; not the 'struggle for existence' (Darwin), but the struggle for a nobler, stronger existence; not the 'instinct of self-preservation' (Spinoza), but the instinct of self-augmentation; not 'love and strife' (Empedocles), but the contest for victory and supremacy."

When he was recuperating in the heights of Sils-Maria, he was possessed and oppressed by the theory of eternal recurrence; that is, the continuous coming and going of the ages without progress toward a goal, without realization of a purpose. But the sun broke through the gloom when in 1883 he wrote his most cheerful book, *Joyful Wisdom*, a book of aphorisms. It throbs with a vigorous, hopeful, life-affirming spirit. Beyond the overhanging cloud he caught the vision of the Superman, who is none other than *Zarathustra*, the title of a book written in 1883-4. Zarathustra is the key to the riddle of the universe and of the mystery of life, the goal of the process of nature and the compelling motive of human action, the hope of the race.

"I teach you the Superman. Man is something that is to be surpassed. What have you done to surpass man? All beings hitherto have created something beyond themselves, and ye want to be the ebb of that great tide, and would rather go back to the beast than surpass man? . . . The Superman is the meaning of the earth. Let your *will* say: The Superman shall be the meaning of the earth, and believe not those who speak unto you of super-earthly hopes!"⁷ Nietzsche called *Zarathustra* the deepest book and the greatest gift that has ever been bestowed upon mankind.

The heart of Nietzsche's final conception of the meaning and outcome

⁷ Foster, p. 13.

of human existence is in the sentence: "All the gods are dead; now let us resolve that the Superman shall live." He anticipates this statement in *Schopenhauer as an Educator*: "Humanity must constantly labor to produce great individuals—this is its task and no other." His premise was atheism; and with the death of the gods and the extinction of his faith all existing values were abolished. In their place he put the free values of creative personalities who reach their consummation in the Superman. For the Superman was to be more than a ruthless destroyer of old values; the creator of new values. Men of this sort have appeared only as happy accidents, not by design and forethought, in different parts of the earth and from widely different civilizations; they were the prophetic forerunners of Zarathustra that is to be. Nietzsche uses the term in two senses: now as an ideal human being and then as a species of men above the present man.

From the viewpoint of evolution, man must produce some one beyond himself if he is true to the basic force of the universe. As the common man is the super-ape, so Zarathustra is the Superman. Yet men must not trust blindly in a natural process, in a personal providence, or in any sort of immanent deterministic and automatic forces. Man alone, of all species, has a mind to discern the meaning of the process about, above, and in him; he alone has the will to direct the upward trend toward a definite goal. He must become an intelligent and voluntary coworker with nature to produce nature's crown, Zarathustra. "Therefore let your will say: The Superman shall be the meaning of the earth." Here is the basis of Nietzschean ethic; the way of escape from degeneracy is the way of the Superman.

On the one hand obstacles to the rise of the Superman must be demolished. Our present conventional order of life must be renounced, and denounced without fear or pity. Reason, virtue, justice, mercy, the sense of sin, God, religion, good, evil, democracy, socialism, communism, feminism, science which glorifies the material at the expense of the ideal and offers only a mediocre culture, the moral law which is nothing else than the expression of the passions and prejudices of slaves and the inferior classes—all these must be destroyed that the Superman may come.

Yea, at the root of the universe there is only force, not love; only the sword, not the cross.

On the other hand, man must affirm life in its totality, its good and its evil, peace and war, joy and sorrow, all cruelty which is necessarily a part

of the struggle for life. One must say yes to fate, even the hardest fate. Heroic natures, Master-men, do not whine in their misery; they fight on with laughter. In Zarathustra he writes: "And if your hardness cannot shine forth and cut and crush, how can ye hope to—triumph with me? . . . All creators are hard. And it must be a great joy to you to mold the face of centuries as if it were war. . . . This new table, O my brethren, I write above you: *Become hard!*"⁸

That he may attain the life of beauty, purity and symmetry of form, the force and strength of the unrestrained and immoral Will to Power, the Superman will not only wound and kill but he will be wounded and killed—life at any price, life with all its woes and joys and hopes and fears, worshiped, glorified, cultivated. His ideal was distinctly pagan, Hellenic, Roman, Neronian, anti-Christian, and anti-democratic.

VI

What shall we say of these men? They loom up in the field of our vision like two monstrous giants who lay violent hands on everything that has been considered holy and righteous in the civilization and culture of three millenniums; on all that men have revered and loved, have lived, labored, and died for. We stand with fear and trembling before them. Anti-Christ they are because they militantly oppose the ultimate premise, the present motives, and the final conclusions of Christianity.

Yet Marx and Nietzsche are prophets, also, who with prophetic audacity stalk across the paths of nations preaching repentance and hope. We stand in awe and perplexity before them. They bring men to judgment in the light of their vision, they diagnose man's disease, they tell man that he is not what he ought to be and what he can be. Man must be surpassed. Marx sees man as a social being struggling vainly for a bare existence, underprivileged, oppressed, enslaved. He needs deliverance not primarily from himself but from his task-masters. Nietzsche sees man as a mass of individuals in bondage to themselves, "a shame and humiliation," anæmic, listless, submissive, cringing, degenerating, deaf to the call of the cosmos to throw off his lethargy, rise above himself and become a superior individual or species. Each, in his way of deliverance, fails to do justice to the common man. Marx sacrifices the freedom of personality to the collective society. Nietzsche sacrifices the social nature of man to the autocratic indi-

⁸ Foster, p. 209.

vidual. For Nietzsche the common man has value only so far as he serves to produce the Superman. For Marx human individuality, as well as freedom, is a heritage of the bourgeois world; personality has value only so far as it serves the collective society.

Both are prophets of consuming fire—only through death can man find life; through war can he win peace; through destruction, reach his destiny. Each justifies the means by the end; is Machiavellian, not Christian, in the strategy of his warfare; professes to live beyond good and evil. Both felt themselves in tune with the basal forces of nature and history. The one was convinced that the end of nature, the meaning and motive of human life, was the classless society; the other, the Superman.

Both saw man not *sub specie æternitatis*, in the form of eternity, but *sub specie temporis*, in the form of time. The whole of life is finite and temporal. Men, therefore, are to banish forever God and eternity from their thinking, their aspiration, and their endeavors. Instead of laboring for the satisfaction of human needs, that men's spiritual destiny may be achieved, they are to spend themselves and to be spent for the accumulation of material power, however refined its form may be, for prestige and wealth. Marx is what Jesus would have become if he had yielded to the first temptation and made bread out of stone; Nietzsche is what Jesus would have become if he would have yielded to the third temptation—fallen down and worshiped the Tempter, the spirit of the world.

Both have in essence the same metaphysics. The ultimate being in the universe is force, not love. Both profess to be of the earth earthy. As the first cause, so is the last fact—matter. Men live in the power of that by which they were created; if by force, they live, labor, and die by force, if by love, they will ultimately live, labor, and conquer by love. They that live by the sword will perish by the sword; they that live by love, will triumph by love in the fulness of life.

Both Marx and Nietzsche are the last product of humanism; at the same time ardent heralds of a way of salvation from the bankruptcy of humanism which culminated after their time in the World War.

The humanists of the Renaissance were nominally Christian; Leonardo, Michel Angelo, Raphael, lived on the religious heritage of their medieval fathers. As this world absorbed the whole of man's interest, and he discovered it to be a thrillingly interesting world, God was gradually pushed from the center to the circumference of life. The gradations in the descent

from God in Christ to God in nature and man, the ground of the universe, are unmistakably clear. In the wake of Christianity came, successively, philosophic theism, a patronizing scientific agnosticism, an indifferent atheism, to be followed by a violently militant ungodliness.

The descending gradations in the conception of man run parallel to the gradations in the idea of God. Man at first found God revealed in Christ—his Saviour and Lord; then he discovered God for himself in the order of the world and in the mind of man, as the creator, upholder, and judge, whose thoughts man is to think and whose will he is to do. His destiny is in eternity. With the reduction of God to an immanent force which works without purpose in this cosmic mechanism evolved from a chaotic waste and void, man himself becomes an impersonal part of nature, able, however, with intelligent volition to renounce God and to put his trust and love and hope wholly in himself and in his kind. Man becomes more and more self-sufficient and God-defiant. Like the plants of the garden and the beasts of the field, he lives, toils, and procreates after his kind. His primary interest is gradually shifted from the beautiful, the true, and the good, to the useful and the profitable, from a soulful organism to a soulless mechanism, from the making of free personalities to the manufacture of marketable things, from the freedom with which Christ makes men free to the slavery of the machine.

This is the price we have paid for the triumph of natural science—the enthronement of the machine, the technique of mass production, and the making of colossal profits.

Across the heavens above us is written the decisive question asked in the Epistle of James, "What is your life?" The Western world has given four answers; the fifth, that of Buddha, comes from the East. They are Jesus and the rule of God; Plato and the rule of wisdom-loving kings; Marx and the rule of the workers of the world; Nietzsche and the rule of the Superman.

Jesus and Plato are kindred spirits, as far removed from Marx and Nietzsche as the East is from the West. The Fathers of the ancient church found their way to Christ through Plato and proclaimed the Kingdom of God as the fulfillment of the Ideal Republic. Jesus was a theistic humanist, saw man in God, came to man through God, and brought men back to God. Plato saw God in man, approached God through man, and directed men toward God.

Marx and Nietzsche were secular humanists—the one a materialist who saw man through matter, the other an idealist who saw man through mind. Each denied the survival of personality and affirmed continuity of the individual only through the species, either in the form of the communist society or of the race of Supermen. Neither Marx nor Nietzsche does justice to the whole life of man—man as matter and mind. The one submerges the individual man in the classless society; the other suppresses the social man in the excessive individualism of the Superman.

Jesus alone proclaimed the gospel of the complete life. He taught and practiced what he said, that men live by bread but not by bread alone; they live by the word of God but not by the word of God alone. They need God and bread; he showed them God and gave them bread. He alone had brought life and immortality to light; begot a lively hope in men which will be consummated in a fellowship of persons in which each is independent of the other through faith, in which each is servant of the other through love.

I still prefer Jesus to Plato as I prefer Plato to Marx and Nietzsche. In conclusion I shall quote what I have written elsewhere: "The new viewpoint of Jesus was the kingdom of God. He sought to promote the life of God in men and the life of men in God. In other words, he lived, and desired others to live, the timeless and the spaceless life, the eternal life. His criterion of values was not material or temporal, not utilitarian or hedonistic. It was spiritual and ethical and had for its end the making of personality—a quality of life such as he lived. In viewpoint and in disposition he differed from the materialist, the egoist, the philosopher, the artist, the statesman, the churchman, the laborer, the capitalist. Each of these views men and things from a different angle and measures their value by the extent in which they serve his purposes. The egoist seeks his personal advantage, the philosopher the unifying principle of the universe, the artist the idea of the beautiful, the statesman the prosperity of the state, the ecclesiastic the welfare of the church, capitalist and laborer each his own aggrandizement. Jesus lived wholly and only for the reign of God, of holy love, in human life."⁹

In him the eternally divine of Plato, the essentially human of Marx and Nietzsche, and the aspirations and needs of the unfathomed depths of the soul of the common man will ultimately be realized and satisfied.

⁹ *Beyond Fundamentalism and Modernism*, pp. 110-111.

Can Liberalism Survive?

HENRY SLOANE COFFIN

I

BY "liberalism" is meant that spirit which reveres truth supremely, and therefore craves freedom to ascertain, to discuss, to publish and to pursue that which is believed to be true, and seeks fellowship in its discovery.

It is a spirit which had classic embodiment among the citizens of Athens in the days of Plato and Aristotle, with Socrates as its protomartyr. Truth stood first in the Greek trinity along with beauty and righteousness. Contemporaneously liberalism found expression in Israel among those to whom wisdom was the principal thing, and who sought the way of understanding. It appeared later in Rome in some of the writings of men who, like Cicero, were influenced by Greek thought. It is congruous with the mind of the central Figure of the gospels, whose God is love; and it breathes in many of the utterances of his earliest interpreters. Its authentic sons are those who rejoice with the truth, and speak it in love, commending themselves to men's consciences. Christianity added to modern liberalism reverence for personality and the desire for universal fellowship.

Inasmuch as liberalism is a spirit, not a system of ideas or body of principles, it has to be reborn and incarnate in each generation. It is passed on as seed, and the seed must find appropriate soil, germinate, grow and blossom. Its form, flower and fruit differ with varying times. There have been epochs in which the seed seemed to lie dormant, and epochs in which it sprang up and produced a numerous company of truth-seeking freemen. Nor are liberals to be confused with innovators: they are devotees of truth whether old or new.

Classic liberalism was recovered in the Renaissance, where it is seen sometimes in the questioning minds of scientists like Leonardo da Vinci and Galileo, and again in devout Humanists like Erasmus and Colet and Sir Thomas More. The Protestant Reformation, with its emphasis upon the right of judgment of the individual in religion, proved a strong ally, although few of the Reformers exemplified it. In the stormy Seventeenth

Century it had a voice in Milton's *Areopagitica*, and in the Cambridge Platonists—Benjamin Whichcote, Ralph Cudworth, Henry More and their associates. It grew in adherents and became an increasing force in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth centuries, where its exponents were rebels against the current orthodoxy of the churches and against absolutist monarchs. Among them were philosophers, scientists and advocates of the rights of the common people. Freedom of conscience was the battle-cry in religion, democracy the slogan in politics. Tolerance, formerly a vice, became a lauded virtue. The rights of free speech, free press and free assembly were enacted in legislation. Where liberalism became dominant in the *ethos* of a people, as in Britain, public criticism and dissent were permitted to go almost any lengths. Confidence in the justice and intrinsic worth of existing institutions banished fear of opposition and attack. In education, under the leadership of the German universities, liberty of teaching became a recognized axiom.

Liberalism's chief conflicts were waged with traditionalism in society, with autocracy and aristocracy in government, with slavery and oppression in the treatment of weaker by stronger peoples, and with ecclesiastical dogmatism in religion. And on all these fronts it won signal victories.

II

In the realm of economics, however, it carried on a less certain warfare. Against the restrictions and monopolies in trade fostered by governments, Nineteenth-Century liberals were devotees of *laissez faire*. Liberalism is certainly not inextricably bound up with the economic *mores* which prevailed in lands affected by the industrial revolution, and somewhat loosely labeled capitalistic; but *laissez faire* was in its inception a protest in the name of freedom. Cobden and Bright fought nobly in its name for free trade between nations, and triumphed for two generations in Britain. But in most other lands their doctrine did not find so favorable a soil. Liberals have often been sharp critics of the developments of capitalism; but few of them have been penetrating in their analyses of the current economic system. Although they believed in democracy in politics, they did not consider it relevant in industry and commerce. In democratic lands business was organized on autocratic lines in the interest of efficiency. Nor did most liberals see the dangers to human personality in the fierce industrial struggle brought on by the evolution of machinery and mass production.

In the later years of the Nineteenth and the first decades of the Twentieth centuries capitalism evolved ever larger units in finance, in manufacture, in transportation, and other public utilities, in chain retail stores, and in chain newspapers. The controllers of these huge enterprises came to possess more power than the government; indeed they made and unmade governments, and upset liberalism's prized democracy. Equal opportunity for all patently no longer existed. This was not only the case with individuals, but with whole peoples. The need of the leading industrial nations for raw materials and new markets drove them to imperialism; and liberalism, while protesting, made only fitful attempts to extend its cherished civic rights and privileges to so-called backward peoples. These attempts were unhappily often ill-conceived and pathetically futile—witness the hasty enfranchisement of illiterate negroes after the Civil War, and the crude imitations of Anglo-Saxon representative government set up in the republics of Central and Southern America. Liberals have been sentimental rather than realistic. Their incapacity to recognize the perils to their cause in some of the trends of economic development and to embody their own ideals in the industrial system has helped to bring about their present weakness.

III

Liberalism's great aversion has been war. Believing in truth it has been convinced that appeals to brute force bring no satisfactory solutions. It has stood for a minimum of force in the maintenance of public order. In its eyes the best government is that which exercises least coercion over the lives of its citizens. Hence it has been wary of all proposals for collective control, lest these destroy initiative, curtail liberty and impede progress. As truth knows no frontiers, liberalism has never been nationalistic. It has espoused the cause of international justice and goodwill. It has constantly striven to adjust internal strife and international disagreements by peaceful means. How could it do otherwise with its faith in truth to be ascertained by fellowship in understanding?

But its blindness to its inadequate application of its own principles to the economic sphere rendered it ineffective in preventing the most tragic war in history, in which the protagonists were the nations in whom its spirit was most alive. This is not to place all the combatants in the war on an equality in their attitude toward freedom. The watchwords of the Allies,

particularly after the United States became associated with them and the issues were phrased by a typical spokesman of liberalism, Woodrow Wilson, are classic utterances of its spirit. Unfortunately they did not voice the real forces which they professed to represent, and the victory proved no triumph for liberalism. On the contrary it paved the way for its swift collapse and threatened destruction.

It was a noteworthy instance of liberalism's inability to discern economic facts which made it fancy that any war could make "a world safe for democracy." War brings poverty, and liberalism has only flourished where there is at least basic economic security and opportunity. A period of widespread unemployment and destitution did not provide the soil in which its seed could germinate.

IV

In the post-war scene two forces have arisen which oppose liberalism and are resolved to crush it—communism and fascism. Both regard it as naïve, if not deliberately hypocritical, because it does not see its own inconsistencies. Both, although with antagonistic sympathies, deride it as weak in permitting a force, like Marxism, to grow up in its midst, without realizing that it is allowing its own existence to be put in jeopardy. Both hold in contempt its faith in the might of self-evidencing truth and its regard for freedom in discussion and teaching. Both despise its aversion to the employment of force as a sign of its lack of virility. Both ruthlessly suppress its loved institutions of representative government, free press, free speech and free assembly, as soon as they have finished using them for their own purposes. Both scorn liberty of conscience; for with both the individual is subordinated to the nation or to the class, and his conscience must be made to conform to the mass-mind. Both are militaristic imperialisms—fascism an imperialism of the middle class, communism an imperialism of the proletariat. Both erect dictatorships, surrounding the leader with a mystic halo, or regarding him as the necessary instrument for procuring the dominance of the messianic working-class.

To the liberal both movements seem reactionary: they are returns to tribalism. Both place the group above personality, which is liberalism's chief goal. They represent a new slavery. The older slavery meant the control of one individual by another for the latter's profit; and against this liberalism protested in the name of the sanctity of human beings. The newer

slavery substitutes ownership by the state or by economic society, and it is no less slavery because a man is himself part of the tyrannical group—a helpless unit in it. Such despotic control may make for social equality, but it is at the cost of personality. Liberalism's aim has been the production of free and independent man. State and economic systems are judged by the chances they afford men to attain their full stature. Fascism and communism, and for that matter some forms of socialism, seem a return to the despotism of the clan. They appear retrograde movements, leading back to lower stages in human development, for to the eyes of the liberal the gradual emergence of free persons is one of the most priceless achievements of history. Hence the presence in power of these two movements endangers all which liberalism holds most dear.

This is not the first time that liberalism has faced enemies which sought its life. Ancient despots, modern kings, czars and popes, revolutionary mobs in the hands of demagogues, have again and again menaced it. It has led a precarious existence throughout the centuries. But it has been stunned by this sudden and unexpected onslaught, just when it seemed to have reached its supremacy in the minds and consciences of intelligent men. How is it to meet this stupendous assault?

If in its tolerance it suffers either a communist or a fascist movement to develop, may it not be permitting its own doom in a Britain or a France, a Scandinavia or an America? Liberalism has had a longer and a wider sway in these lands than in Italy or Germany or semi-barbarous Russia. It has entered more deeply into the very texture of the national character. A love of freedom and a dislike of regimentation have had time to grow and become vigorous. But is there any guarantee that a crisis will not push these peoples to try desperate courses which extinguish freedom? When the frenzied emotionalism of the War is remembered, who can be confident? Is not the United States, with its heterogeneous population, many of whom are without the traditions whence sprang our institutions, and with groups and individuals in almost all communities who frequently resort to violence, peculiarly susceptible to these anti-liberal infections? Ought we to suffer propaganda for the abolition of our forms of government and the prized institutions of our society to be carried on? Is liberalism to sit by, and in deference to its regard for freedom, allow deliberate preparations for its own slaughter?

But suppose it forbids such propaganda (and efforts have been put

forth recently to prohibit both communism and fascism), will not liberalism be disloyal to its faith in the power of truth and its devotion to freedom? When it embarks upon a course of repression, what does it do to itself? Is its only escape from murder suicide? Are these its sole alternatives—destruction at the hands of implacable foes or self-destruction?

V

Thus far this discussion has dealt with the political scene; but liberalism confronts similar perils in the Church. Militant fundamentalism and militant social radicalism (even when it claims the Christian name) are twins in faith, in temper and in method. Both hate and despise liberalism. They occasionally employ its watchwords and insist on freedom for their own ends, while they are minorities. But at heart both are impatient of freedom to seek and speak truth, because both believe they already possess it in absolutist form. Both employ whatever means at their command to impose their views. Both are intolerant of those who disagree with them. Why should they consider the deluded who do not share their orthodoxies? They usually impute sinister motives for such dissent. Fundamentalists think liberals are hugging secret sins; social radicals consider them economically conditioned, and class-bound. In either case liberals stain the purity of the true Church and should be purged out. Both are contemptuous of the courtesies of which liberalism makes much. Both have atrocious manners. Fundamentalists consider amenities the veneer of pagans, and social radicals deem them the fopperies of the long outmoded gentleman—graces of the defunct aristocrat prized by the imitative bourgeois. Both give no quarter in battle. Their gods are jealous gods, and liberals are their Canaanites to be exterminated. Can liberalism afford, once its eyes are open to the aim of these enemies, to let either group grow up within the Church, knowing that if either gains control of the organization, its power will be employed to eradicate liberalism and to enforce conformity with its own theological or economic dogma?

But suppose liberalism proceeds to coercive measures, suppose it resorts to ecclesiastical discipline and deposes rebellious fundamentalists or destructive radicals from their offices, what becomes of liberalism? Waiving for a moment the publicity which representatives of both these groups passionately crave, and which common sense should try not to accord them, the most serious danger lies in the injury liberalism may inflict on itself by

turning to methods of suppression. A muzzling or disciplining liberalism denatures itself. Even the cantankerous and intolerant may have contributions to make to the understanding of truth. The very advocacy of error has helped bring truth to light. Liberalism may learn from its most antagonistic critics. To be sure, the Church is not a society designed to include everybody; but it is the Body of Christ; and so long as anyone professes loyalty to Him, one hesitates to exclude him from membership or even from leadership in the Church, however unchristlike the treatment he proposes for his brethren.

One may protest that this is going too far. Why tolerate in the name of liberalism those who have no intention of tolerating any liberal? Among Christians the answer must be: If ye tolerate the tolerant only, what thank have ye? Do not sinners the same? But if ye grant freedom to the abusive and intolerant, ye are sons of your Father and keep dominant in His Church the love which is His life in her. And if truth and love be what God is, then in remaining loyal to them, despite all provocation, we are taking the course which leads to victory. He who fights against them, fights against God; he who sides with them, has God's universe behind him. God can be trusted to care for His Church through them who are loyal to Him.

VI

In the state, where legal processes based on force are the normal method of government, the issue is not so easily settled. In Germany the contenders for orderly freedom in the Church have succeeded far better than the champions of orderly freedom in the civil state. Political liberalism must be more realistic in facing the forces in our contemporary society, and much more thorough-going in carrying out its own principles. It is idle to talk of the freedom of men and women who lack security in their livelihood. They do not prize a freedom which offers them liberty to starve. Once a reasonable subsistence for them and theirs is assured, freedom becomes a desired boon. To guarantee every man the right to work, and to guarantee him if he is willing to work a basic living, does not involve the abolition of capitalism. To be sure, as has been said, liberalism existed prior to capitalism, and is certainly not linked with it. Complete *laissez faire* is nowhere practiced to-day, and cannot be. The extent to which government intrudes into the realm of business is one of degree. Doubtless lib-

eralism will always prefer as little governmental coercion as possible; and for this reason communism and fascism and some forms of socialism seem to it enslaving. But unless government insists upon an organization of industry and commerce which provides security, liberalism is itself insecure. No hungry man is a liberal. The methods by which economic security for all workers may be attained raise difficult problems; but not problems incapable of solution, for industrial nations have made tentative beginnings which furnish a measure of experience. The point is that steps toward such security must be taken at once, or the future of liberalism is in peril. Among the insecure communism and fascism have their chance.

The introduction of democracy, which is liberalism's preferred method of control, into the management of industry and commerce, opens up still more problems. In politics the tendency of the time is toward lodging authority for decision and action in executive hands, rather than keeping it in a legislative body. Legislatures pass only upon policies and methods of carrying them out. Obviously business cannot be efficiently conducted by mass meetings. Nor does the inclusion of representatives of the employees on industrial councils render a business responsive to democratic control. Managers and workers may be confederates to fleece the public. It would seem that duly constituted commissions (of which we already have examples in the Interstate Commerce Commission and various similar bodies supervising public utilities) should exercise oversight over our major industries in order that the rights of all concerned in them—capital, labor, consumers—may be adjusted and safeguarded. Such commissions are not to carry on the enterprises, but to lay down the lines within which they shall operate and to prescribe the standards to which they must live up. Such commissions, representative of the nation, are a means of maintaining the supremacy of the public interest. In addition there may well be the development of works' councils within particular enterprises on which representatives of management and labor confer together on matters which concern their interests and the interests of the enterprise.

VII

And even more important than this expansion of liberalism in the economic sphere is the need of liberalism's becoming aggressive rather than remaining defensive. It has been mainly occupied in removing restrictions to individual freedom; it needs to insist that freedom is not so much free-

dom from restraint, as it is freedom to a wider fellowship. This is a specific contribution of Christianity to liberalism. The God of truth is also the God of love. Communism preaches class warfare; fascism a militant nationalism or racialism. Liberalism believes in advance by seeking truth, and persuading men to follow it. Hence its desire to abide by the processes of education and democratic government, slow as those processes seem to ardent protestants against injustices and wrongs. But violence is a sin against comradeship and against personality. It does not convince, hence it is no method for devotees of truth and cannot work fellowship. Liberalism prizes freedom, not that one nation may disregard others or that one class may be inconsiderate of the interests of another. It wishes freedom to foster understanding and agreement. These are the highways of truth. They lead to friendship. Therefore they are highways of the God of love.

Both fascism and communism make much of discipline and demand of their adherents the utmost measure of devotion. Liberalism cannot impose discipline. But it can present its ideals of loyalty to truth and to love as worthy to enlist men in voluntary self-discipline for their sakes. Truth is never easily won, nor easily obeyed, nor easily propagated.

To bear all naked truths,
And to envisage circumstances, all calm,
That is the top of sovereignty.

Freedom has to be striven for and defended again and again. Every generation finds its battleline in some high place of the field. Fellowship always involves the crossing of frontiers and the scaling of middle walls of partition, the stern scrutiny of one's own prejudices and preferences and the sympathetic effort to enter into the views and feelings, the appreciations and loyalties of others. Easy-going indifferentism, masquerading as liberalism, must be disowned. Liberalism is not just "live and let live." That is a bastard and negative liberalism. Truth and freedom and fellowship must be striven for, and their attainment exacts all of which human beings are capable—and more. And because liberalism's foes menace these its goals, they must be fought, but fought with weapons of truth and freedom and fellowship. Liberalism must out-think its opponents, for if it lose on the battleground of intelligence all is lost. Have the liberals of to-day stamina for such a warfare with such weapons?

VIII

The answer, then, to the main question: Can Liberalism survive? is that its persistence in the immediate future is by no means certain. The situation is so perilous that not a moment should be lost. Liberalism must set its house in order. It must face frankly its failures—failures to apply its own principles and methods to all spheres of life. It has proclaimed a free church in a free state. It has given men a status as independent citizens in both realms. It must also give them a corresponding status in the realms of industry and commerce—secure men in enterprises controlled by and for the commonweal. It has insisted on freedom *from* tyranny and restriction; it must insist on freedom *to* fellowship across all barriers of race and nation and class. Liberalism's weakness is not in itself, but in its inconsistencies—its failures to be true to itself.

If liberalism goes under, the prospect for mankind is appalling. With either communism or fascism dark ages return. Education will become propaganda; art and letters will be forced to march with the goose-step of the mass-mind or of the dictator's will; the Church will become either a servile bureau of government or be abolished; life will be regimented, and the nations of freemen, born in the struggles for liberty of many generations, will become nations of slaves. Barbarism will overtake civilization.

But God lives and reigns! He is light, and whatever of truth men discover is from Him. He has revealed Himself in Christ as love, and love demands freedom. To cleave to truth wherever it leads us, to proclaim it in love according every man the right to follow truth as he sees it, to seek fellowship in understanding with all men of every race, nation and condition, is to be loyal to the God of earth and heaven. Liberalism's sons may be in for a Golgotha in this generation. They had one in the Great War. Another and more awful struggle with these deadly foes may be ahead. But to this end were they born, and for this cause are they in the world, to bear witness to the truth. The issue is with Him who standing within the shadow keepeth watch above His own.

Religion and Freedom

E. F. SCOTT

IT has long been the custom in the Scottish universities to elect some man of high distinction, in politics or science or literature, to the office of Lord Rector. No duties are attached to the office, except that at some time during his three years' tenure the Rector should make an address to the students, impressing on them some primary lesson which his life has taught him. At Saint Andrews last October the address was given by General Smuts of South Africa, for whom it might fairly be claimed that he is the most remarkable of living men. He stands admittedly in the first rank both as a soldier and a statesman. He is one of the foremost of international lawyers, and had more to do than any other man with framing the League of Nations. He is not only a man of action but a thinker, who has made one of the most original and profound contributions to modern philosophy. His address was in itself singularly impressive, and all the more so as coming from such a man. He declared that from his knowledge of the world-situation he saw little danger of war or of economic disaster. What he did fear was the disappearance of liberty, under pressure of mass-movements and mass opinion. He stated as his deliberate belief that there is less liberty in the world to-day than at any time in the last two thousand years. The address throughout was a passionate appeal to the young generation to hold fast to liberty.

It is strange indeed that at this time of day such an appeal should be necessary. We had grown accustomed to think of liberty as one of the settled issues. For the Scottish youth whom General Smuts addressed the struggle for liberty is connected with the ancient names of Bruce and Wallace. In this country it is taken for granted that liberty was established on the Fourth of July nearly 160 years ago. Since then there has been ceaseless conflict on one great question and another, but it was then decided, for good and all, that the country should be free. Yet men are now discovering everywhere that the struggle must begin all over again. We are faced by the evident fact that the larger part of the world has slipped back into bondage, disguised under more or less specious forms. In this country and a few others it is still possible for men to live their own lives and think as

they see right; but who can tell how long it will last? Ten years ago America was prosperous while the rest of the world was poor. It has now lost its wealth like the others, and perhaps ten years hence it will likewise have lost its freedom.

This is a fear which is secretly present in all our minds; and for this reason many of us are deeply suspicious of movements which appear to be sweeping everything before them—socialism, fascism, communism, and all the rest. By whatever name they call themselves we feel that there is the same general motive behind them all. It is not that we are blindly prejudiced against anything that is new, for we recognize that in many ways these movements are generous and progressive. Neither are we selfishly afraid of personal loss, since most of us, alas, have very little to lose. Our trouble is that we were brought up in the tradition of liberty. We were taught to believe that liberty is the great human interest, compared with which all the others are as nothing. Just as much as any revolutionary we long for the time when there will be peace, brotherhood, food and work and opportunity for all. But if the perfect society is only to be realized by stamping out all liberty, by creating some community of human ants or bees in which there will be no will but that of the hive, we prefer the present system with all its failings. We feel that if the goal before us is that of a society in which all separate men and women will be pulped together into one uniform mass, it would be a thousand times better that the race should cease to exist. It would, indeed, have no reason for existing. If man has been placed on earth for any purpose it is that he should develop himself as a free spirit. There are communities of ants and bees already, and they achieve that sort of life much better than we should ever do, with all our organization. Our destiny in the scheme of things is to form a society of *men*.

The reaction from liberty is the outstanding fact of our time, and there has never been anything quite like it in previous history. Hitherto the call to liberty has always been inspiring, even when it was manifestly used for some sinister purpose. To-day it seems to have lost its spell. We have the spectacle of nations giving up their liberty, not only without protest, but apparently with pride and enthusiasm. They seem honestly to believe that by suppressing the individual will they have somehow risen to a higher plane, from which they can look down on those that still honor human rights. There must be reasons for this attitude, at first sight so utterly

perverted, and it is not hard to distinguish some of them, in the light of recent history.

One reason is plainly to be found in the economic chaos which followed the Great War. Under stress of hunger men are willing to sacrifice anything, and the mass of people in most countries have suffered bitter poverty. Since this evil has befallen them under free institutions they want a society that will be rigidly controlled. Sometimes they clamor for a strong man to whom all will submit themselves unquestioningly. Sometimes they put their faith in a mechanical system which will take the place of all individual will. It must never be forgotten that for more than four years during the war practically every one was incorporated within a vast military machine. The lesson was drilled into us by every possible means that obedience to orders was the one virtue that mattered. This lesson has remained with multitudes of people long after it has served its purpose. A habit of mind has been formed which is fatal to freedom, and this may prove in the end to be the worst result of the war.

Again, it must be admitted that the recoil from liberty has been largely due to liberty itself, or rather to its misuse. Our fathers won it for us, often at the price of their own blood; and we have taken base advantage of their gift. Nations made free have at once begun to oppress their neighbors. Classes which obtained their just privileges have set themselves to exploiting the less fortunate. As each restriction was lifted there have always been those who clutched at the new opportunity for personal gain. It is not surprising that many are now demanding to have the restrictions put back again. They argue (and few of us have the right to blame them) that since liberty lends itself so easily to abuse, there should be no liberty. Yet it is not the liberty but we ourselves that should be blamed. I know a town through which there flows a little river, which has been used, time out of mind, for receiving all the sewage and garbage. It was proposed some years ago to close up the river, which had become nothing else than a filthy drain. But on wiser thoughts a pipe-line was constructed to carry the sewage to the sea. When last I visited the town I found a public garden, planted along the banks of what is now a clear and pleasant stream. It struck me that in social affairs also it is not the streams we must get rid of—not our liberties and the institutions which embody them—but merely the sewage with which they are polluted.

Again, the distaste for liberty has grown with that passion for short-

cuts which has taken possession of every one in recent years. We have made up our minds that the one thing necessary is to attain the end, and that the quickest means must be the best. In business and mechanics this principle may be a sound one, but the law for all forms of life is that of growth, and this law cannot in the end be circumvented. In human concerns it operates by way of liberty. A man must shape his character gradually by the free action of his own will. A society must be free, and so develop itself, even through error, from one necessary stage to another. In our days, however, we have become impatient with these slow processes. We insist that the kingdom of heaven should be taken by violence. We are constantly devising plans by which the largest aims can be achieved in a few months or years. This always proves impossible, but even the attempt requires a suspense of liberty. The new structure is planned, and each individual must leave himself like a passive brick in the hands of the builders. He can exercise no choice of his own; he must cease almost to consider himself a human being and become a mere piece of material. Only in this way can the projected work be carried through in the minimum of time. It is told of Suvaroff, the famous Russian leader in the eighteenth century, that when he required on one occasion to attack a fortress across a deep, wide trench, he marched his army bodily into the chasm. Half of his men filled it up with their bodies and the other half passed over. Progress of a kind can no doubt be accomplished by this use of men simply as material, but it may be doubted whether the progress has much value. When all is said, men are something more than the cubic substance they are composed of, or the units of energy stored up in them. Each man is a spiritual being, and has capacities in him which cannot be measured. Unless he can act freely, employing his own mind and volition, he cannot make his real contribution to the general life.

So there are various causes for the weakening of the impulse to liberty; but they are all connected with one main cause. For a long time past the majority of men and women have lost their hold of religion. This has been partly due to the disintegration of old forms of belief by modern knowledge, and much more to the steady encroachment of material interests on the higher aims of life. However we explain it there can be little doubt of the fact that during the last century, and very noticeably in our own generation, there has been a moving away from religion. This has often been hailed as a liberation. Men have persuaded themselves that by

throwing off the old restraints they had come out into a larger world. The human mind, no longer kept in leading-strings, would now go forward indefinitely. Freedom, as many have conceived it, has no other meaning than the escape from every religious tradition. Most thoughtful men have now lost this confidence. They are finding, sometimes with bitter disappointment, that the nation which throws off religion does not thereby become free. It seems, on the contrary, to fall an easier prey to any despotic power that seeks to fetter it. In Germany at the present moment the only forces which are making a stand for liberty would seem to be concentrated in the church, which was supposed to be the home of reaction. So the truth is gradually dawning that religion and liberty are not in conflict. On the contrary, liberty is bound up with religion; it has its root in religion, and without it must wither and die. To set men free by releasing them from religion is much the same as to relieve a desert traveler by taking away his store of food and water. You prove to him that without this load he will march faster, and will be able to use a route which will cut off some weary miles. For a few hours he will find this true, and will step forward light-heartedly. But he will never finish that journey.

It is very significant that all those movements to-day which aim at subjugating personality to the rule of some theory or system are antireligious. The most glaring example is Russia, where the worst persecution which history has ever known is in process before our eyes. The apathy, or even approval, with which it is regarded by the church at large is surely the most shameful blot on our present-day Christianity. Many well-meaning people appear to hold that Russia is engaged in a great humanitarian experiment, and that this attack on religion is only a temporary phase, which has no relation to the aim in view. But the persecution belongs to the essence of the movement. Its leaders know what they are doing, much better than their simple-minded apologists. They are bent on subduing a people, body and soul, to a prescribed order, which may be good or bad but has to be imposed by the strong hand. No rights can be allowed to personalities, which must all be crushed together into one inert mass, like Suvaroff's soldiers. But before this can be done, religion must be put out of the way. It is realized that wherever you have religious men you have men who are potentially free. You may force them, to all appearance, into your system, but only for a time. The spirit of freedom is in them, and at any moment it may assert itself in some outbreak that will shatter your

system. That is the fear which in all times has given rise, more or less consciously, to religious persecution. The effort is continually going on to bring the free spirit of man into bondage, and the obstacle is always religion. This, at all costs, must be removed, for religion means freedom. When Caiaphas and Pilate condemned Jesus it was liberty which they sought to crucify. They felt obscurely that in him it was personified. They recognized a force in this man which would finally break up the dominance of the Law and the supremacy of Rome. Behind all the later persecutions we can discern essentially the same motive as in that first one.

Everywhere in the New Testament the gospel is associated with liberty. One might almost say that the writers here find their chief evidence for the truth of Christianity. They believe that religion is given to men that they might be free; and since Christ has fulfilled in the highest measure this aim of all religion, he brought the true message. Paul, more than all the others, gives a central place to this idea of liberty. Ever and again he drops all theological argument, and takes his stand on the simple fact that through Christ he has become free. Formerly he was in bondage to the Law, to this world, to his own evil passions, to the opinions of men, to the fear of death. Since he had known God in Christ he had become master of himself and of all earthly circumstance. On this fact which he cannot doubt since it has been given him in his own experience, Paul rests his faith. Religion is liberty, and Christ has made us free. So firmly does he hold to this principle that Paul sometimes pushes it to a dangerous extreme. He claims that for the Christian man no outward constraints exist any longer. No authority has the right to impose itself on Christ's people. All distinctions of race and class have disappeared, and every man can now think and act for himself as if he were the sole possessor of the world. "All things are yours." There can be no possible limit to the freedom which we have through Christ.

What is the nature of this connection which Paul perceives between religion and liberty? His thought, in its fundamental idea, is not hard to understand. He is aware that liberty, in the last resort, is a spiritual condition. This had been pointed out by moralists from the earliest times, who saw that the wealthiest and most powerful men are often the most enslaved. To be sure, they can do what they please, but they live in constant dread of robbers and assassins, they are tossed about by lawless desires, they must defer to all men if they are to keep their place of privilege. Freedom

cannot be made for us by circumstances but must be something in ourselves. It consists ultimately in possessing our own souls, and the one purpose of all outward liberties is to make possible that inward condition. A society may easily be conceived in which all men should be politically free and economically on much the same level, and yet be slavish men. This has actually happened more than once in the world's history; and it is always found that when the inward freedom is gone the outward is not long in following. On the other hand, the inward freedom never fails in the end to produce the outward. All the successful wars of liberty have begun with an awakening in men's own souls. Knowing themselves to be free they have found power to assert their freedom. This, indeed, was the manner in which the old institution of slavery, inseparable as it seemed to be from the very nature of the social order, was rooted out. It has been made the gravest charge against Paul that although he had the evil system constantly before him he never agitated against it, or even called on Christian masters to release their slaves. None the less, Paul was the great emancipator. He impressed on the slaves that they were to work and think in a free spirit, "not with eye-service, as men-pleasers, but as to the Lord." He changed them inwardly into free men, and by and by slavery fell away like a withered husk, no one can tell when or how. One could wish sometimes that modern champions of labor who criticize Paul would try to adopt his method. All emancipation, if it is to mean anything, must begin with the inward change. Liberties and privileges may be lavished with both hands, but until men are spiritually made free they are still in bondage.

This, then, is why liberty must spring from religion. When a man knows that he belongs to God he cannot surrender his will to any fellow-man, or to any party or system. He is his own man. He lives by standards which he knows in his conscience to be right, not by those which are forced on him by outward authority. Not only so, but he is certain of a power behind him which will prove stronger in the end than any earthly power. This is why religion gives something which can never be obtained by way of reason. Ever since the days of the Stoics it has been claimed that in his own reason man has the liberating force which will lift him in the end above all wrong and tyrannous demands. The radical movement in politics was ushered in by a book, *The Age of Reason*, in which it was shown that now at last, when men had learned to think rationally, all oppression would cease. The same note has been struck, with much more

skill and decision, by countless modern teachers. They tell us that the one road to freedom is to know the world better, and to trust fearlessly to the light of knowledge. Yet it grows increasingly evident that something more is needed. Perhaps the most mournful and humiliating spectacle at the present time is the surrender of highly intelligent men to crowd emotion and the dictates of second-rate minds. Germany has done more than any modern country for intellectual progress. More especially in philosophical thought, which is reason in its purest form, Germany has led the world for two centuries. Yet in German universities to-day we have scholars and men of science writing in defense of the most childish theories; we have distinguished thinkers working out a philosophy for policies that were exploded in the dark ages. Reason can always be bribed or intimidated. We know from our own lives that when a strong passion insists on having its way it can bring the mind to supply the necessary arguments. Successful mobs and despots are never at a loss for able reasoners. It is not reason that liberates but the faith in a higher will which can overrule all others, and which will support us when we hold true to it. As soon as we lose faith in that will we are at the mercy of every wind. We have no volition of our own, and are glad to submit ourselves to any outside force that can direct us. It is only through faith in God that we can truly possess our souls.

Dark pictures have often been drawn of the tyranny for which religion, in all its forms, has been responsible. We are told how in the days of savagery men were ruled by superstition, and how kings and priests in all times since have taken advantage of this human weakness for their own ends. It cannot be denied that this is partly true. All religions have been mixed up with baser elements, and there have always been ignoble men who made use of everything for selfish gain. Just as statesmen have sometimes grown rich out of patriotic sacrifices, so there have been unworthy priests, from the sons of Eli onward, who have made profit out of religion. Yet it may confidently be affirmed that in every age the chief bulwark against tyranny has been religion. The savage appealed to the sacred customs when he was threatened with injustice. The church, under the worst medieval Popes, was still the visible symbol of a higher power which was on the side of right. Whatever errors it may have been guilty of, they were rarely those of subservience, for at almost every stage the church opposed itself, sometimes unwisely, to the potentates of the day.

To represent it as the grand enemy with which freedom has been struggling for the last fifteen hundred years is nothing but a perversion of the plain facts of history. The church has been the standard-bearer of freedom, and men have known in their hearts that it was so, and for this reason have borne patiently with its many failures and corruptions. Here was the institution which stood for God. By maintaining it they could assert the right, and hold their own in face of earthly oppression. The hostility to the church, and the effort to silence or capture it have not come from the side of liberty, but from those who have sought, in one way or another, to suppress liberty. This is equally true to-day. So long as there is a church, witnessing however imperfectly to a power above this world, men cannot be enslaved. As members of the body of Christ they are conscious of rights and duties which must not be violated. Whenever they engage in a religious service they have entered into a sphere of things in which there is nothing between their own souls and God. This is to-day, and has ever been, the essential function of the church.

There lies before us in the coming generation perhaps the decisive battle in the age-long struggle for liberty. This precious birthright of man has never been so much imperiled; and we all realize that it is infinitely precious. In New York harbor, at the very gateway of the country, there rises the statue of Liberty, and strangers have often smiled at this brave gesture. But it stands for something intensely real in the minds of all Americans. They know that the nation rests on liberty, and that if this goes everything else will go with it. How is liberty to be preserved? Not by patriotic songs and orations, and fireworks in July. Not by armies and fleets and education and even the wisest enactments. All these methods have often been tried before, and have come to little. The citadel of liberty is religion, and we must make sure of this central thing. So long as men keep their faith in God they have laid hold of something which is beyond the world, and no worldly power can master them. "Where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is liberty."

Immortality and Liberty

EDWARD SHILLITO

SOME years ago the Soviet Government prepared a splendid film to spread abroad the glory of the tractor in the new Russia. In this film, which was called "Earth," there was a procession of youth. They were marching to the funeral of a comrade who had died for the cause of the proletariat, and there were songs of the morning on their lips. The priest had been told that he was not needed. He is seen invoking the curses of heaven upon these rebels. The ceremonies of the church had been contemptuously declined. These heirs of the age to come were honoring the dead, who had died for the cause. But they were dead, and for them there was no resurrection. So far as they were individual human lives, each with its own name, they were no more. That figment of man's invention, the life beyond death, was left with dead things. It was a phantasy of man's egoism cast on the screen of the future. Yet they who believed in the glory of their cause could still rejoice.

It is not always understood how closely related are the belief in the sacredness of the individual life, and the belief in immortality, and how necessary it is for those who vindicate the freedom of man to believe first of all that he is a being made for eternity. Without the prospect of a life beyond death there is nothing for man but a place, a temporary place, in a process in which personality as we know it has no permanent value. What has been called personality in such a world, is but a blunder in the scheme of things. The idea of immortality becomes a presumptuous claim, the guess of a being going beyond his province. All such idle fancies must be laid aside, and individual man must become in his own eyes, as he is most certainly in the universe, the passing instrument of a process which has no value to give to him.

The decision which those young knights of the new order were registering as they marched to the grave of their comrade, was not simply a decision upon an abstract question, it was also an affirmation that neither he nor any of them were units with any significance in the sum of things. These two affirmations go together. Or in other words it makes a profound difference in all planning of human society whether or not the individual

life is regarded as a sacred unit, and this in turn depends upon the answer to the ancient question, "If a man die, shall he live again?"

It is at first sight surprising that the question whether or not man survives death can have any bearing upon the character of human society, as it will be reshaped in the future. But any society which will arise must take its character from the conception that is held of human life. There are here two main possibilities. If man is a transient creature, one ideal of society will befit him, and will be enough to make the most of his powers. If however he is an immortal being, other ideals will be needed for his sojourn in this world. It cannot be a matter of indifference to statesmen and economists for what manner of being they are legislating.

There has been a revolt against the Christian faith in this matter. In Russia there has been made the boldest and most logical attempt to build a new state on the foundations of a purely secular creed. In other countries there is in full display the totalitarian state, in which the freedom of the individual man is denied, and the former assumption that he is a sacred unit is rejected. It may well be that in many countries it is still counted legitimate to retain the belief in the immortality of the being, who is treated here as an impersonal creature, but in the end the two positions will be seen to be incompatible. Freedom, in the true use of that word, and immortality go together.

It may indeed be hard to defend human freedom without the sure and confident belief that man is not made for death. But when the Christian man hears of the experiments in Russia and Germany, which are based upon the denial of the freedom of the individual man, does he offer this answer, that man must be free since he is immortal?

To no article of the Creed is there more latent skepticism than to this: "I believe in the life everlasting." Part of the weakness of the defense presented by Christian advocates in face of the tremendous challenge of secularism, lies in their half-hidden doubt concerning the life beyond death. It is professed still; it is the theme of many hymns; but for many it is no longer a glorious certainty with which the Christian confronts the enemy.

When Easter comes round, this ancient hope is fanned into flame; the entire company of Christian people take up the defiance, "O death, where is thy sting?" But it is doubtful if those who sing this chant of defiance mean it, or are only expressing a traditional emotion.

There is more unbelief in this matter than we are ready to reveal at funerals. Some doubt the doctrine; many are not interested in it. No one need go far to meet members of Christian churches and even preachers of the gospel for whom this belief lies "bed-ridden in the dormitory of the soul." They do not plan as if they were certain that beyond the bounds of this life they would enter into a life not less but more personal than this life. If they think at all of the life beyond death, it stretches before them cheerless as the world of the dead to which the ancients looked. To be a serf in this earth is a better lot than to be a king in that land of shadows! If we could discover the deep underlying thoughts of many Christians we should discover such an unbelief and such a distaste.

When death comes near, there is a conspiracy to avoid all mention of it. The doctor and the parson play this game to the last. It is not in the interests of the patient to speak of death, near as it may be. He knows; they know; he knows that they know; but all of them conspire to ignore the coming end. The Catholic attitude is different. The believer, "fortified by the last rites," goes into eternity; for him there is no hiding the fact that death, the last visitant, is at the door. Too often those who are not of the Catholic Church, treat death, when it comes, as if it were the end.

The present writer had a friend whose bearing and that of his people to death occasioned astonishment simply because it was the bearing of those who took seriously their faith in immortality. He was a man who had lived intensely and joyfully all his days. The head of a great business; a keen political leader in his own countryside; an artist; a splendid servant of his church, and of the church of Christ overseas. When he came to die, he made all his arrangements, rejoiced in the last conversations with his own family, followed the news of the day, had thought of all his friends, noting that there was a marriage in one of their homes, and the parting of death in another. He knew he was soon to go to his Lord; and with a good cheer he went as one might wave a farewell from the deck of a ship starting on its way.

That is a logical end. But is it common? When we read of John Smith, the master at Harrow, a saint of these latter days, we are almost amused to think of him rushing upstairs to congratulate a friend who had been warned that death was near. But which is the odd and eccentric course of meeting death for a Christian believer?

There is a large measure of unbelief, and this helps to paralyze us when we are fighting against a plan for rebuilding society in which individual man is no longer a sacred being. We ought to be able to cry out defiantly: "Do not lay your hands on the liberty of an immortal being."

We disguise from ourselves this unbelief of ours by labeling certain Christians as "otherworldly" and we say of ourselves that we are not as these others are. To devise a label is not to advance an argument. There is a form of otherworldliness which is contemptible because it is a way of escape from our part in this life. But if we sincerely believe that there is another life, it is unreasonable to ignore it. If we are at school, we do not carry on the pretense that we shall never be anywhere else. We do not call it "otherworldly" to speak or think of the university or the business in the city which lies before us. Yet in our whole system of thought we have a wonderful experience before us, and we prefer to be silent upon it. Is it because we do not really believe in it? We do not disbelieve, but between disbelief and belief there are many shades. Is not this our practical bearing at times—"Whether or not there is life after death for me, I cannot tell, but it is well not to build too much upon it. Besides, it is not so important after all."

If such is our mind, we are bound to halt in our defense of the sacredness of human personality against those who frankly profess the philosophy of the hive and legislate for man on that basis. The community is everything, they say, the individual life is negligible. The individual man is simply a dying member of an undying society.

Who dies, if Germany lives? Who dies, if the proletariat society lives? What can be said in answer to this by those who believe still in human liberty? Surely they are stammering in their plea, if they cannot say with conviction that man is an heir of God and a joint-heir with Christ. He is the brother for whom Christ died; he is a son of God to be led into the glorious life of God, and he is a son of God even now and it doth not yet appear what he shall be in the rebuilding of human society. The last issues rest with the man of religion; whatever distinctive part the statesman and the economist may have, in the end the most important question to be answered is this: "Who then is this man for whom this society is to exist?" If it cannot be claimed for him that he is more than a temporary tenant of this house of life, then it is hard to rescue him from the net of the totalitarian state, in whatever form it may be found. When it is said that man

in his individual life can have no liberty, and we can only answer that he has indeed a life of his own, sacred in the sight of God, but that this life will soon be ended, what sort of a case is this? Jesus himself taught us that if there is a covenant between God and the soul, it must be one which outlives death. "God is not the God of the dead but of the living." Once in covenant with God, always in covenant with him. That is an ill-important fact for those who accept the teaching of Jesus as authoritative even if they go no farther. To Jesus man was a being who lived unto the God of the living. That describes his destiny; that also determines his value in this human scene.

The secularist might well say to the Christian who leaves this out of his effective creed, "You say that the individual life is a sacred unit. This man, every man, is a being for whom Christ died. But what after death becomes of him? You think that the answer need not change the argument one way or another. But as far as we are concerned it must make a radical difference. It is one man whose career is cut short by death long before he attains to anything like his complete stature. It is another man who has eternity before him."

Man certainly does not live long enough on this earth. In his *Back to Methuselah* Mr. Bernard Shaw makes this very clear. "Men do not live long enough; they are for all the purposes of high civilization mere children when they die." Mr. Shaw thinks that this may be remedied, and the same power which made this mistake may remedy it. The familiar hymn is literally true:

"We just begin
And then our work is done."

We cannot say in the same breath, "The days of our life are three score years and ten" and "We are on this earth in a brief space of time to live the perfect life." We can either reduce our ideal of perfection or extend the scale of our life either on this earth or in some other world. If we have eternity before us, we can lay down big plans, and start our cathedral. If we have only three score years and ten we had better be content with a modest villa. But the two prospects for man are different, and call for different treatment.

But there may be the elect few who can attain under present conditions to a measure of the perfect life. Even if there is no life beyond

death, these may be the final product to which all creation moves. For the sake of bringing them into the life of the world, the multitudes must be content to be sacrificed. The rest are but the members of the hive with no life of their own. To single out the few such supermen as a proof of the sufficiency of this life, is to imply that the others who are not supermen must be counted as simply means to an end. It has been maintained that there can be no civilized or cultured society without slavery. The belief that the human race exists for the sake of a final aristocracy involves that same condition. The arising of the superman means the sacrifice of the herd-multitudes. It is therefore possible to suggest this alternative to men: "You may sacrifice your brief earthly life so that the superman may arise." But this is a chilling prospect for the multitude; and even for the supermen it is no substitute for eternal life. However rich, however peaceful, however beautiful life might be for the few, there is death still to shadow the soul.

These then are the alternative assumptions upon which a society may be built, or out of which it may grow.

Man is a being made to be an heir of God and eternal life is offered to him in Christ. Society must therefore be organized to give scope for such a being.

Man knows nothing of any such sacred realm or calling. He has what he likes to believe an individual life, but he is only a piece of the collective life which he must serve till he dies and afterward be for ever silent. For such a being another social order must be planned.

These are two alternative interpretations of man. We cannot have both. The future of society will depend upon the choice made between them.

The one may be called the way of democracy, if democracy is understood as the way of true liberty, or of Christianity if that also is interpreted to mean an offer of liberty to the captives, and eternal life to the children of time.

The other is the way of the totalitarian state, or of the secular state, which cares little for the individual and much for the collective life.

In such a time it is merely waste of time to argue that any social system, now in being, provides a worthy scene for the sons of God. The creation still groans and travails in pain together, waiting for the revelation of the sons of God.

The Christian Church holds no brief for things as they are. But it is entitled in any shaping of the new world to put in its demand that the man for whom it is designed shall be man as he is in Christ, man redeemed and called into the glory of the eternal God.

If the church speaks, for example, to the communist, it is no answer to his experiment to say: "We too are concerned with this life, and we too have ceased to reckon upon the life beyond death. But unlike you, we believe that each individual life is sacred." The communist may well reply: "You are simply moved by sentiment or the momentum gathered from the faith of others in other times. If the individual man is not immortal, there is grave difficulty in believing that he is a unit now and here to be reverently considered and, as we think, to be allowed to thwart or delay the hope of society."

It is idle no less to take refuge in the compromises with which Christians have comforted themselves in their hours of doubt. We may join the "choir invisible of the immortal dead." We may live again in a nobler race. Others will reap what we have sown. All these things are true, but they have nothing to do with the question, whether or not man is immortal. And if this is all that the Christian Church can offer, it surrenders the whole case to the totalitarian or to the communist state with their postulates concerning man.

If after death there is nothing for the individual man but annihilation, then why for the sake of a few added years should he not be annihilated or enslaved so that others in this human family may be profited or the state advanced? If all the universe can make of him after death comes is to reduce him to an impersonal factor, what is there wrong in treating him now as an impersonal factor? Why trouble him with ideas beyond his station? In the end he will be better served by losing his liberty and becoming in effect what he really is in his status. The directors of human society cannot be doing wrong if they act in sympathy with the processes of the universe. If man has no standing as an individual being after death, why should he have it before death?

The charge against the Christian people that they have never provided a fitting home for man as they believed in him, is true. It is humiliating for the church to admit its failure. It is not enough to rehearse the familiar story of its great deeds. The liberation of the slaves was an achievement, but what a time the church took about it! It is better not to

boast too much, but to repent and to do deeds worthy of repentance. So far as its records are concerned, the church has no ground for boasting.

But there is still the future to be considered. Where does the line of division come? let us ask once more. In the world of to-day there are those who believe in the Christian doctrine of man, and those who deny it. And those who believe it must be prepared to maintain what follows. In any new society man shall be treated as a being made for eternity. In no case can the church give its blessing to any order in which this is denied.

The character of human society is changing before our eyes. We shall never see again the social order as it once was. Nor does it rest simply with the Christian Church to decide what will take its place; but it must bear its witness and make its claim.

This is written in the firm conviction that the church must make the claim, not in any spirit of apology, but with boldness, that man is a child of God, in covenant with him, and an heir of the life to come. Because the church believes in God revealed in Christ Jesus, it believes in man. It cannot keep Christ and lose man; it cannot believe in the incarnation and deny the glory of the individual life; for which he lived and died.

Belief in the life to come is not a luxury which the church may have or not—a matter of no importance. We must decide on the evidence before us whether or not we do believe in the life everlasting; if we do not, we must bear the consequences, whatever they may be. But we must not deceive ourselves. Without this faith, we are of all men most helpless in the fight which is before us, the fight for the liberty of the individual man. Nothing will avail us in this hour but the whole counsel of God.

The Timeliness of Preaching the Timeless

BOYNTON MERRILL

THIS article, in the process of preparation, has taken on more of a personal aspect than I had intended. It has become, I fear, a personal confession of faith regarding preaching, a statement of the convictions that lie back of, and of the motives that run through my own preaching. If the first personal pronoun is used frequently, it is only because I write out of my heart and mind, as one charged with the heavy and glorious responsibility of preaching to the needy, eager, perplexed men and women who fill our pews.

Our chief concern as preachers is, I suspect, so to declare and interpret the convictions, experiences and hopes which God has given us that those who sit before us shall be able to interpret their own convictions, experiences and hopes and find goodness and God in them; a God real, available and sufficient to their daily needs, a God able to help us realize the hopes that haunt us not only for ourselves, but for our world.

How very varied are those who sit before us and how different are their needs! All the way from ten years of age to eighty; in from the hurly-burly of business, and out from the quiet of sheltered corners. They're acquainted, some of them, with the best of contemporary and of previously written literature and others barely read more than the daily paper. They're college professors and clerks in stores, nurses, teachers, mothers, farmers, philosophers and high-school students. They come sympathetic with religion and deeply longing for help, and they come critical, almost daring the minister to break through their hostility and to convince them that his words are worthy of their attention. The only thing these all have in common is a deep, inherited realization that religion has had power to reach down through all centuries and all differences, and that it has mysteriously and greatly influenced human thought and behavior.

Reviewing twenty years of active and constant preaching, I find that my accent has fallen heavily and increasingly upon the personal, inward, spiritual aspects of religion. Within those limits I have tried deliberately and definitely to vary the type of sermon, hoping thereby to interest and

help these different types of people. But thus preaching consistently the inward and spiritual has won for me the criticism from some few that I am not up to date nor timely. I write not in defense when I affirm my long-held and steadily deepening conviction that when one sets himself to preach directly to the needs and opportunities of his decade, but to do it in terms of truths that are above all decades and that are timeless, then he is most assuredly timely. Such preaching is, I believe, up to date and certain to be an influence for righteousness in "The present crisis."

If to be timely and up to date one must discuss in his pulpit Bolshevism, the birth rate in Italy, Hitler's latest outrage against liberty, the decline of the dollar and flights into the stratosphere, then I am decidedly not up to date in my preaching. It is my humble opinion that such matters belong in the papers, the magazines and the forums. I have no intention of turning my pulpit into an editorial chair hedged about with symbols of religion, and of passing the latest events through a bath of humor and of what I fear would often be prejudiced misinformation, and then to wring them dry with some obvious moral application. I have neither the time nor the inclination so to do.

Every moment in the pulpit is to me precious and preaching is to me serious business. I have no desire to attract people by being entertaining for I cannot get rid of the notion that the church and the ministry are here to do something that no other agency under heaven can do. We are here to remind men and women of God, to help them to keep and to renew their contacts with him, and to challenge them to live their lives in his sight.

Having said this, may I go back a little bit and come up into a statement of why I believe that preaching the timeless things of the spirit to the hearts and souls of individual men is really very timely and, perhaps, the surest way to effect the social reformation and health we desire?

All of us have lived under the spell of the teaching of Jesus. All of us have caught glimpses of his deep concern for the children of men. We all rejoice, too, that in our decade great sections of the Christian Church have, in a rebirth of devotion, set themselves with new zeal steadfastly to make this a world in which love and not hate shall more surely rule, in which justice shall be more widely done and in which the abuses which very evidently bring grief and distress to the children of men shall be slowly but surely driven out.

"What doth the Lord thy God require of thee but to do justly, to

love mercy and to walk humbly with him?" This ancient query of the prophet has become in our day an imperative. We have laid the question mark with which the query ends upon the anvil of the Christian conscience and we are seeking with the hammer blows of a great desire and of deliberate effort to straighten it out into an exclamation point. The aroused church is beginning to say to the conscience of the world—"The Lord thy God requires of thee to do justly, to love mercy and to walk humbly with him!" The emphasis of religion in our day is falling not so much upon theological concepts and creedal statements as upon the doing of righteousness. Religion, we are always saying, is "a way of life." The spearhead of the Christian Church is thrusting to-day not so much into the realms of philosophy and theology as into the fields of human behavior. "By their fruits ye shall know them." We are saying that the precepts of Jesus, long declared and well known, must be practiced.

For four hundred years and more, the so-called Christian or Western nations have pillaged and sought to dominate the planet and for the last hundred years almost we have seen the light of intensive study falling upon the pages of the New Testament. The result is twofold: first, we have been brought face to face with world-wide injustices and with man's inhumanity to man; and, second, we have caught new and soul-stirring glimpses of the compassionate spirit of Jesus and of the love of God which was meant to cover the earth as the waters cover the sea.

There is no need of pressing the issue that we live in a troubled and turbulent time. I am quite certain that nine ministers out of ten are honestly seeking in their public utterances to be "timely" and "up to date" and "to the point." They are, too, in increasing numbers, allying themselves publicly with movements designed to educate and arouse the rank and file of men to the abuses that exist in our modern life. They are doing everything possible to lift us out of our world sickness into world health.

For all such timely utterances, when they are the truth spoken in love, we must be grateful. For all such courageous alliances with noble movements, we are and should be thankful. I am, personally, in deepest sympathy with all this—and yet when I have said that, I want to go on to say that it is my conviction that we must not, in our effort to be timely and up to date, forget that we are the servants of Him who is timeless and that we are above all else the declarers of truths that are dateless. Jesus' words are always timely because they deal with the timeless things of the spirit.

They are not sharp in one century and dull in another. They are sharp and swift and pointed in every century; and this is so because he had his eyes fixed not so much on Rome as on God, not so much on one system, on one century and one country as on the Spirit, able to cleanse and ennoble men and their systems in all centuries and in all countries.

He seems to me always to be trying to teach that the solution of outward problems lies beneath the surface. He is always looking on the heart for he seems convinced that out of the heart are the issues of both life and of death.

"My Kingdom is not of this world."

"The kingdom of God is within you."

"Blessed are the pure in heart."

It may seem and it probably is a far cry from Jesus in Galilee in the first century to William James in Cambridge in the twentieth, but they saw eye to eye in this. "The deepest thing in our nature," wrote James, "is this dumb region of the heart in which we dwell alone with our faiths and fears."

There can be, I think, no question, but that Jesus addressed himself primarily to this "dumb region of the heart," to the inward and personal aspects of religion, believing that clean hearts and sound minds and good wills are fundamental to a saved society. He seemed to sense that one thing necessary to good fruitage was good rootage.

I suppose no man of modern times has been so identified with the seeking and the saving of the lost as has William Booth. He writes in his book, *Darkest England and the Way Out*: "To get a man soundly saved it is not enough to put on him a new pair of breeches, to give him regular work or even to give him a university education. These things are all outside a man; and if the inside remains unchanged you have wasted your labor. . . . All material help from without is useful only in so far as it develops moral strength within. . . . You must in some way or other graft upon the man's nature a new nature, which has in it the element of the divine. To change the nature of the individual, to get at the heart, to save his soul is the only real lasting method of doing him any good."

"The deepest thing in all nature is that deep dumb region of the heart."

"To get at the heart is the only real lasting method of doing him any good."

"As a man thinketh in his heart, so is he."

"The kingdom of God cometh not with observation; it is within you."

"Ye must be born again—born of the spirit."

I was talking only lately with one of those ten thousand young men with a little family, out of work, money gone, facing the winter. "I'll tell you," he said, "what really lies back of it all; it's not the war, it's not machinery, it's not capital and labor, it's not politics, it's not these things that people are trying so hard to change—these things are only the result of the real cause—and that is greed and selfishness in men's hearts."

Jesus and James, Booth and the young man who, after ten years in business, is now out; they know, and you and I know, that the seat of the infection is within. It is not the times that are "out of joint." It is we who are all wrong. We may alter the outward scheme of things again and again, we may keep on doing it until the crack of doom, but until men get goodness and God and love within, recognized and regnant in their thinking and their willing and their doing, we are, in the words of Booth, all but "wasting our labor."

"A corrupt tree cannot bring forth good fruit, neither will a good tree bring forth corrupt fruit." If we want the fruits of the spirit—love, joy, peace, goodness, temperance—we will have to drive the roots of human nature down, ever down into the soil of the spirit. We'll have to teach men to love goodness and to hate evil, not only the evil that is outside of them but also the evil that is inside of them.

Our primary task as preachers under God is, I believe, the proclamation of the reality, of the availability, and of the power of the spirit. You and I must be, to borrow a phrase from medicine, "internalists," for it is only as men are made right inside, that they will comport themselves aright in the world. Out of the heart are the issues of life—and out of the heart, too, are the issues of death.

Ten million young men dead in the war and the dragon's teeth are being sowed assiduously to-day in every country under heaven; ten million men out of work, and the tragedy being manipulated for political advantage. It's not because men are not wise enough and do not know enough to devise ways out. A dozen magnificent schemes have been proposed, any one of which would go far to ameliorate the tragedy and the threat. But men do not want to outlaw war, or scrap their armies and erect a world police force, or promise never to cross another nation's boundaries with

hostile intent. It would cost too much in the coin of national pride, and sacrificed investments and possible future plunder. They do not want to bring about a juster distribution of the national wealth—it would, they say, kill incentive. What they mean is, it would reduce profits and curtail luxurious pleasures. The spectacle of the learned professions drawing into their service men of brilliance, lifting them into eminence and influence and power, giving them great satisfactions and a chance to serve their fellows—and all without hope of any great monetary reward—is a spectacle lost on business. Business and industry will not take the hint. I suspect that no people under heaven are so under the spell of incentive or know such satisfaction as do real teachers and preachers and physicians and artists, yet wealth is not even remotely in the picture for them. Their hearts are not set primarily upon treasures that earth can corrupt and take away. Until business and industry find their real rewards in other realms than the realm of dividends and profits, they will be at the mercy of a world that casts up its final reckoning not in terms of dollars but in the terms of inward worth.

No, it's not because men are not wise enough, it is because they are not good enough; and the seat of goodness is within us, and the source of goodness is in God.

Other men will find that they can work best through other channels, but I have decided that the greatest service I can render to my time is, in my preaching, continually to remind those who will listen to me of Him who is timeless. I desire, above all else, to speak to them of those cleansing, transforming ministries and of those enlargements of the mind and heart that wait for the children of man in the realm of the spirit. It is not so spectacular as howling against this or that abuse. It will never put you on the front pages of the papers, but it will feed those hungry sheep who look to you for that bread which the world cannot give and who, if they are not fed by you, will not be fed at all.

In these confused and complicated days men long desperately, I believe, to be steadied and to have their vision cleared that they may know more surely what their duty is and find courage to do it. They want to know that in a world where "change and decay" are all about there are some things that abide. They want a few simple things of which they may be sure, which they can grasp with their minds, cling to in their hearts and in the light of which they can walk.

In our English tongue the really fundamental things by which men live are named in words of one syllable. Earth, sea, sky. Day, night. Light, dark. Sun, moon, stars. Work, play, sleep. Birth, life, death. Man, God. And precisely at the point where God and man meet and mingle and strike hands and complete and complement each other, there are other great one-syllable words. Heart, soul, mind.

And the things that dwell in these hearts and souls and minds of ours—they, too, are simply spelled. Sin, pain, greed, evil, grief, right, wrong, good, bad, thought, will, joy, peace; these, too, are written down in words so short that none need stumble to say them. And it is in this same inward realm that there dwell also those simple majestic powers of the spirit upon which our life is really founded and in the light of which it can come to splendor. Faith, hope, love—these three, and they do abide. They are the mightiest agents for remaking men that the human race knows anything about. When men really possess these things they plan and live nobly; when they lack these, they plan and live on a lower level than was ever, I believe, the purpose of their Maker.

Now the source of these simple and powerful things is, in our tongue, called God and so, in my effort to be timely and up to date, I preach always the timeless and dateless God. I seek to show how he dwells in our midst, not only the God of comfort and of peace, but also the God who is ever seeking to cleanse us from our fault, in both our public and our private concerns. He seeks ever to win and to compel us to the actual doing of his will, as that will is declared in conscience and in hopes, in our hopes both for ourselves and for our world.

Three lines have been to me an ideal statement and a great help as I have sought to lift my very human and faulty ministry nearer to the ideal. They are in a sonnet which Michelangelo wrote on the occasion of the two hundredth anniversary of the birth of Dante, whom he passionately admired. He characterizes the greatest of all Italians and his great service to the race thus:

"Escorted by great thought
This star of virtue, by his shining
Showed to us blind men the hid eternities."

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Thinking as greatly and as clearly as we can, guarding always the integrity and the virtue of our own lives, let us go on humbly trying to declare to blind but eager men "the hid eternities."

Helping Discouraged People

JAMES GORDON GILKEY

SHORTLY after the Depression began, the director of one of our Rescue Missions made this significant statement: "Our major problem to-day is not with liquor or with sexual vice. It is with discouragement. The men who are now coming to us for help have lost not only their money and their work, but also their self-confidence. Most of them are in utter despair. Unless we can give them courage, their real problem remains unsolved."

This problem of discouragement is not confined to the group which frequents Rescue Missions. It emerges in every part of modern society. Of all the practical responsibilities confronting religious leaders to-day, the responsibility of helping disheartened individuals regain their grip on life and on themselves is probably the most pressing and the most important. Consider a letter which recently came to me from a stranger in a distant community. "In one of your books you say that when we do our best God will give us the help we need. But what is that help? What if it doesn't come? For years my husband and I have tried to do right, but the harder we try the worse things seem to get. My husband would have a good job to-day if he had been willing to be dishonest. But because he insisted on being straight he is now out of work, our children are deprived of the things other children have, and we ourselves are worried almost to death. How can I make a contact with God? How can I get from him the help you say he has for me?" Again and again such questions are put to religious leaders to-day. How can we answer these questions? How can we bring real and immediate help to this army of discouraged people?

There are two familiar facts which should be stated frankly and immediately. The first is that much discouragement is traceable to abnormal physical or mental states. The only people qualified to handle the individuals whose despair has this source are physicians or psychiatrists. To refer such individuals promptly to these specialists is the first duty of the minister, the Sunday-school teacher, or the well-meaning but untrained "friend of the family." We religious experts are highly indignant when we find medical men attempting to discuss (usually with a pitiful misuse of

terms and a startling ignorance of facts) the neat points in theology or church history. Why do we not realize that we ourselves make quite as sorry a spectacle when we attempt to invade the field of medicine or the field of psychiatry? When a disheartened individual comes to us for help, and when our questions make it evident we are dealing with a person who has some form of physical or mental abnormality, we should immediately refer the individual to the nearest competent physician. The first and most obvious rule for religious leaders is to confine their efforts at helpfulness to the normal men and women who are suffering from a temporary emotional or spiritual upset, and leave to the specialists the many individuals who are the victims of more serious disorders.

It is equally plain that much contemporary discouragement is traceable, directly or indirectly, to defects in our existing economic order. If we were living in a society in which all jobs were secure and all savings safe, much if not most of the contemporary despair would vanish overnight. Everyone who has eyes to see and ears to hear realizes that a bewildering proportion of the human misery surrounding us to-day is the result of the faulty organization of our economic system. Under these circumstances a religious leader faces two fairly obvious tasks. The first is to examine with an open mind the different schemes suggested for the reorganization of the economic order, and then give his support to the plan which seems most promising. The second is to give what immediate and practical help he can to those who have been the unfortunate victims of existing economic maladjustments. To discuss the technique of the second task is not to forget the first task, and it is certainly not to imply there is no first task. As we religious leaders attempt to be competent "stretcher-bearers for the wounded" we willingly confess that the task of "stopping the war" is—in the long run—even more important. Yet here the wounded are; and while we are waiting for the necessary changes to be made in the structure of society itself, it behooves us to learn how to make our efforts at immediate helpfulness most effective.

In dealing with disheartened individuals there are three common procedures we should *not* follow. To begin with, we should not try to generate courage by advancing theoretical and inevitably speculative explanations of the evil in our world. Consider a concrete situation. Some years ago a man who was in great trouble addressed this inquiry to Doctor Cadman. "I am seventy-four years of age, and I find myself

unable to explain the following situations. In 1895 my wife, sick with melancholia, took her own life. In 1901 my eldest son died of a fever. In 1920 my eldest daughter, overtaken by mental depression, shot herself. In 1924 my only remaining son and his two small children were burned to death in their own home. My question about life can be summed up in one word: Why?" Would a theoretical and inevitably speculative explanation of the evil in the world have been of immediate and practical help to this bewildered and disheartened man? Probably not. To each statement he would have had, almost certainly, a devastating rejoinder. The interview would have ended, almost inevitably, with dissatisfaction and disappointment on both sides. In dealing with discouraged people we must remind ourselves constantly that there are many situations in life which cannot be explained. They can only be faced, mastered, and then deliberately put out of the mind. Almost the last words Jesus uttered were: "My God, why?" Even Jesus found some elements in life inexplicable. We shall probably never prove wiser than he.

Again, it is usually a mistake to try to encourage an individual by relating to him the succession of disasters which has overtaken someone else. If we follow this unfortunately common procedure, what idea do we inadvertently but inevitably thrust into the mind of the person we are trying to help? The idea that some such array of misfortunes may be waiting for him. Recently a young man of my acquaintance fell victim to serious heart-trouble. In the effort to console and encourage his distracted wife, one of the neighbors called and explained how another young man on the same street had recently died—and died almost without warning, too! This neighbor thought the information would encourage the anxious wife by reminding her that other people had their troubles. As a matter of fact the information had exactly the opposite effect. What if the young man with heart-trouble should die, and die as quickly as his youthful neighbor had done? If a man has lost his job and comes to us for encouragement, we never help him by enumerating the number of the unemployed. Our lugubrious statistics, instead of reminding him that other people too are out of work, inadvertently suggest how many competitors he has as he seeks to locate a new job. If, calling on a parishioner who is dying of cancer, all we do is describe the other members of the parish who are dying of Bright's disease, hardening of the arteries, or pneumonia, we usually donate despair and fear rather than courage and hope. The French

have a proverb, "There is comfort in the misery of one's friends." But that type of comfort is usually unsatisfactory. As a medicine to dispense indiscriminately it is extraordinarily dangerous.

Still again, we must not try to create courage and self-confidence by the familiar expedient of urging disheartened people to "brace up." This is the technique which many well-meaning but unimaginative individuals employ in the effort to help their friends and help themselves. They say vigorously "Snap out of it! Be a soldier! Buck up!" and then wonder why their energetic advice proves of such slight and temporary benefit. The reason is, of course, that this advice fails to consider the cause of the individual's despair. If one of our friends contracts typhoid fever we bring him singularly little help by urging him to "get well," and by telling him he should go about his work as though nothing were the matter. Something *is* the matter, and only when we locate the cause of the disease do we put ourselves in a position to effect a cure. Despair has its causes quite as truly as typhoid and malaria have theirs, and in the cure of despair there is an intelligent and effective technique, just as there is in the cure of typhoid or malaria. What now is that technique?

My own experience has led me to believe it involves three successive steps—a transfer of the individual's attention to new and happier areas of his own experience, the suggestion that he has latent resources greater than he realizes, and a description of the precise nature of the divine help.

Anyone who deals with great numbers of disheartened individuals soon realizes how important it is to transfer the attention of these individuals to new and happier areas of their own experience. As a matter of fact, the major reason why they are disheartened is that they have lost temporarily an accurate perspective on themselves and their affairs. Brooding for months over a tragic bereavement, or worrying for weeks over a possible disaster, they have lost sight of the other areas of their little world. To restore their true sense of proportion, to enable them once again to see life steadily and see it whole, is to release within them secret forces making for confidence, courage, and hope. In nine out of ten cases the best start to make with a discouraged individual is to say in effect, "Suppose we look again at your dark situation. Is it as black as you think? Are there not glimmers of light somewhere?" Thus to transfer the individual's attention from the darkness to the light is to start within his mind and spirit the process of healing.

What are the concrete methods we can follow in this effort to help discouraged people re-focus their attention? For one thing, we can remind them there are areas in their little world which are wholly unaffected by their present disaster. Even if their money is gone, they still have their health, their friends, and their work. Even if their health is gone, they still have their intellectual and æsthetic interests. Even if everything in their present world seems dark, they still have the new world of to-morrow to contemplate and plan for. In one of Bulwer-Lytton's essays there is a paragraph which, by thus re-focussing attention, has brought significant help to numberless readers. "When one sorrow gets hold of your mind like a monomania, when you think that because Heaven has denied you this or that, that your whole life henceforth must be a blank, then diet yourself well on biography. See how little a space one sorrow fills in a long career, see that scarce a page in the book is given to a grief once quite as bitter as your own; and then note how the life sails on triumphantly after that." The method of encouragement used there is the transfer of attention. It is a method all of us must employ, in one way or another, when we seek to create new strength, hope, and confidence in confused and darkened lives.

Another method we can follow in making this transfer of attention is to remind those we are trying to help that there are many individuals in their world who desperately need their friendship, their sympathy, and their aid. Here the attention of the disheartened individual is diverted, not to other areas in his own life, but to the needs of other people. One of Tennyson's familiar lyrics gives a vivid illustration of the principle:

Home they brought her warrior dead,
She nor swooned nor uttered cry,
All her maidens watching said,
"She must weep, or she will die."

Then they praised him, soft and low,
Called him worthy to be loved,
Truest friend and noblest foe—
Yet she neither spoke nor moved.

Stole a maiden from her place,
Lightly to the warrior stepped,
Took the face-cloth from the face—
But she neither moved nor wept.

Rose a nurse of ninety years,
Set his child upon her knee—
Like summer tempest came the tears,
"Sweet, my child! I live for thee."

Through the transfer of attention from her own suffering to the need of that child, the mother's courage and will-to-live were re-established. Through the simple suggestion, "You must be brave for the sake of others," we can, again and again, reawaken in bereaved hearts the spirit that enables people to pick up, face life again, and go on.

The second step in the process of creating courage is to remind people, directly or indirectly, of their own latent resources. This is the technique employed by the writers of "inspirational" poems, essays, or sermons. Analyze these writings carefully and you will find almost invariably that they suggest there are, within the reader's own life, unguessed resources of wisdom, strength, endurance, and power-to-achieve. It is this suggestion which gives the stanzas or sentences their power to inspire. It is the technique thus ingeniously employed which preachers and pastors would do well to study.

Perhaps the most obvious way by which to suggest to people the magnitude of their latent resources is to relate to them the story of other people who, caught in some equally difficult situation, have revealed a wholly unsuspected capacity for endurance and achievement. Such incidents not only transfer the listener's attention from his own hardships, but also suggest to him in surprisingly effective fashion the fact that he may possess equally great latent abilities, and the fact that he may be facing an equally gratifying triumph. To many confused and disheartened young people I have told the story of a stowaway on a Pacific liner who made the twenty-one-day trip from Australia to Canada hidden in a life-boat swung high above the top deck of the ship. Crouched there day and night, eating the meager supply of emergency rations placed in the boat for use in a crisis, that young man finally completed the voyage and crept ashore at Victoria, British Columbia. Only when, a few days later, the sailors lowered the life-boats to renew the water in the kegs, did they discover that a stowaway had been living in one of the boats for the preceding three weeks. Why does that story invariably hearten young people? Because it suggests to them the capacity for endurance which they too have, and on which they too may draw in time of need.

Another way by which we can suggest to needy individuals the extent of their latent powers is to remind them of the complexity of their inheritance. Each one of us has two parents, four grandparents, eight great-grandparents—and then how the numbers jump as we move backward through the generations! In the tenth generation behind us we come to more than 1,000 individuals—all of them in that tenth generation—who were our direct ancestors. If we go back six centuries instead of three, twenty-one generations instead of ten, we come to a time when—at the same instant—some two million direct ancestors of ours were walking the earth. One of our essayists has recently made a curious use of this fact. He says that six hundred years ago the total population of England, thanks to the effects of the Black Plague, was less than two million. Thus if one of us to-day were of pure English stock he would (theoretically, at least) number among his ancestors everyone living in England in the fourteenth century! Granted that some of those shadowy and hitherto-unrecognized forbears are nothing to be proud of. Others are men and women to be immensely proud of. From them we may well have drawn the qualities of character necessary for victory in the hard battle we face to-day. Granted that the major elements in a man's inheritance are derived from his two parents, and that most of the remaining elements are drawn from his four grandparents and his eight great-grandparents. Even those fourteen individuals can provide a surprisingly large array of virtues; and—thanks to the infinite complexity of the life-process—there is always the chance that additional virtues from earlier ancestors may make their belated and gratifying reappearance in a human life to-day. To remind disheartened men and women of these facts, to assure them that their inheritance is more complex than they dream, and to point out the fact that it may be a source of unsuspected strength as well as a source of embarrassing weakness—to do these things is to suggest hidden resources and latent abilities. And when we suggest these things we invariably begin creating courage and rousing self-confidence.

The third step in the process of giving people this form of strength lies in bringing them a new understanding of the precise nature of the divine help. It is at this third step that the path of the religious leader and the path of the conventional consulting-psychologist separate. The psychologist utilizes in his efforts the transfer of attention and the suggestion of latent resources. There he stops. The religious leader, on the con-

trary, goes on. He adds to the wisdom of psychology the further wisdom religion provides. And the essence of that wisdom lies in the message of a divine help available to us all, available the moment we rise to the level of our own best.

Unfortunately there is an immense amount of popular confusion to-day on the subject of the precise nature of this divine help. Many individuals, like the woman whose pitiful letter we quoted at the beginning of this paper, have no clear idea what the divine help is, or how and when it comes to human beings. Other people, even more confused in their thinking, fancy that the divine help may assume strange and fantastic forms, and may bring miraculous deliverance from any and all difficulties. Recently a supposedly intelligent woman in a New England city came to her minister and asked indignantly why God had "let her down." When the minister asked how it was that God had proved unfaithful, the woman explained she had withdrawn all her funds from the bank, invested them in tickets on the Irish Sweepstake, and then prayed faithfully every day that God would make one of her horses win. When all her tickets proved worthless, and when she found herself facing another Depression-winter utterly penniless, she concluded that the benefits of prayer had been vastly overrated, and demanded that her minister justify the ways of God with men. In a world which reveals such pitiful evidences of religious ignorance, and which also discloses cults that flourish by making extravagant promises of divine aid in gaining health, wealth, and irresistible personal charm, is there not desperate need for a careful type of adult education on this central point of Christian teaching—the reality and the nature of God's help?

In this situation thoughtful religious leaders can, and must, say two things. The first is that experience has shown, not once but a million times, that God does not help us by changing our external situation. After we have prayed, prayed with all the earnestness and faith at our command, our external situation remains exactly what it was before our prayer was uttered. The laws of Nature still operate, the old problems still press upon us for solution, and the attitudes of the men and women about us remain quite as unfriendly as they were beforehand. When, occasionally, there is a change in the external situation after prayer has been offered, a thorough analysis of the situation almost invariably indicates that the change—though it did come *after* prayer—was not precipitated *by* prayer. To

those who, ignoring the mountain of evidence on this point, still insist that prayer can and does change external situations, the experience of pious but disappointed people is an insoluble riddle. Why, if God will cure infantile paralysis in answer to prayer, are there so many children of praying parents whose deformities persist? Why, if God will interfere in the course of external events for the benefit of human favorites, is it *not* wise to buy tickets on the Irish Sweepstake and then implore God to make one of those tickets the source of a fortune? The woman who risked the remnant of her savings on such tickets was taking her religion seriously. The trouble was she was not taking her religion intelligently.

If God does not help us by changing our external situation, how does he help us? What can we say to puzzled and disheartened men and women who crave some assurance of the divine help, some ampler understanding of it? We can say this. God helps us, not by changing our external situation, but by changing our own inner life. To this inward change, following sincere and earnest prayer, centuries of human experience bear eloquent witness. It was this inward change to which Jesus almost certainly referred in the great saying, "Everyone that asketh receiveth." Everyone who asks does not receive external deliverance, but everyone who asks does receive inward help. How does the help come? In the form of ideas rising in the mind of the person who prays. Sometimes those ideas—as in the case of the idea of self-sufficiency—bring a significant release of energy within the personality. Sometimes those ideas suggest a definite course of action, one which later proves of the utmost significance. Sometimes those ideas lead an individual to do for his friends something those friends needed to have done, but which they themselves—unaided—were unable to accomplish. The answer to prayer, whether for ourselves or for those we love, is an idea emerging quietly within the mind of the person who prays. The consequences of that idea, as human experience has repeatedly shown, may be of enormous significance near and far; and for those consequences the God who planted the seed-idea in a waiting mind bears at least some responsibility. To make all this plain to tired, confused, and disheartened individuals; to guard them against the danger of expecting the impossible from prayer, while at the same time disclosing to them the reality and the certainty of the divine help—to do these things is to bring them that final increment of courage and hope which religious faith, and religious faith alone, is able to provide.

Causes of the World's Confusion

HAROLD PAUL SLOAN

IT was the summer of 1934 and the steamship *Washington* was steaming northward on its course, which lay to the east of Newfoundland. Half a score of passengers who had been walking on the deck, stood gazing at a narrow red line, as of flame, which bounded the sea at the horizon. It was past nine o'clock, and there was this last lingering fire from the sun, while around, the evening was darkening to night. All about the ship was nothing but the waste of water. Sea behind us! Sea before us! Miles and miles of rolling, restless sea!

As we stood there at the rail gazing at the sun's red line, the word "sea" doubtless meant something different to every one of those passengers. Some thought of it as vivid water, wet, and cold and deep. Some thought of it in terms of its chemical formula, mysterious molecules with gaping spaces in between. Others thought of it as even more rarefied, a complex of forces, electrons and protons, which took on the nature of the sea only when perceived by human minds through the human senses. Perhaps, if we really could know just what the sea is in its essential nature, we might find it to be something more rarefied still—a complex of mathematical formulæ, a play of ideas within the Infinite Mind.

Such is the inevitable difference in human knowledge whenever it concerns values known in sense experience. Each man's perceptions are of course modified by his own particular background. Each man perceives something individual and different, as did those passengers at the rail of the *Washington*. There was, however, one experience which was substantially identical for all of those passengers: Each one of them discriminated himself both from the sea and from the sunset: Each one of them realized himself as a stable center of consciousness in the midst of the surrounding flux of things. This discrimination of self may or may not include something of sense experience. Whether it does or not, the experience is none the less independent of the detail of the senses. It is an immediate spiritual perception, and one of the most immediate experiences in consciousness. It is an instant certainty, a primary knowledge. The without-which-not of all other knowledge whatsoever.

In vain have some psychologists sought to avoid the subjective, wishing to achieve complete objectivity for their science. All knowledge inevitably includes the factor of consciousness and self-consciousness. Eliminate these and knowledge can neither be received, tabulated nor conveyed. But my wish is not merely to establish the fact of this inner world. It would go further to affirm that its data constitute the most immediate and most certain of all truths.

Returning now to those half score of passengers on the *Washington*. In spite of their differences of background, their experience of the knowing self was practically identical; and it would have been equally identical had the differences of background amounted to the wide differences existing between primitive and civilized man. The untutored savage will be aware of that same sense of stable experiencing consciousness which characterized Sir Isaac Newton or any of his scientific successors. The whole advance of the race has recorded no progress here. Every experience that has come to focus in a human intelligence has included as its deepest element that self awareness which is characteristic of the experiencing mind.

Science has done marvels in its simplification of the mysteries of the sense universe about us. Its cataloguing of the minute details of every phase of being from the sub-microscopic, up to those distant burning stars, is a romance of achievement that will permanently command the admiration of the race; but this objective achievement leaves the real mystery of being untouched. It is man's own self-knowing rational consciousness, with its capacity for creative purposing, and its sense of relation to a back-lying infinite that is the real mystery. The suggestion that this rich consciousness is the inside of matter is no solution of the mystery. It is not even thought. It is more words that have no intelligible thought content. Objective phenomena is everywhere a flux, nowhere coming to stability; but consciousness with its abiding core, the sense of self, transcends this flux. Consciousness might be said to look down serenely upon the flow of phenomena much as the changeless stars look down upon the rolling sea. The universe flows; but consciousness is, in a sense, static. It transcends the flow and abides the same. What, then, is consciousness? What is man's power to know and to know himself as knowing? Objective science cannot answer. Psychology, in so far as it aspires to be an objective science, cannot answer. This is the field of philosophy and religion, of searching subjective analysis and of aspiring faith. Do we disallow these in the name of our unbalanced passion

for the objective approach to truth? Such an attitude only lays bare our unthinking shallowness, for in spite of every clamoring protest of this objectively minded age the reality of knowing consciousness is basic to all knowledge.

And this knowing consciousness is very far from being a blank sheet of paper on which experience has written a complicated record. There are truths that are of consciousness itself; truths that the soul contributes to experience. It does not find them in experience. They make experience possible. I will not attempt to detail them, but the sense of self, of the infinite, of freedom, of duty and of rational relationships are clearly all of consciousness. To say that ultimate truth must include an appreciation and comprehension of these values is but to utter a truism. Every value in the universe must be included in an ultimate comprehension of it. What I really mean to say is that the appreciation and comprehension of these inner values must be seen to be the most significant and certain of truths: for here, for the mind that is capable of the analysis, is the most fundamental knowledge possible to the finite mind. It makes all other knowledge possible. To call this knowledge in question is to plunge one's self into a bottomless skepticism.

All knowledge mediated through the senses, must assume the dependability of two powers, namely, man's perceiving senses, and his rationalizing consciousness; but knowledge that is of the inner consciousness alone is under the necessity of assuming only the second of these two. This latter approach to truth is thus demonstrably the most certain form of knowledge. Doubtless, it is involved in difficulty, because the average man cannot achieve sharpness in the analysis of subjective values; but this circumstance does not warrant it being ignored by the truth-seeker. The exploration of the inner world—the world of man's immediate awareness—is necessary to the pursuit of truth, and without it truth in the largest sense becomes impossible.

But while we would insist thus upon the recovery of man's inner world, and on the recognition of its disciplines, philosophy and religion, we, yet, would not seek for them an overweening authority, nor would we put upon them an exaggerated emphasis. Truth belongs to no single intellectual discipline. It can be attained only by men who pursue it by the use of all intellectual disciplines. The experience of the race would seem clearly to indicate that truth must always be approached along several highways

simultaneously; and since it must lie in every approach, it evidently will be at the point of convergence. In other words, truth is a vision that belongs to moral personalities who approach it by the use of all their faculties; and the overemphasis upon any faculty or approach leads to a false emphasis which vitiates the whole process of thought.

The first quarter of the twentieth century has been suffering from such a false emphasis. Our pursuit of truth has been one-sided. We have exploited our sense powers, neglecting our immediate awareness. We have developed the objective sciences, neglecting philosophy and religion. The result has been an inevitable confusion. We drove up a blind alley. We are just now beginning to be aware of our position, of its futility, and of the necessity of turning about. We must correct the unbalance of our former emphasis. We must restore philosophy and religion to their proper place in what we might call the equilateral triangle of truth.

It will instantly be agreed on every hand that the specialist in the field of religion, if he essays to discuss biology must have due regard for the discipline of the laboratory, which is so necessary if one is to speak with authority concerning the growth and multiplication of cells. I affirm that we need to lift up the opposite caution, namely: If a biologist essays to discuss the field of religion—the ultimate interpretation of this whole universe, including man with his moral and spiritual nature—if, I say, a biologist essays this ultimate mystery, he must have due regard for the disciplines of the spirit; which include prayer, worship, aspiration, pain, bereavement, faith, character. For the scientist to fail in his regard for these things would be as fatal to the reliability of his opinions as would the opposite failure of some religious writer. I mean seriously to assert that either ethical failure, neglect of spiritual aspiration, or even inexperience of life disqualifies one for clear and responsible thinking in this field of ultimate truth.

I am seeking to lift up an emphasis upon the inner as distinct from the outer world, and to insist upon it that truth cannot be arrived at without the due cultivation of both fields. There must be in the future, as there has been in the past, a devoted exploration of objective phenomena by the physical and biological sciences; but there must be in addition to this a due regard for philosophy, and for the still deeper moral and spiritual intuitions of religion. Failure along any one of these lines of approach will be fatal not only to truth, but also to life. The human race will suffer, as the

human race is now suffering, and it will suffer more unless the false over-emphasis upon the objective in our present approach to truth is corrected.

The dictatorship of philosophy issued in intellectual skepticism, moral corruption and social failure. The dictatorship of religion issued similarly in unbelief, corruption, and in shameless tyranny and cruelty.

The present dictatorship of the physical and biological sciences has brought civilization once more to the edge of the abyss. We have regarded life as wholly circumscribed by law, and freedom by consequence has been disallowed. As a result of these things, moral ideals have been completely discredited, hope excluded, and a coarse, crass materialism has been given the center of the stage. More serious thinkers have been in despair. Some even have railed against the truth they have proclaimed. Others have steeled their souls against what they have held to be the inevitable darkness.

Such is always the tragedy of the one highway approach to truth. It makes no difference whether it be science, philosophy, or religion, inevitable failure and disillusion awaits the age which approaches truth by any single intellectual discipline. The time has come for prophetic voices to be lifted up to demand for our modern world a new and balanced intellectual life. We want to have all the sciences exploring the world of the objective, but we want philosophy and religion, the disciplines of man's inner world, to be recognized at their true values. We want these disciplines to act upon the sciences, and themselves, to be acted upon. The time has come when men must be made to understand that a failure to recognize the authority of philosophy and religion in their own proper fields is as unintelligent as religion's sometime failure to recognize the authority of science in its legitimate field. Let us have all the sciences; but let us have philosophy and religion beside them, and let us be intellectually impatient, as much of a science which attempts to dominate the whole field, as of a religion that would deny to science its proper sphere of authority.

In this universe one almost never comes upon one value standing alone, and dominant in its solitariness. Instead, we come constantly upon combinations, numerous interacting forces, which, operating together, arrive at their proper resultant. The newer science itself affirms this organic principle as characterizing all existence. Space, time, and physical bodies are all bound into one. I insist that we must recognize the necessity of a similar interaction of forces in our pursuit of truth. Religion and philosophy, as well as science, must have their own recognition and authority.

Religion must operate within its own special authority, and science must do the same. Science as well as religion must be seen as a clearly defined discipline. There are areas of experience that lend themselves to the technique of the scientific method; and there are areas of experience that require instead the moral and spiritual sensitiveness of a magnificent spiritual life. One approach is as capable of dependable results as the other; for is there not exactness in poetry, music and art as well as in weight? Total truth is neither of science alone nor of religion alone, but of both. If a particular discussion seems to lie within the proper field of investigation of both these disciplines, it must be explored with due humility by each; and each must recognize that its conclusions represent the findings with respect to only one side of the shield. No single conclusion, however, of any intellectual discipline should be accorded the recognition which must be accorded to religion's basic affirmations concerning human nature, namely, its intuitive rationality, morality and sense of infinite destiny. These affirmations are the most immediately known truth in the possession of mankind, and the full acceptance of these affirmations is necessary, not only to human well-being, but also to a world where it is possible to speak of truth and to find truth.

Doctor Whitehead, in his *Science and the Modern World*, asserts that scientific speculations have repeatedly involved science in the complete negation of its own conclusions. He instances the unrelated series of Huxley as an illustration. Even a layman in science could add several more illustrations. Such impossible hypotheses have, time after time, led science on a blind trail. Neither truth nor humanity is served by such speculations, which afterward come to be recognized as pseudo-science. In repeated instances, an adequate familiarity with the basic certainties of religion and philosophy would have prevented science from entering upon such misleading adventures. For example, Watson would never have suggested the central postulates of behaviorism, if he had had a decent respect for his own intuitive sense of freedom. And if the race's sense of freedom and moral responsibility can be set aside, one would question whether there are any facts of experience sufficiently demonstrable to serve as the basis for an authentic science.

The error in this matter reappears again and again. It is that of having attempted a one highway approach to ultimate truth, ignoring the proper authority of other equally responsible and important intel-

lectual disciplines. And this has been a serious defect of thinking in these opening years of the twentieth century.

Our intellectual life has stressed sense science to the neglect of philosophy and religion. The progress of invention and of material well-being has tended in the same direction. Our civilization has become shallow. We have pursued the outward with an excited fury that has increased with our discovery of its insufficiency. We have developed a technique of rapid-change simply to maintain our interest, because our activities were not deep enough to give us profound satisfaction. Such was the rise of the now rapidly passing jazz age, an age of fevered objectivity, of thoughtless rush and shallow excitements. We had thought to make the sweep of our activity cause us to forget the burning thirsts of that inner life, which we had steadily neglected, and often dogmatically denied. Now, we are in the midst of the results of these neglects and negations. Life is tragically impoverished, Christian ideals have declined amazingly in their authority, government decays, while freedom, the political outflowering of the Christian religion, is itself weighted by the increase of moral failure.

Such is the world's present confusion. We must meet it by a reconstruction of its intellectual life that will at once restore to it balance and recover the vital authority of religion. The Christian thinker has unrivaled authority, when he operates within his own proper field of study and expression. The Christian thinker has a number of definite certainties, which arise in his own inner consciousness. If some one trained to the objective approach should presume to deny these certainties the Christian thinker need not be disturbed; for he has, and does experience them, and as a student of man's inner life he is definitely within his own proper field of specialization in defining and expressing them.

Corresponding to these inner certainties, the Christian thinker has the apostolic witness to that astonishing series of events which, beginning far back in Israel's peculiar national history, came to its climax in the sublimity of the fact of Christ.

That fact includes the open, empty sepulchre, and an announcement of a most astonishing human victory over death. Out of it arose the Christian Church. In its un-reduced magnitude this fact of Christ meets the outreachings of the human soul. It is the one point at which the outer world of historic events has attained to the dimensions of man's infinitely aspiring inner life.

This coincidence between history without us and the aspirations of the soul within, not only makes an addition to the authority of the Christian position, it multiplies that authority. This is the unique appeal of Christian truth, which it shares with no other religion.

The Christian thinker's position has another element of great strength. It is the fact that his faith has been socially creative in an extraordinary way. The human race has made incomparable advances under the inspiration of the Christian religion. Christianity has promoted human freedom and filled it with moral and spiritual and social meaning, and the Christian centuries stand separated from the pagan centuries by amazing contrasts.

These are intellectual values which the Christian thinker does not beg men to accept any more than Newton begged them to accept the law of gravitation. These are facts and experiences, and they give to the Christian religion an unsurpassed authority in its own proper field of truth.

It is with gratitude that I notice in a number of current scientific publications something approaching this very recognition of the authority of religion. Scientists to-day are admitting, if no more, that their single discipline is not adequate to the discovery of final truth. One might quote such recognized leaders as Dr. Alfred North Whitehead, Sir James Jeans, or Sir Arthur Eddington. But far beyond their admissions the pressure of new scientific positions will inevitably make for an enlarged recognition of religion. When Jeans, for example, calls matter "a mathematical formula of infinite mind" it points to a scientific recognition of the spirit which is of incalculable value to religion. I am convinced that religion will soon confront a much more favorable intellectual environment. I believe we are within a decade of a new religious movement. It is not enough, however, that Christian men should merely accept with appreciation this better attitude of the physical sciences. We must go beyond this to recognize the strength of our position. We must undertake to measure up to our renewed opportunity. We must undertake to make of ourselves literally *specialists in the field of man's inner life and of its historic complement, the fact of Christ*. We will not dispute with science. We will assume its positions in so far as they are really verified conclusions, and will lead human thought out beyond them into the reaches of that back-lying infinite, which is essential both to thought and life. This is the Christian thinker's own proper field of specialization. It has a technique as definite and as essential as that of the biological laboratory. The spiritually undeveloped point of view is

as certain to produce crass error, should it attempt this field, as some one unlearned in science would be if he should attempt a treatise on relativity. Here, then, is the Christian thinker's responsibility and opportunity: the world is waiting for him to lead it in a new appreciation of the inner world, and of its unbounded sublimities, in which alone its reason, conscience and aspirations can find fruition and satisfaction.

Here is indeed a challenging call! The Christian preacher must undertake the task of being indeed a specialist in the field of man's inner nature, and the fact of Christ. His sermons must be made intellectually commanding as well as sympathetic and comforting. The world needs to learn again the comfort of strong truth as contrasted with mere emotionalism. The pulpit must again be stood beside the university class-room, and it must be accorded an equal intellectual recognition. Responsible information will in the long run command recognition; and the Christian minister must again win such recognition for himself. Certainly he cannot be as great a scientist as Whitehead, or Jeans, or Eddington; but he can know humanity's aspirings, and the reality of their fulfillment in that mighty series of events which center about Bethlehem and Calvary. He can know the evidential strength of the Christian witness, and he can know it with a positiveness that needs to ask no questions of any other authority. He can know, too, the creative power of the Gospel's impact upon the centuries. He can know, as an inner experience, the redeeming power of that *amazing cross*, and the unquenchable hope of that *riven tomb* of the Christ. He can know these things, and he can secure their expression in sermons, in music, in art, in ministries of human helpfulness, in ethical leadership, in social leadership, in life which conquers sin, in faith which conquers death, until the very power of his evangel will challenge and convince the age. It is so we must rebuild foundations of Christianity in America.

Have we the courage to ask ourselves whether our American Protestantism has been doing these things? Must we not regretfully admit that we have been too widely children of our age, objective as it has been objective? Together we have read on the surface, and thought on the surface. The world has demanded lighter preaching, and we have conformed to its demand. In how many pulpits have we attracted our congregations from Sunday to Sunday by spectacular methods that have indeed brought a crowd, but that have done nothing to rebuild the authority of faith?

I do not want to spend much time upon the failures of yesterday. It

is sadly true that we have made great surrenders. The Church of Rome has not compromised with the age, as we have compromised. Doubtless, the Roman communion has also its vulnerable point, but it has shown a magnificent loyalty to essential Christian truth through this period of frightful bewilderment and confusion.

There are, as I see it, six chief sacrifices which Protestant Christianity has made during the decades just behind us.

First, we of the pulpit have yielded our authority as specialists in the religious field at the behest of an age dominated by science. We have allowed its prejudiced criticism of our Gospel to disturb our own confidence in it. We, ourselves, have become to a degree uncertain and we have allowed uncertainty to develop around us. These things have continued and the practical reforms which we have achieved, for lack of foundations, both of morality and of government are insecure.

Second, we have neglected doctrinal preaching, having been preoccupied with what we called the practical problems of life; and we have done this to such a degree that the foundations of faith have become disintegrated, and the practical reforms, which we have achieved, for lack of foundations, have collapsed in ruins at our feet.

Third, we have denied depravity because it did not fit the self-sufficient, self-assertive spirit of the day; and seemingly we were unconscious that this self-assertive mood was the very depravity we were denying. We even surrendered to the demand of the age to abolish restraints. With it we criticized the "thou-shalt-nots" of yesterday, to the point of declaring the Ten Commandments outmoded. As a result, we have seen an age passionately desiring self-assertion (self-expression it was often called) abolish one Christian ideal after another in its mad rush to find life where life never was, until the world itself stands astonished at its own confusion.

Fourth, we have carried our criticism of the earlier other-worldliness of the Church to an extreme that is both false to the New Testament and impoverishing to religion. There is an other-worldly emphasis on both Jesus and the apostles. There is an other-worldly emphasis that is basic to religion as a whole, and peculiarly central in the Christian hope. Our neglect of it has weakened Christian life.

Fifth, we have overly emphasized our concern with civil authority and law. In our actual emphasis, we have come very near to substituting social

reform for personal redemption. Certainly no one familiar with church history would call in question the Church's reforming responsibility. What we are insisting on is this: The Church's redemptive responsibility is basic, and it must ever so be maintained. Indeed, it is the effectiveness of its redemptive labors that makes possible reforming achievements.

Sixth, we have exchanged various humanly operated programs of character-building for that divine salvation which requires of men just the opposite of our loved self-assertion, namely, self-despair and surrender. The Gospel of Christ substitutes for human self-sufficiency a divine supernatural endowment, which is creative, and transforming. We have neglected this resource. We seem to have forgotten Wesley's ineffectiveness before Aldersgate Street, and Luther's ineffectiveness before his great evangelical experience, and Saint Paul's ineffectiveness before the inner illumination which came to him at Damascus. We seem to have been unconscious that sin is not so much immoral details such as drunkenness and adultery, as it is this very self-sufficiency which we have loved. The genius of Christian experience demands a moving of the center of life from self to Christ. In nature, we are self-confident, and self-glorious. In Redemption our confidence is in Christ and our glory also is in Christ. Yes, we have missed all this just as if Saint Paul and Luther and Wesley had not all defined and affirmed it; and we have substituted for the New Testament's creative experience of justification and regeneration through Christ a program of self-poised character building, which is as remote from Christianity as was the Phariseism Gamaliel taught the young Saul of Tarsus.

These failures of our Protestantism are chiefly responsible for the confusion of our times. It is because our faith has halted and our gospel has been obscured that we are suffering this present uncertainty, confusion and failure.

FACING OUR TASK WITHIN THE CHURCH

Not before in our national history has Protestant Christianity faced this present situation. There is, to-day, a considerable public that neither recognizes the authority of the Church's truth, nor regards its ideals. However, we should not be daunted by this circumstance, for we are much better placed than were the first Christian witnesses, who found confronting them a dominant and engulfing paganism. If they could succeed against the odds they confronted, we can succeed to-day.

But we must be inspired by an absolute confidence in our Lord and in his truth. We must be thoroughly convinced of the authority and significance of the Christian ministry. We must put the authority of Christ above all other authorities. And why not? Even if we claim no more, we must at least assert that Jesus was the foremost specialist the ages have produced in the field of man's inner life. I will risk without hesitation the truth of any spiritual intuition of Jesus against any contrary speculation of any age. If, however, I am fully Christian, I have a much larger confidence, even than this. I can start with a divine incarnation—the living God invading human history, exploring the tragedy of man's dark tomb, triumphing over it and with a shout leading man out into eternal life. Here is a mountain summit of vision which gives to the Christian thinker definite advantages over all his fellows in the pursuit of truth. Standing on these heights, he ought to be able to out-think, out-live, out-serve, and out-die his fellow beings.

Among all the detailed needs of our times, there is none so vastly important as that every *son and daughter of our race should have his horizon of life pressed out again to the infinite*. Man was made for the unbounded. The thing that shocks me most about Russia is that its people can endure even this long to live wholly in the world of sense and time, being fattened like beasts, with no outlook into the infinite. My soul would suffocate in such an atmosphere. Large truth cannot possibly come out of such an oppressive point of view. Men need great certainties if they are either to think or live sublimely. They need Jesus' serene confidence concerning the kingdom of heaven, with its supremacy of righteousness, its victory over littleness and sin, its conquest of death, its immortal and exalting hope. The majestic fact of Christ has value for the race both in the charting of truth, and in the energizing of lives. Jesus' open, empty sepulcher throws a fuller light upon man, his dignity and destiny, than all of human learning beside. If these things indeed be true then every great Christian value stands and our race can gaze upon the glow of truth which is eternal though it cannot yet outline the detail of the sky line.

And the majestic fact of Christ is the Church's great heritage. God has given to us a dependable glimpse of the final truth, and of the goal of all life while yet we grope our way in the midst of the confusion and by-paths of the trail. It is my deliberate conviction, no matter whether we are thinking of the race's progress in its pursuit of truth, or of reform,

or of the spiritual solution of life's problems, that the supreme value lies in the total fact of Christ. Science would have avoided many a blind alley if its investigators had but kept him clear above their horizons. Haeckel's materialism and Watson's behaviorism would have been instantly excluded as *per se* false had these scientists had a sufficient breadth of culture to recognize the proper authority of religion, and the significance of the fact of Christ. It is the Church's responsibility to see that religious truth as it centers in Christ is kept in effective emphasis. If at times we must resist the trend of a contemporary culture in his name, we can be assured that the culture of another generation will justify our devotion.

Said Saint John: "This is the victory that overcometh the world, even our faith." Faith is the consummate choice, the supreme achievement; and in every age, but in this age especially, we need high, clear voices calling men again to its great achievement. Undoubtedly, we stand at the threshold of a new world. It will be definitely different from much that we have known before. If the Church does not lose her confidence, or in some other way fail her Lord, it may be greatly nobler. We dare not raise the question between the gospel for individuals and the gospel for society; the gospel of Christ must be seen as all inclusive. It concerns both men and institutions, both science and philosophy, both art and education. It concerns the whole range of life, and every expression of life. I believe that there is, at present, a pressing necessity for a new emphasis upon the evangelism of the individual, and a focussing of our concern upon the Church itself, as distinct from the State, or the civilization which surrounds it. But notwithstanding these immediate demands, the Church can never when wisely led face less than its total task—the making Christian of the whole range of life and every expression of life, and the bringing of all truth, all government and all men to the obedience of Christ.

The sources of our power were established for us by our Lord, himself, as he said:

"When the Comforter is come, whom I will send unto you from the Father, He shall testify of Me; and ye also shall bear witness, because ye have been with Me from the beginning" (John 15. 26-27). By this double witness, the one outward, human and historical, the other inward, divine and supernatural, it is the will of the God who speaks to us as Father, Son and Holy Spirit, to unify the ages in Christ. We are the ambassadors of God, himself, the authoritative ministers of his truth.

The Christian and War

HERBERT H. FARMER

I AM among those who have decided that henceforth they will under no circumstances participate in war. I have been asked to set forth in this article some of the thoughts which lie behind this position. I do not claim to have answered satisfactorily, even to my own mind, all the perplexing questions which arise in any discussion of the *general* topic of the place of force and compromise in the Christian life; but I do feel clear at the moment concerning one *special* instance of the use of force and the attitude of compromise, namely, modern warfare and the Christian's participation in it. Nothing that I shall say is meant in the least to suggest that those who take a contrary position are not entitled to the name of Christian; the point is simply that for me, at the moment, my sense of loyalty to what I conceive to be the mind of Christ demands that in any future war I must be "counted out." And for that I must seek to give reasons, not in order to score dialectical points, but in order that both those who are disposed to agree, and those who are not, may be, on a tremendously grave issue, "fellow helpers to the truth."

I shall say a word at the end as to what I mean by participation, should war actually arise. By war I mean the actual or threatened use of wholesale, indiscriminate wounding and slaying of men by organized lethal machinery, in order to force them to do what, it is assumed, they would not otherwise do.

The position to be maintained can perhaps be set forth best by taking up in turn three fundamental questions which are involved in it and closely related to one another. By discussing briefly these three questions we shall be able to make clearer, not only what the position is, but also, which is perhaps in some ways more important, what it is *not*. These three questions are: (1) Are we ever entitled as Christians to say in advance what we will do, or not do, in certain hypothetical circumstances? (2) What is the relation of the use of force to a distinctively Christian dealing with our fellow men? (3) What are the limits of those compromises with evil which are admittedly forced upon those who would walk the way of Christ in this sinful world?

(1) Many who sympathize with the position we are maintaining refuse to commit themselves wholly to it on the ground that it is of the essence of the Christian life not to bind itself in advance, but to leave itself completely free to discern the will of God in each new situation as it arises. I feel the force of this objection, based, as it is, on a principle of Christian living which is true and important. But it is possible to press the application of the principle too far. Two things may be said:

First, there is plainly some place for final prohibitions even within the liberty wherewith Christ has made us free. Indeed, liberty, so far from being contradicted by limitation, necessarily presupposes it. Only the man who has got some final exclusions in his life can stand up amidst the pressures of his environment as a genuine personality with a specific style and character. If Christ be in any valid sense the Way and the Truth, then certain other ways of living and acting are *not* the way once and for all, and can be known as such. Under no circumstances, for example, could it ever be right for a Christian to torture a child, even to save another child from being tortured; and there is nothing inherently impossible in the suggestion that to stick a bayonet into a man's stomach, or pour poison gas into his lungs, may lie under a similar final prohibition. The suggestion may be mistaken, but if it is, it must be for some other reason than the supposed limitation that it sets on Christian freedom.

Second, to speak of "each new situation as it arises" may be a dangerously misleading abstraction. There is no such thing as a completely new situation which drops, as it were, into the midst of history out of the skies. Each situation grows out of the previous one, and it is arbitrary to draw a line at any one point and say that here an old situation ends and a new begins. We are creating new situations by what we do in the present, and we have a moral responsibility before God, which we cannot escape, for what emerges in the future. Now it is precisely part of our position that the part God is calling upon us to play in the creation of future world situations in respect of war is that we announce as Christians that henceforth we will have nothing whatever to do with the war method. There is no question that if all Christians were to announce this, and to announce it on a religious basis, so that statesmen would know that nothing they could do by way of propaganda would move the inflexible refusal before God of millions of their best citizens, the whole situation would be radically changed. We have recently seen what concerted Christian action of a negative kind can

do by way of cleaning up the films. It may be legitimately questioned, of course, whether God is so calling upon men, but the objection can hardly lie against those who think He is that they are abstracting from real life situations, and unduly prescribing to God or binding the hands of His servants. The ever overshadowing threat of war is our real, historical situation to-day, and there is no prior reason why God should not be meeting us with a demand that we should set up an absolute refusal in the midst of it.

What ground then is there for thinking that He is? The ground for us is not some merely prudential and worldly consideration that unless war is prevented civilization will perish, but something much more ultimate and more specifically Christian. It is some sort of final and inescapable recoil of the Christ-illuminated insight from the use in personal relations of that type of force which modern war essentially is. This brings us to our second question, namely, what is the relation of the use of force to a distinctively Christian dealing with our fellow men?

(2) In this connection we will first state on what our position is *not* based; we will then indicate briefly on what it is.

It is not based on a literalist and slavish adhesion to the sixth commandment, or to certain sayings in the Sermon on the Mount. It is not based on a sentimental squeamishness about loss of life, as though there were nothing worse than that men should die. Above all, it is not based on a fantastic repudiation of all force in men's dealings with one another. This last point is important, if only for the reason that so many people seem to assume that such a repudiation is the so-called "pacifist" position, and that if they can only show the absurdity of it—a not difficult task—that is the end of the matter. It is, however, a perfectly consistent position to maintain that force may, indeed must, on occasion enter into human relationships—as, for example, in a police and penal system, or in the restraint of imbeciles, or even in strikes for better industrial conditions (though we would reserve the right to condemn, and to refuse participation in, *certain types* of penal and police activity, lunacy administration, industrial conflict)—and yet maintain that that sort of exercise of force which we call war must never in any shape or form enter in. That is to say, our position rests on a discrimination in the light of Christ of the uses of force, and is the affirmation that when that discrimination is rightly made, then whatever may be said of other exercises of force, war at least is seen to be under a final prohibition.

By what standard then may we as Christians discriminate between uses of force? I take it as axiomatic that the standard is love. There is not space to enter into an inquiry as to what we mean by love; nor do I think it is in any case really necessary. As this is a discussion among Christians some common ground must be assumed. I assume that in a general way we know what is meant when it is said that a Christian is under absolute obligation in all his personal relationships, and not least in those with people who are estranged from him, to seek, under God, to establish the other man and himself in a genuine community of thought and feeling and will. We may not be able to grasp and express what such an ideal will be in all its richness when it is attained, but if there is anything other than sentimentality in saying that God is love, and that we are ourselves being reconciled to such a God, and commissioned to a like ministry of reconciliation, through Christ, then it must be possible to know in some measure when we are genuinely seeking it, to what extent we are making progress toward it, and, more particularly, what kind of activities are a definite contradiction of, and hindrance to, it. Granting, then, that what may be impossible to describe in abstract propositions may be, in the sphere of practical personal relations, real enough to guide and check the disciple into the way of Christ, I submit that the following four principles in respect of force emerge from our experience in this sphere: (a) that the high ends of Christian reconciliation and love can never be served by the exercise of force alone, (b) that, on the contrary, the use of force is extremely liable to make those ends more difficult to achieve, (c) that, therefore, if force is used at all, it must be always and only as preparatory to the major appeal of love, and in a form that can be controlled and directed with discrimination to that end, (d) that a use of force which in its essential nature makes such control and appeal impossible must under no circumstances be used; it is for the Christian finally prohibited.

Proposition (d) is the crux of the matter so far as war is concerned. Let us take the two sections in turn:

As I see it, war is essentially a use of force in personal relationship which makes it impossible to grasp in love the personality of the man with whom you are dealing, or even to make him realize that you are seeking so to do—for three reasons. First, its deliberate and professed design is to kill, that is, to put the other man out of relation to you so totally that any appeal of love is, in the nature of the case, impossible. Second, it is, espe-

cially in its modern form, wholesale, indiscriminating, impersonal. If ever there was room in war for anything in the nature of genuine personal rapport between the combatants, it has now almost completely disappeared. Third, war is compelled to add to its task of mechanical slaughter certain other things which poison personal relations at their roots, namely, lying, trickery and subterfuge. War, in short, of necessity and in its essential idea, is a use of force which, from the angle of the demands of love, is a hideous cul-de-sac in personal relations.

But—turning to the second half of the proposition—does that set it under a final prohibition for the Christian? Here we are likely to come to the parting of the ways among equally sincere Christians, even if the first half of the proposition in its relation to war should be agreed to. I can only say that for me such a cul-de-sac, such a “no thoroughfare” for right personal relations, does put it under such a final prohibition. It cannot be the lesser of two evils for there is no greater evil, nothing more contrary to that mind of God which, so far as I can judge, is revealed in Christ, than deliberately to set oneself in such a relationship to human personality. As I contemplate myself sitting behind a machine-gun pouring molten lead into distant masses of men, or dropping bombs from a great height on towns and villages, or being trained to stab a young fellow’s stomach with a bayonet before he has a chance to stab mine, and as I contemplate myself seeking in these very acts to yoke my thus deliberately formed purpose to that Divine purpose of love which rests on the other man even as it has rested on me, then I just seem to know that, whatever qualifying considerations might be urged, there is for me, as Christian, absolutely and finally no other course but to say No. Nor is it any weakness in the argument thus in the end to come to rest, after endeavoring to see all the factors involved, in an intuition; in the last resort all ethical determination of conduct must rest on an ultimate sense of what is right and wrong, and, if, after due discussion, that sense is in any particular instance not shared by another, there is nothing more to be said.

Those Christians who share the writer’s abhorrence of war, but do not share this sense of an absolute prohibition in regard to it, usually base themselves on a doctrine of compromise. The position is entitled to the greatest respect, and must be briefly commented on. Thus we come to the third of the questions with which we started.

(3) The position is that though war in an ideal sense is contrary to the

mind of Christ, and every effort must be made to eliminate it, none the less our situation in a world of sinful men and women, with whom we have to deal, not only as individuals, but also as groups, forces it at times upon us as the lesser of two evils. The evil consequences of not using the war method, it is said, would be greater than the admitted evil consequences of using it. Thus we may be under obligation to repel an invader, or to achieve freedom against an oppressor, or to quell an insurrection in the body politic, and the regrettable necessity is forced upon us because men are evil and must be restrained. The force of this must be granted, the more so as I hold that compromises in respect of the use of force in relation to social necessities are sometimes forced upon us. Yet plainly there are limits to the compromises permissible to the Christian, otherwise he would speedily cease to make any distinctive witness at all; and the point of the argument so far has been that the limit must be drawn this side of any use of force which, like war, is what I have called a *cul-de-sac*.

Now the argument from the necessity of compromise is, in the nature of the case, an argument from the supposed evil consequences of one course of action as over against another. When this is realized, a difficult prior question comes into view, namely, how far the estimate of probable consequences should enter into the determination of Christian conduct. It is hard enough to estimate consequences of actions on grounds of ordinary worldly wisdom, but in a sphere where *ex hypothesi* what is conceived to be the redemptive will of God, that is, a factor transcending history and man's natural understanding, is involved, does not such estimation become well-nigh impossible? Is it not of the essence of religious faith to be ready at times, in response to what is felt to be the inescapable imperative of God, to defy all the probabilities and obey, committing the consequences unto Him? Thus it was in a measure, I conceive, when Christ went to the Cross. Wherefore, everything comes back to the question whether one does feel an ultimate divine prohibition against involving oneself in that *cul-de-sac* of lovelessness in personal relationship which is war. If one does, then any setting forth of an estimate of consequences becomes completely irrelevant. If one does not, then there is nothing to do but launch on the precarious business of trying to estimate them and deciding accordingly. I do not see any escape from this dilemma in methods of approach. Either we start from what we feel to be an immediate Christ-given insight into the ultimate realities and demands of the universe of personal relations—an

insight which in the nature of the case the unredeemed man cannot share, and which will appear folly to him—and abide by it, confiding the outcome to God; or we start from what appears to be required by the ordinary standards and purposes of the mass of mankind, and then try as best we can to adjust the mind of Christ to it. I can only repeat that for me the prohibition which rests on the war relationship seems at the moment so self-evidently absolute, directly I contemplate myself in it, that I am forced to grasp the first horn of the dilemma and treat the words consequence and compromise as irrelevant.

Much of the weakness and ineffectiveness of the church's witness against war, even when it has been of an emphatic and vigorous kind, comes from over-readiness to argue on the basis of probable consequences, and not enough on the basis of the intrinsic wickedness of war in the sight of God, and the necessity therefore of repudiating it and taking the consequences of such repudiation. The argument so often heard in this connection, that while there is no final prohibition in respect of war upon the Christian, none the less the time has come when it should be treated in effect as final, for under modern conditions war will mean the collapse of civilization altogether, seems to me to cut little ice in view of the forces which govern human conduct. Being based on an estimate of consequences, which none can demonstrate and any may question, the position lacks the passion and the obstinacy which can only arise from a religious awareness of the will of God, which must be obeyed come what may. In so dubious a matter as foreseeing the future, there will always be the temptation to make revised estimates under pressure, and to decide that one more war is necessary to end war, and save civilization from disaster. We have had many spectacles of nations persuading themselves that the future of civilization is bound up with their own military power and prestige. Moreover, such considerations are certain to be swamped by those heroic, quasi-religious impulses in men which are impatient of merely prudential considerations and are desirous to do things, "damning the consequences." A repudiation of war on the grounds that it won't pay is bound to look dull, unheroic, cowardly, when the banners are flying and men are being called upon to lay down their lives for the honor of the fatherland. As I see it, war is one of those evils so deeply rooted in the impulsive sin and blindness of man, that whatever else may contribute to its final elimination, one thing is quite indispensable, namely, that there should be set up in the midst of mankind the

absolute refusal of religious souls, who, in their faith in God, are ready to take all the risks and pay all the penalties of such refusal.

Though the Will of God often reaches us in a way that at the moment runs far in advance of, and even counter to, human estimations of consequence, none the less it is to be expected that, when once it has been grasped, there will not altogether be lacking some sort of support in facts. Hence, though I do not base my position on an estimate of consequences, I am quite prepared to offer some argument for it from that angle. The evidence of history on the supposed effectiveness of war in certain circumstances to achieve even the natural values of unredeemed man is by no means unequivocal, and still less so when the standard of measurement is anything even approaching the Christian concept of love. The consequences of not using war are always made to look bad because writers habitually assume that the only alternative to not using war is *doing nothing*. But that is not the Christian position. The negative prohibition which we conceive to rest on war springs from the positive imperative of love, which directs that every means must be used, at any cost, to set wrongs right and build human relations on a right basis; and such means, I conceive, might include forms of coercion other than the mechanized slaughter of war. Thus there are methods of what has been called "non-violent non-co-operation." There might be worked out in the family of nations forms of economic pressure to be brought to bear upon treaty-breaking nations, forms which are free of the major objection which lie against war, and which can be applied with something of the restraint and discrimination of judicial process, leading up to an arbitrated, and not merely punitive, settlement of the issues. It has yet to be demonstrated, either on general grounds or on the evidence of particular instances, that war is the only method left open to men to achieve the ends of righteousness. Even Christians' minds are obsessed, far more than they realize, by a hoary and sentimental war-tradition, which makes it impossible for them to suppose that there ever could be any other way of defending, say, freedom, than by what is called, euphemistically, the sword.

That the negative attitude to war rests upon a positive imperative of love involves another important point, namely, that such an attitude is only, so to say, a focalization of a wider Christian witness against our social and economic system, and of a way of life which is ready costingly to break away from that system in other things besides war. International wars

are in large measure the result of an economic rivalry which is all the time producing wars, more or less disguised, within the nations themselves. The League of Nations and other peace machinery may do much to head off international wars, but the situation must always remain terribly insecure so long as the general economic framework of man's life, and the values upon which it rests, are essentially predatory. There is something revoltingly blind and inconsistent in the man who grows indignant about international wars, yet is content to grow wealthy out of the present industrial system, to see its disputes settled by force, open or disguised, and generally to live by a scale of values which is entirely acquiescent in its tangled and ruptured personal relationships. A pacifism which is not part of a Christian transformation of all values, a sacrificing witness over the whole of our living, can hardly rebut the charge of sentimentalism so often laid against it.

It is sometimes regarded as an objection to the position here taken up that it is impossible to carry through consistently when the nation has been placed upon a war footing, and, as is inevitable in modern war, the whole people is in effect mobilized to the end of victory. This raises the question of compromise again, for the only way to avoid every sort of participation, including that of the remotest kind, would be to commit suicide. In the end the judgment on this issue must, as on the wider issue of war generally, be left to the individual conscience. The difficulty is often very much exaggerated. Society and government have to go on, whether there is war or not, and to engage in those services which have a permanent significance altogether apart from war is manifestly different from engaging in those "services" which have no meaning apart from war, namely, the army and the navy. A much greater difficulty for the pacifist is that of avoiding falling into an isolation of spirit in the midst of all that poignancy of experience which is the lot of the average man when a nation is at war. Yet it is a difficulty not hard to overcome, if he keeps close to the true source of his insight, which is the love of God in Christ, and walks humbly in the necessity which is laid upon him, not counting himself other than a woefully sin-blinded man, needing, with all his fellows, the divine forgiveness. The pacifist needs continually to remind himself that the test of a man's Christianity is not his views on this issue; the test is whether he is seeking to walk in the light of Christ, and whether he is ready to commit himself, and all this chaotic and shadowed existence of mankind, to the Wisdom and Love and Power of God.

The Pacifist's Dilemma

EDWIN T. BUEHRER

FORTY odd peace societies in the United States, spending more than one million dollars annually, and enlisting the interest and active participation of some twelve million people, are keeping alive a relentless warfare against war for the greatest pacifist campaign our country has ever known. Their activities have left few agencies of propaganda unutilized. They have concentrated on the League of Nations, on the World Court, and on various other international organizations, and they have undertaken far-reaching studies in the cause and cure of war. They have invaded churches, schools, and colleges throughout the land; they have broadcasted their appeals over the radio, and have published pamphlets, posters, tracts, and books without end. Their ministers have observed Armistice Sunday, Memorial Day, and other special days, with a solemn consideration of the horrors of war and the blessings of peace. They have sent out questionnaires, seeking statistical information relating to various forms and degrees of pacifism, thereby measuring the statistical and emotional strength of their cause. They have filled volumes with petitions for this or that particular aspect of the peace problem; and, finally, thousands of their followers have publicly, or in written form, pledged themselves never again to sanction or participate in war of any sort. Often the teachings of religion are invoked, and particularly those of the New Testament; or, in the case of those intellectuals who are not interested in religion, philosophic sanctions are sought and quoted.

Many people believe that this sustained and aggressive resistance to war will result in a definite postponement of the next conflict, or perhaps even prove effective in keeping our country out if and when it comes. More generally it is predicted that our present pacifist strength is a sentimental and peace-time strength which, though large in numbers, and eloquent in its appeal, will nevertheless subside precisely as all similar movements have subsided in previous wars. This much is certain: If our present vast numbers of fair-weather pacifists stand their ground and resist the sneers of patriots and the conscription of their government, there will be meted out to them a swift and ruthless punishment the like of which conscientious

objectors have not experienced before. No government will tolerate mass resistance when it is fighting for its life, or thinks it is, and pacifists do well to realize this in advance.

Be this as it may, the forces of "patriotism" are not asleep. Military propaganda goes on apace side by side with the propaganda for peace. The preparedness organizations have a clear-cut and unified purpose. They are more highly financed, and are more in keeping with the "glorious traditions" of our country. There is the Navy League, sponsored, aided and abetted by the munition makers; there is the super-patriotic and politically active American Legion, and there is our national administration itself with its army and navy departments spending the greatest peace-time appropriation in history. In the course of their efforts the various peace agencies inevitably encounter the traditions, policies, and bitter antagonisms of these forces, and they are consistently defeated. They sought to force this country's entry into the League of Nations, and failed promptly and completely. After fourteen years their failure to lead us into the World Court has been just as complete. They have made strenuous efforts to pledge our government to a renunciation of the use of poison gas, but were easily balked by the American Legion, and their efforts to influence the Disarmament Conference have been in vain.

This, on the face of it, seems to be a record of failure quite out of keeping with the statistical dimensions of the peace movement. How can its ineffectiveness be accounted for? Is it possible that pacifism is something of a grand delusion based on emotions and pious hopes rather than on intelligent insight into, and understanding of, the forces that make and shape our lives? Pacifism, like militarism, especially in times of international emergencies, is opportunist and hysterical. Professional pacifists are then obliged to accomplish in a moment what can be done only by means of well-established social, political, and economic agencies, and over great periods of time. They cannot then resort to calm and logical reasoning, and neither can they reshape social or economic structures, or control the complicated maneuvering of international politics. Their only hope lies in the day-by-day staving off of the inevitable through the preaching of love and brotherhood and non-resistance. With each generation, therefore, and to the accompaniment of every war, there are multitudes of men and women who are at first persuaded by these methods, only to falter in the end with characteristic bitterness and disillusionment.

The importance of the campaign to banish military conflict from the earth can scarcely be over-estimated. The very existence of civilization may depend upon its ultimate success. It is doubtful whether any campaign in history has issues so involved, or consequences so far-reaching. An impartial consideration, however, of the place of force in human life, makes pacifism, invaluable though it may be on specific occasions, a method that should be resorted to only with intelligence and discretion. This means that there may be times when, as an instrument of social control, it is either useless or even dangerous. We live within a limited geographical area which we know as our country, and with which we carry on a relation of citizenship involving reciprocal privileges and duties. We have inherited a particular racial strain with a sufficient carry over of primitive instincts and prejudices to make friendly co-operation as yet more an ideal than a positive achievement. We are members of a social system with so many cultural and religious backgrounds as to make good will and brotherhood difficult if not impossible. We have inherited a political system which roots back into many historical antipathies and maladjustments, and in which deep, unseen forces manipulate international affairs. We have, finally, inherited an economic order which, constructed as it is, on the principle of rugged individualism, has taken deep root in our nation, and has created domestic and international rivalries and struggles entirely beyond the reach of superficial or emergency programs of peace. To ignore these and other factors which could be enumerated, and which make for conflict, is to take flight into the land of make believe.

Peace is not an abstract or transcendent good. It cannot be called into existence as if by magic, through fervent hopes, glowing emotions, and fine words. It does not emerge full grown from a set of laws, ordinances, or injunctions; and it cannot be invoked at a moment's notice to adjust and regulate historic issues, or to allay the deep-rooted antagonisms of economic interests, of nations, and of races. To proclaim that war grows out of the evil minds and emotions of men, to indict it on the ground that it violates the Sixth Commandment, to berate the munition makers for their greed and international traffic, and to persist in denying the efficacy of force regardless of how or when it is to be used, restrained, directed, is to reduce our efforts on behalf of peace to the level of naïve moralizing.

This statement is not to be construed as a wholesale indictment of our various peace agencies; and neither is it an attempt to belittle the pacifists.

During the World War there were no more heroic or inspiring figures than those pacifists who understood the stern realities, who were dissatisfied with the issues because they saw in them the hatreds and futilities that no war could settle, and who therefore decided to wash their hands of the whole enterprise. That they were more right than wrong is now widely conceded. It was obviously not a war to end war, it did not make the world safe for democracy, and it settled no major issues. On the contrary, it made Europe a seething cauldron of hate, violence, dictatorship, and international confusion. Its costs cannot be computed, and the evils it brought in its wake have thrown a pall over the whole world. It settled nothing, and unsettled practically everything. One would therefore be lacking in spiritual sensitivity to belittle the achievement of such a realistic pacifist as, for example, Eugene V. Debs, who saw that world peace would be an empty dream so long as economic rivalries, untamed and uncontrolled, would continue to breed hatreds and issues faster than any power on earth could settle them.

But, and this constitutes the heart of the pacifist's dilemma: the moment the ideal of peace is hitched to a definite program of action in social, economic and political fields, it is by that step obliged to abdicate its absolutist nature. It must then resort to something besides moral suasion, and that something is force, or coercion. For the question of power, and what we are going to do with it is as important in the world of human relationships as it is in the world of mechanical relationships. Force is not the negation of life; it is of the very essence of life, and its constant expression. Everything we know of our cosmic world is involved with the application of force. It is through the interaction of an organism with its environment that life is possible. Always there is a propulsive movement that meets resistance. Every human being has within his own personality impulses that war unceasingly with one another; and the organized impulses of one individual war with those of another. With an ever-widening crescendo the organized impulses of a community of human beings engage in conflict with those of another, until at length we see the spectacle of nations and races each seeking to exterminate the other. Always the forces of life come to grips seeking a common denominator, a balance of power, as it were; and always, in the very nature of things, when this goal is eventually approached there must be renewed stirrings and continued instability, or death will end it all.

Looked at from any angle therefore, force is an essential characteristic of life. It appears on the human scene rationalized for the purposes for which it is used, and by the consequences which such use entails. It may be mere mechanical energy used in the service of man, as, for example, in engineering or in surgery. It may be a vehicle of discipline by means of which parents and teachers direct the physical, emotional, and intellectual development of their children. At other times it is an instrument of political or economic slavery. Public opinion is force when, for example, it bolsters the opinions and prejudices of the *status quo*. The ballot box is a force, as every office-seeker soon knows. Non-resistance, even, is a force; that is to say, it is a species of resistance, a technique employed widely in India and China for the achievement of definite political and economic goals.

The professional militarist who glorifies war dimly perceives the nature of force in generating and preserving human values; but he promptly misses its deeper meaning when he idealizes force in its most degenerate and destructive form. Whereas the perfect peace of dogmatic pacifism, if it could ever be attained, would eventuate in social stagnation, the international conflict which the militarist deliberately or unwittingly provokes would destroy and blow to bits all the institutions which man has laboriously erected. In his idealization of war the militarist makes himself a willing pawn of political and economic forces which are likely to enslave and destroy him in the end. He is thus divorced from realities, and places his emotional frothings on a par with those of a professional pacifist.

It is entirely beside the point, therefore, to eulogize force as does the highly emotionalized militarist, or to condemn it, per se, as does the dogmatic pacifist. The important question for us is not, "Shall we renounce all further participation in armed conflict?" It is rather, "When, how, and under what circumstances is the resort to force necessary?" To put it in another form, "When is armed conflict, as over against non-resistance, the lesser evil in terms of ultimate ends and purposes?" The answer is not easy to find, but one can at least say that it must be sought in the specific situation rather than in vague religious authoritarianism or in a process of *a priori* reasoning. In the American Revolution, in the French Revolution, in the World War, in the Russian Revolution, or in any other conflict, we have to count on immediate circumstances for a clarification of issues and alternatives. Professor John Dewey, writing in the *New Republic* shortly after the war, indicated the conditions under which American participation

might possibly have served the cause of peace. Said he:¹ "If the principles of force to the limit had been in operation on behalf of our ideals, complete information would have been had at an early date regarding the secret agreements that were outstanding, and *our share in the war would have been made to depend on a clearing of the decks.* . . . Either we and our allies were fighting for the same ends or we were not. There was no moral generosity in putting them in a position of willingness to use our help for professed democratic ends, when in reality they were to use it for imperialistic ends." Here at least is a suggestion with regard to *the use of armed conflict for desirable ends.* Whether the allies were actually in a position to so "clear the decks," and to give satisfactory assurances as to their objectives, Doctor Dewey does not undertake to say. Be that as it may, the international scene is now so muddled that pacifists, seeing no hope in war of any kind, feel impelled to renounce it altogether. Future events may again justify their decision precisely as the World War justified it twenty years ago. It seems hardly likely that the present generation will see an international conflict in which one side is so much in the right, and the other so much in the wrong that a sort of Kantian imperative will force conscientious objectors to change their attitude.

In addition to the international scene, however, pacifists have recently been called upon to consider the alternatives with regard to internal conflict. If the nature of international conflict will justify out-and-out pacifism during the present generation, how will the logic of such an attitude fare with political and economic struggles within the nation itself? If we again turn to the World War we shall find a perfect illustration in the Russian experiment.

It was obvious to the acute observer that Tsarist imperialism, even at the beginning of the struggle, was heading for disaster. Lenin saw it, and so did a host of others, peasants and aristocrats alike. It was the one great fact that kept the revolutionary fires burning with renewed hope. As early as 1916 the economic life of Russia was almost completely destroyed, and the authority of the ruling classes undermined. The masses had lost confidence in their government, and saw themselves as mere pawns in an imperialist war which neither could nor would achieve their social or economic salvation. It dawned upon them that international warfare could

¹ Quoted from an article, "The Discrediting of Idealism," in the *New Republic*, October 8, 1919.

only mean their deeper enslavement and degradation. War-weary and desperate, the peasants refused to fight, and before the end of the second year hardly a single regiment remained to oppose the Germans on their eastern front.

But the Revolution! That was another matter. The issue, so it seemed to the peasants, was now clear-cut and commanding. Taking Lenin at his word they fought for the liberation of Russia, and for their own personal salvation. Their belated pacifism (if such it could be called), with reference to the international situation, had not rooted itself sufficiently into their moral consciousness to carry over into their attitude with reference to conflict in general. The war with Germany offered no issues worth fighting for. The war with the old order in Russia did. It so happened that Lenin's famous coup d'état in October, 1917, made the revolution comparatively bloodless, but the fact remains that the soldiers who refused to fight on the German front in the spring of 1917, were willing revolutionists in the fall of the same year, when even the peasants could see the issues that were at stake.

Here, then, was realism with reference to the use of force, and the value of conflict. Judged solely by the purposes of the Bolshevik party, with which the peasant came to identify himself, and the consequences measured in terms of Russia's present-day exaltation of spirit and energy, one would have to be a hardy critic to argue that the hardships and brutalities of the revolution were not the lesser of two evils.

Viewed historically, the Russian revolution was timed perfectly. Many years of hardship and hopeless rebellion preceded it. Secret groups of intellectuals met regularly, year in and year out. Eluding the watchful eyes of government officials, they clarified issues, discussed plans for a new Russia, set their secret machinery of propaganda into operation, bombarded their fellow-countrymen with pamphlets, books and magazines; and, in short, left nothing undone to prepare themselves for leadership once the national crisis should arrive. Anxious questions were asked: 1. Has the *status quo* shown definite signs of collapse? 2. Has it become intolerable for the great masses of people? 3. Have all possible alternatives, such as the ballot, moral suasion, petition, et cetera, been sufficiently considered, and has the cost in human suffering been taken into account? 4. Have the leaders drawn up clear and detailed plans so as to insure the success of the revolution? 5. Are the leaders sufficiently strong of character, purpose, and

intelligence to command the necessary respect and following? 6. Has the revolutionary cause found such a warm response in the minds and emotions of the people that they see it as the great objective of their lives? In other words, the revolutionary leaders realized that their success was conditioned upon a necessary combination of circumstances. Lenin, always shrewd and realistic, had the necessary qualities of daring and self-restraint to bide his time, and then to rush in at the proper moment.

Every revolutionary movement must ask itself questions similar to those suggested above, and unless the answer to each question is definitely in the affirmative the enterprise is not likely to succeed. The recently attempted Nazi revolution in Austria was a horrible example of what would-be revolutionists must not do. Human suffering had apparently not reached the desperation point, the loyalty of the masses had not been sufficiently determined in advance, the leaders were inefficient and poorly organized, and they had no definite plans for the reorganization of the government which they were determined to overthrow. It was only to be expected therefore that they would bungle the entire procedure once they decided to launch their coup. There is logic then in the observation that initial purposes and subsequent events have more than justified the Russian revolution, whereas the Nazi attempt was not justified. In each case, however, the answer is to be found in the manner in which human beings have dealt with actual situations, rather than in transcendent theories regarding the right and wrong of conflict.

It is easy enough to see why thoughtful and sensitive people shrink from the clash of arms. Beyond the outward romance and glamour lies the terror that only a mad and unimaginative adventurer could face without hesitation. The scene of international war, as we have observed, presents issues so confused, consequences so debasing, and objectives so vague and unattainable that one cannot participate except with a deepening sense of futility. In intra-national conflict, with economic problems surging to the front, issues and objectives are likely to be more clearly drawn; but even there the possibilities of success are always remote and extremely precarious. Interminable hardships, heart-rending frustrations, and bitter disillusionments are the usual lot of the revolutionist. He must be made of stern stuff, and driven by a desperate situation and an exceedingly high and pure hope. He stakes all to win all; and he must decide whether the immediate violence inherent in a revolution, and, if successful, the consequent oppor-

tunity to live a better life, is more desirable than the consequences of humble submission.

Dogmatic pacifism, claiming to be realistic, holds that armed conflict is inherently brutalizing, and that in the end it always does more harm than good. Tolstoy, the Russian Christian; Gandhi, the Hindu saint; Bertrand Russell, the English mathematician-philosopher, and Dr. John Haynes Holmes, the militant American minister, have all long since come to this conclusion. Says Doctor Holmes, a friend of Gandhi's, and a staunch pacifist during the World War: "I shall still be opposed to the use of force, and still strive for the better way. For I believe that the triumph of no cause can be safely bought at the price of man's reversion to the brute. . . . A war to save civilization must, of its own processes, destroy civilization."

Such a statement, coming from such a source, cannot be taken lightly, but both logic and morality demand that before we reject a proposition because of its cost we ponder the cost of rejecting it. In the larger social enterprises, precisely as in individual relationships, there are some things worse than the use of force. Passive submission to intolerable social and economic and political tyrannies may be worse. Hopeless degradation is often the condition of human beings who accept without resistance the hardships imposed by imperialistic nations which are stronger, wealthier, better organized, and farther advanced industrially. The beneficiaries of the *status quo* cannot be expected to see the moral issues clearly. It is always difficult to convince them that their prerogatives are unjust. Clinging to them, they are actuated by a relentless will-to-survive, and a will-to-power. When they resort to force in defense of their "rights" they will tell the world that it is in defense of civilization, and they will become ruthless and irresponsible unless they are checked by counter force. The ensuing conflict, tragic though it be, once again emphasizes the grim truth that history knows hardly a major good which has not been paid for in human blood and tears. The conclusion is inevitable. Despite the ever-present danger involved in the use of force, despite the fact that few men or groups of men are ever wise enough or good enough to resort to it, despite the fact that it often does debase, degrade, and brutalize men, nevertheless, there are occasions when its use seems to be decidedly the lesser of two evils. To condemn it, therefore, as an unmitigated curse is to ignore historic facts, and to deprive human beings of the only instrument that is at times available for the achievement of their liberation.

Japan Turns to the Past

WILLIS LAMOTT

“NO one can understand the trend of events in present-day Japan unless he takes into account the nation-wide revival of *Nippon Seishin*, or as it is roughly translated, the ‘Spirit of Japan.’” These words by a popular interpreter of Japanese thought are countered by a statement made by a retiring political leader to the effect that “no one can comprehend what we mean by the Spirit of Japan, except a true Japanese.” At all events, however, an attempt to understand *Nippon Seishin*—literally “The Pure Spirit of the Sun Origin Land”—is obligatory upon any Westerner who desires to be intelligent concerning Japanese affairs.

Although one may not be able perfectly to understand what the Spirit of Japan is, one may speak with some authority about what it is not. It is not, as many Westerners suppose, the spirit that throughout their national history has enabled the Japanese to take over and assimilate the arts and science of other nations; it is not the spirit of determination that raised the nation in the course of half a century from the position of a mysterious hermit country to that of one of the powers of the world; nor is it the spirit of conquest and imperialistic ambition which some modern western observers connect with the more recent acts of the nation on the continent of Asia. When a Japanese says the words “Spirit of Japan” he means none of these; neither does he mean the courtesy, the fine perceptions of the artistic, the sensitive response to nature, the manual cleverness, the obliquity of psychological processes, or other characteristics which are so often classified as combining to form the Japanese temperament. He uses the words as the shibboleth of a crusade, the incantation of a cult and a confession of faith as deep and earnest as that uttered by any religious devotee.

Although heard from a million lips, although seen in almost every issue of every magazine and newspaper, although made the subject of innumerable books and articles, the words *Nippon Seishin* still remain an insoluble mystery to most foreigners. Furthermore, one’s Japanese friend and counsellor can throw but little light on their meaning. A young man commits suicide as a protest against the provisions of the London Naval Treaty, four years after the event. It is *Nippon Seishin*. Judges pro-

nounce light sentences upon army and navy cadets and officers found guilty of assassination, because, we are told, the young men possessed *Nippon Seishin*. Foreigners are unconvinced of the righteousness of Japan's operations on the continent of Asia. It is because they do not understand *Nippon Seishin*. The revulsion against liberalism in politics, the rise of what Westerners erroneously term Japanese fascism, the hatred of popular politics which stirs the common mind to-day—all are due to a spontaneous welling up in the breasts of the people of *Nippon Seishin*. A ruffian murders a newspaper editor for advocating internationalism. It also is *Nippon Seishin*.

The action of the "Three Human Bombs" in giving their lives for their country during the Shanghai incident when the timing of a projectile went wrong is cited as the example supreme of *Nippon Seishin*. Unconscious of the fact that the popular version of the story is largely apocryphal, that similar deeds have been done under the contagious influence of the war spirit in every country, the nation went wild with enthusiasm at the time, and even to-day, several years later, on the streets of the great cities bronze statues are being erected to these exemplifiers of the Pure Spirit of the Sun Origin Land. The Department of Education recommends that the name "Japan" be hereafter abandoned and the name "Nippon" adopted as the designation of the country in western languages; the words "East Asia" appear in an official interview as substitutes for the more familiar term "Far East"; a party of picnicking foreigners are arrested as spies—to account for these and for a hundred other phenomena of heightened national feeling, one's Japanese mentor is sure to remark, "Ah, the Nippon Seishin!"

Gleaning little or nothing from the citation of these examples, we must perforce seek further for our explanation of the true Spirit of Japan. It is the spirit (we are told) of the cherry blossom, best loved of all flowers in Japan—the spirit which impels it to fall obediently to the ground, not deigning to cling to its stem as lesser blossoms do, before the blasts of the winds of Fate. It is the spirit of the great general, whose act of self-immolation at the time of the funeral of his Imperial master still incites a reverence akin to worship in the hearts of the Japanese people. It is the spirit of the Carp, strongest of fish, whose banners are flung to the winds at the time of the Boy's Festival on the fifth day of the fifth month, a spirit signifying, we are assured, "openness of heart, love of humanity, a burning desire for peace born from love of country, and mutual co-operation." It is the spirit that inspires a man to prefer death to dishonor. It is the spirit

of the *samurai* of fiction who committed *hara-kiri* rather than face the shame of admitting to a noodle-seller that he had forgotten the coppers necessary to pay his reckoning; it is the spirit of the Forty-seven Faithful Retainers who, after avenging their Master, took their own lives. It is, again, the spirit exemplified by the three imperial treasures, which, according to tradition, have been guarded by the Emperors since before the dawn of history: wisdom, as exemplified by the mirror, courage by the sword, and humanity by the jewels. It is the spirit symbolized by the national flag: the red sun of burning sincerity, the white ground of perfect purity and incorruptible loyalty. It is the spirit of spiritual culture, as contrasted with the materialistic spirit of western civilization, which animated ancient Japan before a selfish individualism from abroad came in to sully and dilute it. We might continue indefinitely quoting from story, conversation, newspaper or school textbook, and not get nearer the real meaning of the *Nippon Seishin*.

Yet, are we not very near to an understanding of it? The essence of the Spirit of Japan lies in loyalty to the moral concepts of the past. It is loyalty to the *kokutai*, a word rendered variously as "national-constitution," "essential Japanese nature" or "fundamental principles of the Empire." So explains the statesman. It is loyalty to the old ways, the old customs, the old gods, loyalty especially to the Emperor as descendant of the gods and Father of his people. So explains the common man. It is loyalty to the Imperial Way, to the moral principle inherent in Japanese nationality. So explains the philosopher. And in this latter phrase, "The Imperial Way," used by the philosopher, lies, perhaps, the understanding of *Nippon Seishin*.

According to Article I of the Japanese Constitution, the "Japanese Empire shall be reigned over and governed by a line of Emperors unbroken for ages eternal." Literally, or by a process of rationalization, every loyal Japanese believes that his Emperor is the successor, in a direct and uninterrupted line, of the Sun Goddess, in whom was embodied all the life-giving forces of the universe. Not only has the Emperor the divine right to rule, but he is divine, the *Aru-hito-gami*, or "Actual Living God," who translates the living past into the living future and fuses the nation into an organism enduring forever like heaven and earth. He believes, as a corollary to this, in the righteousness of the Emperor. "The difference between the Kingly Way of the Chinese Sages and the Imperial Way of Japan," explains a Japanese speaker at a college assembly, "lies in the fact that pro-

vision was made in China for disposing of corrupt kings, while in Japan we are convinced that the Emperor can do no wrong."

A philosophical interpreter of the Imperial Way illustrates this point: "The Emperor in undertaking a spiritual communication with the gods, endeavors to eliminate from his consciousness all shades of selfishness and bias and thus to reduce it to the primordial state of vacuity which may be likened to the spotless surface of a mirror. Now that the heart of the Emperor is in its purest state of vacuum, the divine will of God can descend from heaven and occupy it, filling it afresh with absolute love and benevolence. With his heart filled with the purest and strongest sentiment of love, the Emperor cannot but feel himself called upon to ameliorate positively both the spiritual and material conditions of his subjects by means of moral enlightenment and social policy. In performing this act, the Emperor becomes virtually a God in human shape."¹

Thus, through mystical communion with his divine ancestors, the Emperor comes to occupy the position of the moral and spiritual center of the nation, which in turn becomes more like a theocracy than a modern nation, a theocratic family-state in which the Emperor, as descendant of the gods, and as head of all the families of the nations, is the object of the worship, loyalty and filial love of his subjects. This response of the people is the *Nippon Seishin*.

Does this answer our question? In one sense it does, but the significance of the revival of *Nippon Seishin* to-day lies not in the essence of the spirit itself, which our Japanese friends tell us has always existed, but in the inferences and corollaries which are being deduced from it. For example, the ardent follower of the Spirit of Japan to-day opposes international agreements because they limit the power and strength of the army and navy, which are the Emperor's (not the nation's) fighting arms. He opposes not only Marxism, which would overthrow the fundamental basis of the Empire, but he also opposes Liberalism, which would reduce it to an Oriental replica of the British monarchy. He opposes Parliamentarianism because the bi-party system disrupts the essential unity of the people, by placing one group continually in the position of opposing His Majesty's government; because also of the fact that in Japan power does not, in reality, rest in the people but proceeds from the Emperor; because the Imperial Diet itself is theoretically an advisory and not a primary law-

¹ Chikao Fujisawa, in *Cultural Nippon*, March, 1934, p. 48.

making body. He opposes the current fads of Westernism because he sees that in the uncritical acceptance of the outward forms of western civilization Japanese youth receive the ideas of individual responsibility, political liberty, sexual equality, social equalitarianism, and other ideas destructive of the essential values of Japanese nationality. He opposes Capitalism because it puts self-interest higher than national interest, and is the ally of Liberalism. He condones the assassination of a harmless and aged premier, because the premier and his cabinet had continued in office after an attempt had been made upon the life of a sacred personage. He justifies the militaristic methods used by Japan in Manchuria on the ground that the working out of Japan's national destiny was being frustrated by the disloyal schemes of self-seeking politicians, misguided diplomats, and semi-foreignized capitalists. His final reply to the charge that Japan entertains imperialistic ambitions is that it is unthinkable that His Majesty should harbor ideas of foreign conquest and the unrighteous domination of other peoples.

The friendly critic sees furthermore that although exponents of the *Nippon Seishin* preach a return to the Imperial Way, this latter idea itself is symbolic of far more than the political theory it embodies. The traditional relationship between sovereign and subjects is used as a symbol representing the sum total of the inherited moral, social, and spiritual ideals of the Japanese people: the laws governing social relationships, the subservience of the individual to the group, of children to parents, of the younger to the older, of women to men, and of all to the Emperor.

In almost every issue of the newspaper are examples of this attempt to revive the old standards. Recently the procurator of the Tokyo District Court, in demanding a three-year sentence for a girl mother who had strangled her illegitimate child at birth, made this amazing appeal: "Illiterate women seem to be prone to commit this sort of crime. The most important factor is the revolt of present-day Japanese women against the precepts of feudalism which require that women make sacrifices in the interests of the family. Modern women are struggling against righteous feudalistic concepts, and for that reason I believe an example should be made in this case. As women gain freedom from the rules laid on them by the old order they are liable to lose chastity and maternal affection. I wish this present case to serve as a warning to all women, and to cause society to look within itself." The exponents of a return to the Imperial Way and the present interpretation of *Nippon Seishin* echoed these sentiments.

Nevertheless, the sovereign-subject relation is the center of this call-back from the ways of individualism and self-expression to the old deal of self-effacement and acceptance of moral authority from above. Even true democracy will be realized, we are told, when, by accepting this righteous and divinely ordained authority, men shall fall naturally into their proper places and perform their proper functions as integral parts of the organic family-state.

How far does the influence of this modern interpretation of the Pure Spirit of the Sun Origin Land extend? It is difficult to say, but it is known to extend throughout the army and navy. It inspires the members of the widespread Showa Holiness Society, a confederation of reactionary associations whose membership extends from princes down to hired ruffians, and who are preaching a "Showa Restoration"² which shall be as far-reaching as the Meiji Restoration which overthrew the military dictatorship in 1869, restored the Emperor to power and made possible the rise of modern Japan. It also inspires the more philosophical minds of the men united in the Nippon Cultural Federation and similar societies. It is not too much to say that *Nippon Seishin* is accepted by millions of Japanese as the present-day application of the Oriental proverb which affirms that "to go forward one must first go back." To understand adequately many of the recent happenings, both external and internal of Japan, one must take into account the *Nippon Seishin* and the religious zeal with which it inspires its multitudes of followers. And it will doubtless be a determining factor in other, and even more astonishing events in the future.

When you listen to him speak you realize that the follower of *Nippon Seishin* is not merely a mediævalist, a narrow-minded nationalist, or a theorist trying to build a new socio-political principle out of the materials of tradition and mythology. He burns with an intense zeal and enthusiasm. He feels the sense of world mission. He would take to all the world the philosophy of the Imperial Way, which, according to the Imperial Rescript on Education, is "infallible for all ages and true in all places." Like General Araki, he would spread throughout the world the "morality based upon the Imperial Way." He would proclaim to all nations their need to turn from the divisive and degenerate ways of materialistic civilization to the new spiritual culture which will arise when they render loyal obedience to some moral authority.

² "Showa" is the designation of the present era in Japan.

"No one can understand the Spirit of Japan except a true Japanese." Yet one can readily see the significance of this movement which is so profoundly influencing present-day Japan. Not only in Japan, but in every land to-day culture has become the prey of civilization. Civilization, the complex of external goods, skills, and techniques created by the modern spirit, has relentlessly driven culture into the realm of non-essentials—culture, as consisting of the inherited traditions and customs which for centuries gave unity and meaning to the life of men.

In no country more than in Japan has culture in recent years abdicated more completely before the demands of civilization. The abruptness of the change from the old to the new, the speed by which the forces of civilization were forced to perform their task, the vast divergence in type between inherited culture and the superimposed civilization, and the fact that the forces controlling the latter did not emerge from and work through the inherited traditions of the people—these are but a few of the reasons why during the flushed and fevered days of the reconstruction of the country, culture was forced to capitulate to civilization.

The change wrought overnight from handicraft to machinery, from isolation to membership in the world of nations, was not more startling than the spiritual change effected in the minds of Japanese men when new Japan was born. In ancient times Japanese culture was unified in a peculiar way. It was a synthesis binding the people together into an organism by obediences and loyalties, restraints, controls, and codes—a synthesis far more perfect even than that achieved in the mediæval civilization of Europe. Then—individual initiative, without which the industrialization of modern Japan could not have been realized, came in to challenge the old loyalties to group and state. Manhood suffrage, general elections, government by clashing parties whose actions still offend the sense of propriety which is so highly valued by most better-class Japanese, came in and took the place of government decorously conducted from behind the scenes by men whose right it was to rule. Utilitarianism, the class struggle, exploitation, strikes superseded an industrial order based on mutual aid. The rights of the individual, western ideas of love, of family relations, of religion, of political democracy, of freedom, came in to undermine the time-honored moral standards in which self was lost in allegiance to the group.

To a degree unbelievable to western eyes the outward forms of the old culture were sacrificed in the conquering of the knowledge, the tech-

nique, and the skills of modern civilization. A Japanese educator, in speaking to a group of Japanese and foreign residents of Tokyo, recently said, "Our younger generation knows less about Japan than about the West, and this has been brought about by many causes—educational, political, economic, and religious. If we do not know ourselves, we cannot know others, and the problem which the nation faces to-day is to get a firmer grip on what Japan is and has, before attaining a clearer, more understanding and more appreciative conception of the Occident."

Whether the Japanese will rediscover in the sovereign-subject relationship the moral center which will turn their civilization into a culture, is a question concerning which men will certainly disagree. But one thing is sure: Not only the *Nippon Seishin* movement, but every sign on the horizon of Japan to-day indicates that the nation has come to the end of her uncritical acceptance of western civilization. She has come to the place where she must assimilate the vast mass of outward material she has absorbed from the West since 1869. The makers of New Japan believed that the nation could take over the external aspects of western civilization, while rejecting the ideas which created them. The time has come for the present generation of Japanese to decide whether that is possible. The time has come when Young Japan must choose between the values inherent in western civilization and those carried down by tradition since the dawn of her history. Perhaps she will find that, to create a culture out of civilization, she must lay hold on the values which have made western civilization not altogether vain, and will therefore ultimately turn toward some form of Christianity. Perhaps she will find that, in order to revive the old in the attempt to create a new culture, she will have to slough off many of the external appurtenances of civilization.

More likely, under the influence of this revival of interest in the traditional ideals and mores of the race, she will do what she has done before in several crises of her history: create a new and characteristic Japanese culture out of the raw materials of a foreign civilization. This genius for fusing and transforming into something peculiarly Japanese the externals of a foreign civilization and culture, still appears to be the *Nippon Seishin* in its most essential form.

Whatever happens, something new and startling will dawn upon the world as a result of this earnest and united attempt of the people of Japan to discover and revive the Pure Spirit of their Sun Origin Land.

Archæology and the Bible

GEORGE A. BARTON

THE Bible holds a unique place in the affections of Christian people. Such has been the influence during the last four centuries upon all Protestant communions of the doctrine of an "infallible Bible" which John Calvin opposed to the Roman doctrine of an "infallible church," that we are still haunted by the ghost of plenary inspiration. On Sunday, February 3, of the present year, 1935, the head of a theological seminary in our third largest city dogmatically defended it, with evident sincerity, to a large radio audience. No wonder, then, that fifty years ago, before the higher criticism had gained a foothold in this country, at a time when the great conflict seemed to be between Genesis and geology, the revered President of my Alma Mater, a scholar who had been a member of the American Revision Committee, could exclaim: "They seek to correct the Bible by the rocks; why cannot we correct the rocks by the Bible!" So little was the nature and function of religious revelation then understood, that one of the foremost scholars of that period actually thought that an ancient Hebrew's conception of how God made the world was more reliable than God's own record of his work written in the rocks! The advent of the higher criticism and the revelations which it has made have compelled many to discern more clearly. Some of us now realize (after pain and struggle) that what we call "inspiration" and "revelation" does not impart scientific facts to the recipient; it gives him new insight into the nature of God, God's attitude to man, man's duty to God and to his fellow men. This insight the recipient is left free to express in his own language and by means of his own thought-concepts. As these concepts are shaped by the scientific and philosophical environment of the recipient, they always reflect the scientific point of view of the time in which he lives. As knowledge is always growing, the writer of Genesis reflected the imperfect cosmological conceptions of his time. We cannot correct the rocks by him, but, if we view creation as now understood with a religious faith such as he made his account reveal, we shall have learned the real lesson that the story of creation as he told it was meant to teach us.

As the people of fifty years ago generally held the view of the Bible

voiced by my dear old "Prexy," it is no wonder that, when the higher criticism was introduced into the English-speaking world at about that time by the late W. Robertson Smith, T. K. Cheyne, and S. R. Driver, good people were aghast. It seemed to them that the blatant attacks of men like Robert G. Ingersoll had appeared in a more insidious form. It was then that defenders of the Bible, in looking about for arguments with which to refute the new conclusions, conceived the idea of proving by archæological discoveries that the Bible is true in all matters of fact concerning ancient history and life. Instead of attempting to correct the rocks by the Bible, the bricks and stones of the ancient world were summoned to confound the critics and to vindicate the infallibility of the Bible. Thus was inaugurated the supposed war between the higher criticism and archæology, in which it was confidently assumed that archæology was the Bible's champion.

Perhaps a word should be said as to what the higher criticism and archæology are. The adjective "higher" sometimes has been thought to indicate that the critic thought of himself as superior to the Bible. In reality the word was applied only to distinguish historical and literary criticism from text-criticism. The textual critic seeks, by comparing manuscripts, to ascertain the true text; the higher critic seeks, by studying the references of a document to other dated events or documents, to ascertain the time of writing, and by studying the relation of its various parts to one another and to other literature of the same people or of other peoples, to ascertain whether the work is a unit or is composite. The higher criticism as applied to the Bible began in the eighteenth century, and has been now applied to the whole Bible. Its results are accepted now in our universities and in the theological seminaries where dogma does not fetter reason. The work of the higher criticism is not yet fully accomplished; it is still seeking solutions for some of the literary problems of the Bible. Nevertheless it has notable achievements to its credit, the results of which will never be undone.

Archæology is the science of recovering and reconstructing man's past history. As it concerns the student of the Bible it is the recovery of a knowledge of the history, life, institutions, implements, and literatures of Palestine, Mesopotamia, Egypt, Syria, and Asia Minor. It is a young science. As regards Egypt, it dates from the expedition of Napoleon to Egypt in 1798. Mesopotamian archæology began with the collection of inscribed bricks by employees of the British East India Company in 1797-8. That of Palestine, with the first expedition of the American scholar Edward

Robinson in 1838. The scientific exploration of Syria and Asia Minor is more recent. Every young science struggles into existence, perfecting its methods as it grows, and archæology has been no exception. Only within the last fifty years have its methods become really scientific and only within the last thirty years has the scientific method been perfected. Professor W. M. Flinders Petrie gave its scientific development a great impulse by the discovery that types of pottery were the surest criteria of the sequence and relative dates of the periods of progressing civilizations, and George A. Reisner and Clarence S. Fisher have perfected scientific methods of recording the location and contexts of exhumed objects in a way that makes them reliable data for reconstructing the life of an ancient city. Great as are the advances archæology has made, it is yet in its infancy. Like physics it is a progressive science. As knowledge increases, some of its findings have to be revised. Nevertheless much has been achieved that will never be undone. These achievements are the bases of future knowledge.

The history of the supposed conflict between archæology and the higher criticism has fallen wholly within the memory of the present writer. He has witnessed its battles and reverses; he has been at times exasperated by its mock warfare, and at others, amused by its shoddy parades. Through it all, however, both archæology and the higher criticism have been united in the discovery of truth, and together have done much to make the Bible for the modern world an unsealed and inspiring book.

In this warfare some who have made great contributions to archæology have been the greatest sinners in misleading the public into thinking that archæology is the great vindicator of the traditional views of the Bible. One of these was the late Professor A. H. Sayce, whose discovery of the Hittites endears him to every archæologist. Sayce, however, jumped at conclusions as to how every new find confirmed the Bible and often published them in popular journals like the *Sunday School Times*. It frequently happened that the next week or the next month his view was proved untenable and abandoned by himself, but he seldom, if ever, took the trouble to inform the public of his change of mind. The Sunday-school public were thus nearly always misled by his articles. In 1887-88 an archive of letters written on clay was discovered at El-Amarna in Egypt. A number of these letters were written to an Egyptian king who ruled 1375-1358 B. C. by Ebed-Hepa, a king of Jerusalem. When, in 1890, two German scholars published these letters, Sayce immedi-

ately read them. In one of them he found this sentence: "Behold this land of the city of Jerusalem—neither my father nor my mother gave it to me; the mighty hand, the arm of the king gave it to me." Slightly mistranslating this at first, Sayce immediately connected it with what is said of Melchizedek in Hebrews 7. 3: "Without father, without mother, without genealogy, having neither beginning of life nor end of days"—and, interpreting the "king" in the tablet to be "God," declared to the world through the columns of a popular paper that archæology had discovered Melchizedek and vindicated the strange statement of the Epistle to the Hebrews! On such hasty misidentifications was the popular faith in the infallibility of Scripture fed!

In 1894 the same scholar published a book, *The Higher Criticism and the Verdict of the Monuments*, the purpose of which was the same, though fortunately the arguments were much more substantial. Another scholar, who, like Sayce, rendered great service to archæological research and sought by means of it to confound the critics of the Bible, was Melvin G. Kyle, Professor and President at Xenia Theological Seminary. In 1912 Kyle's book, *The Deciding Voice of the Monuments in Biblical Criticism*, followed in the footsteps of Sayce's earlier work and helped to continue the popular fallacy that archæology proved the traditional view of the authorship and dates of the biblical books. Kyle labored to show that the world of the time of Abraham was a civilized world, that Hyksos kings, whom he assumed to be Semitic, were ruling in Egypt, and that it would be natural for Abraham and Jacob to go down to that country, and that Moses lived in a literary period, when writing was well known. Therefore, he argued, that the Mosaic authorship of the Pentateuch and the credibility of the patriarchal narratives had been established. He overlooked the fact that archæology had brought to light no evidence that the particular Abraham and Jacob mentioned in Genesis ever lived or went down to Egypt, the fact that Moses might live in a literary age and yet not be able to write, and that, if he could write, that would not be proof that he wrote the Pentateuch. Many of us who can write, never wrote a Pentateuch and never will! The real question to be met in the case of the Pentateuch is: "Does its contents bear the stamp of having come from the age of Moses?" It contains at least six strata of legislative material which fit into as many different periods of Hebrew history from 1200 to 300 B. C. Some of these codes modify or abrogate provisions in others. They are understandable,

if the product of the advancing life of a nation. From that point of view one can argue that this nation, which played such a part in establishing the world's best religion, was divinely guided. To suppose, however, that all these contrary regulations were revealed within the forty years of the lifetime of one man and sent forth to a bewildered nation in the mixture in which they are found in our Bible, taxes the credulity of one who knows the facts and has any realization of how such things happen in this world of ours. To credit such confusion to plenary inspiration is a slander upon inspiration! Against the basic facts brought to light by the higher criticism archæology has never brought a shred of evidence. Critics, as well as archæologists, are, however, human, and have at times been "wise above that which is written," and here archæology has sometimes corrected them. Thus in Isaiah 20. 1 mention is made of Sargon, king of Assyria, whose name had survived nowhere else in literature. Some had ventured the opinion that Isaiah was mistaken or his text corrupt. Between 1842 and 1855 two French archæologists, Botta and Place, unearthed his palace at Khorsabad, and found hundreds of lines of inscriptions giving us a complete chronicle of his reign. Again in Acts 17. 6 the rulers of Thessalonica are called in the Greek "politarchs"—a term unknown in any other ancient classical or Hellenistic writer. Saint Luke seemed to have been guilty of a mistake. During the last hundred years, however, no less than nineteen inscriptions mentioning "politarchs" have come to light, and a number of these are from Thessalonica itself. In addition, the term is found also in papyri dug up in Egypt during the last forty years. In this detail Saint Luke's accuracy has been abundantly vindicated.

Archæology has also supplied us with the power to reproduce in imagination the life of Bible times. We know the kind of houses in which the people dwelt, with what tools they prepared their food, their spindle-whorls, mills, sickles, wine and olive presses, their weights and measures, their water-jars and drinking vessels, their needles and musical instruments, and a host of other things are now well known. Thanks to archæology, we can, if we will, see the Bible characters as men and women of flesh and blood like ourselves, dealing with human problems and finding religion a creative factor in their life, as we too may find it.

If we ask what archæology has done for our knowledge of specific parts of the Bible, the answer in brief outline would be as follows. It has shown that the writers of the documents which underlie Genesis borrowed

their accounts of the creation and the flood from similar accounts which we now have from Babylonia. They did not merely borrow; they cleansed and ennobled. They accepted the Babylonian theory of the structure of the universe and the general order of creation, but retold the story so as to make it the vehicle of revealing the one God.

As to the age of the Patriarchs, archæology confirms the general conceptions of prevailing conditions reflected in the patriarchal narratives. We know the names of Abraham and Jacob from Babylonian documents, and the names of Jacob and Joseph from Egyptian documents, but the names did not and could not apply to the particular individuals mentioned in the Bible. The fortunes of Joseph are paralleled in Egyptian tales, and it seems probable that the stories in Genesis concerning this patriarch were borrowed from Egypt. The revelations of archæology up to now confirm the belief that the real religious history of the Hebrew people began with the work of Moses and the conquest of Canaan.

While archæology has thrown much light on the period of the Exodus and the conquest of Canaan, the evidence is so conflicting that, up to the present, it has raised more new questions than it has solved. Was Palestine conquered between 1400 and 1350 B. C., when the El-Amarna letters reveal to us the inroads of a people who were called Habiri, and whose name is probably to be identified with Hebrews? How could they then be in Egypt? The first chapter of Exodus seems to make Rameses II of Egypt the Pharaoh of the oppression, and he did not live until the next century. Did, then, the conquest take place about 1200 B. C., the Exodus having occurred under the reign of Merneptah, the successor of Rameses? Some hold one view and some the other. Merneptah, in an inscription found about forty years ago, in speaking of his conquests, speaks of having conquered Israel in Palestine. Were there, then, two conquests, a part of the Hebrews entering Palestine in the fourteenth century, and a part about 1200 B. C.? If so, only a part of the nation could have been in Egypt, to be led out by Moses. This is a vexed question that is still far from settled.

Sir Charles Marston, a wealthy English patron of archæology, furnished the means for the thorough excavation of Jericho by Dr. John Garstang, an eminent archæologist. Garstang thought he had fully established by means of the pottery below the bed of ashes made by the burning of Jericho that the conquest took place soon after 1400 B. C., but Professor W. F. Albright, another archæologist of eminence, excavated in 1934 a

part of Bethel, and brought to light evidence which seems to show that neither Bethel nor Jericho fell before the twelfth century B. C. This would seem to confirm a view which the present writer has held for several years, that there were two conquests, one by the Habiri (the Leah tribes) in the fourteenth century, and another by the Rachel tribes, who alone had been in Egypt, in the twelfth century, but the proof is not yet complete. The problem of the Exodus and the conquest of Canaan is a good illustration of the fact that archæology is a progressive science, that its discoveries often raise as many problems as they settle, and that in it, as in other sciences, old conclusions have frequently to be revised.

On the study of Hebrew laws archæological research has thrown a flood of light by affording abundant material for comparison. Three codes of laws have been recovered, a Babylonian code, codified under the great king Hammurabi about 2000 B. C., an Assyrian code, perhaps brought together about 1300 B. C., and a Hittite code which was brought together between 1400 and 1200 B. C. The first of these was in force in Babylonia, the second in Assyria, and the third in Asia Minor. Each of these groups of laws afford certain parallels to the codes of the Pentateuch, though naturally the parallels are most numerous in the Code of Hammurabi. Each, too, bears the special marks of the country and nation which produced it. Some of the provisions of the laws of Hammurabi provide for just such marriages to slave girls, when the wife bears no children, as Abraham and Jacob are said to have contracted, and many of the penalties of the same code are based on the Semitic law of revenge—"an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth, life for life"—on which laws of the three principal biblical codes are based. Archæology has thus furnished an excellent background for the fascinating study of the development of Hebrew law.

For the period of the Hebrew monarchy the contributions of archæology are especially rich and varied. They reveal Israel's contacts with Egyptians, Assyrians, Babylonians, Moabites, and Philistines in a way that sometimes confirms the biblical text, sometimes corrects it, and sometimes fills gaps in our knowledge. For the period of the Exile and the early days of the return the same is true.

To the understanding of the New Testament the contribution of archæology has been somewhat different. The documents which throw light on it are Greek papyri—business documents of the common people of Egypt. They were usually not thinking of religion, least of all of

Christianity, but their written words make clearer the meaning of many an obscure word in the Greek Testament. Parts of documents, too, have been brought to light—the Gospel of Peter, the Revelation of Peter, the Teaching of the Twelve Apostles, Sayings of Jesus—some of which once were read in churches. These make us thankful that the limits of our Canon were drawn where they are. Archæology, too, has made the journeys of Saint Paul live again for us, and has given us vivid settings for the seven churches of the book of Revelation.

Not the least of the services which archæology has rendered is the recovery for us of the topography of Jerusalem during the different periods of its history. One who visits that city, dear to so many millions, can in imagination reconstruct the city of David and Solomon with its fortress, walls, temple, its battles and sieges; he can walk the temple courts with Isaiah and Christ; he can live over on the spot many of the scenes of the tragedy of the Passion; he can identify some of the scenes of the preaching of Saint Stephen, and reconstruct with the topography before him the arrest of Saint Paul. Or he can go to Capernaum and stand on the site of the synagogue built by the centurion, of whom it was said: "He loveth our nation and hath built for us a synagogue"—the very synagogue in which Jesus so often taught. If we cannot go to Palestine, we can by pictures and reading make—thanks to archæology—biblical scenes very real to ourselves. The ability thus to clothe the biblical scenes with flesh and blood is a great privilege and should result in religious benefit.

Biblical archæology is in reality the handmaid of the higher criticism in giving us what is practically a new Bible. Tradition had distorted the perspective of biblical history, dogma had removed for us the biblical heroes to a realm of unreality, the biblical precepts and the biblical promises had become for far too many of us substitutes for thinking and earnest ethical endeavor. The combined work of archæology and historical criticism has rebuilt for us the ancient biblical world. We see its heroes as real men and women, living in an actual world, faced with real problems, and putting their religion into life; we see them gaining the secret of blessedness because their faith eventuated in something more than artistic worship; it led them to strive to make the world a better place for people to live in. The Bible becomes something better than "an infallible rule of faith"; it becomes an inspiration. As we see the life of the Son of Man in its simplicity and Divinity we are drawn to follow in his steps.

Karl Barth's Fight for Soul-Liberty

R. BIRCH HOYLE

THE place of religion in life receives dramatic illustration by the removal of the famous theologian from the professorial chair he has held at Bonn University. Richard Rothe once held that chair, but it is doubtful whether any predecessor ever riveted the gaze of multitudes in so many lands on its occupant as Karl Barth has done during his six years tenure of it. "We see dimly in the present what is small and what is great," sang James Russell Lowell, but one may safely say that future historians will look back on Barth's removal as an "Entscheidung," a "turning-point" (to use Barth's typical term), as significant in the age-long fight for liberty of conscience, as Luther's nailing up of the ninety-five theses on the church door at Wittenberg, or the fight of Hampden over ship money in the Puritan era in the reign of Charles the First in England. Indeed Barth's insertion of the qualification of the oath of allegiance to the *Führer*, Hitler, takes us back to the famous utterance of Peter to the Jewish rulers: "We must obey God rather than men" (Acts 5. 29), and further back still in history, for Socrates said pretty much the same when on trial in Athens. Already the significance of this removal of a theologian from his chair has been grasped by men of vision. As Doctors S. Parkes Cadman and Henry Smith Leiper wrote in the *New York Times* (December 2, 1934): "We are not prevented from seeing in it an indication of the logical consequences of State Totalitarianism pressed against the loyalty and conviction of the religious man." Thus religion in life to-day means a tough fight.

On the personal side, the tension between the pull of the state, and the pull of the Divine constraint on a believer's soul is acute. But it is more than a "bread and butter" question. That is serious enough for a professor in these days, when so many have had to face poverty because of their insistence on soul-liberty, and are exiled from their Fatherland. As Barth sees it, it is a challenge to the sovereignty of God, his absolute claim to unqualified obedience. The state here claims to be absolute over a man's conscience, and the tug between these two colliding absolutes raises the momentous question of the relation between state authority and God's sovereign claim to the whole of a man's life. So is it seen by such a sharp-

eyed observer of events as Canon Peter Green of Manchester, England. In the world-famous paper, the *Manchester Guardian*, he wrote: "Over against the authority of the totalitarian state, Barth sets the authority of the omnipotent God."

Such an issue is greater far than the mere removal of a theologian from his chair. It raises the fundamental problem whether the secular state, as in Russia also, is the highest authority over the individual, or whether "the crown rights of conscience" are to be respected and preserved by the state. Now Barth did not challenge the state nor attack the regime of Adolf Hitler. He was prepared, as a person holding office under, and drawing salary from, the state to take the required oath to the successor of Herr von Hindenburg. The oath runs: "I will be loyal and obedient to the Leader of the German Empire and People, Adolf Hitler; I will observe the laws and fulfill the duties of my office conscientiously, so help me God." But to safeguard conscience Barth wished to insert to the words, "Adolf Hitler," this clause, "so far as I can respond as an evangelical Christian." He explained why that clause was inserted. "In opposition to the *plain unlimited* duty to the Constitution that lay in the oath in its original form, now, by the new oath of service, carrying with it an unlimited duty toward 'the Leader,' this *unlimited duty* is not compatible with one's knowledge and position as an evangelical Christian." (So Barth is reported in the Basler *Nachrichten*, November 27, 1934.) This was said when under suspension, before Reichs-Minister Doctor Ruft dismissed him from his post.

The day prior to the secret trial of Professor Barth, even that clause was removed, owing to the statements of leaders of the German Evangelical Church; such men as Doctors Marahrens, Koch, Breit, Humburg, and Fieldler said that they understood the oath to Hitler as "Leader" implied the respect for conscience that he promised two years ago. The Moderator of the German Reformed Church, Doctor Hesse, also wrote to say that the three hundred Reformed churches understood the oath in the same sense as Barth. Barth did *not* refuse to take the oath; he simply wanted to clear up any ambiguity that might lurk in its interpretation. In view of such explanations from those great churches, Barth wrote (December 18, 1934), "now the condition given in my clause is *superfluous*" (vide, Basler *Nachrichten*, December 20, 1934). That journal interpreted the decision to dismiss Professor Barth as making the meaning of the oath to

Hitler "absolute." "For" (it continues) "behind this decision" (to dismiss) "stands the presupposition, that there cannot be any conflict between the authoritarian state's government and the will of God, because the will of the state's government coincides with the will of God." Barth is to be compensated with half a year's salary! The great class of nearly three hundred students were put under the charge of Herr Schmidt-Japing, a "German Christian" in sharpest opposition to Barth's views. Within three days the class dwindled down to a paltry "baker's dozen"! The students sent a joint letter objecting to Barth's removal, stating that no one could take his place and represent his views; that the substitute was "intolerable" as a church theologian. "We want 'the goods' and no substitute," is the closing sentence of their protest. Meantime proposals to Barth to teach elsewhere have gone to him: from America, England; from Basle, Zürich and Geneva. It is understood that Barth feels that he must stay on the battlefield in Germany. His projected visit to lecture in the United States he has cancelled: "America is not ripe for my teaching; perhaps in 1936 I may come."

If the Professor is thus deprived of his "sounding-board," he has not been muzzled. His pen is busy as well as his tongue. He is pouring out from the press a rapid series of brochures under the title of *Theologische Existenz heute!* eighteen of which have been issued. The first eleven were put under the ban—their circulation in Bavaria was interdicted. Most of his own *Hefts* contain addresses delivered to gatherings of ministers, and sermons to great congregations. Here we see into his great soul, and the purpose of the rest of this article is to give, of course, in mere outline, the main drift of his present teaching. He does not stand alone. His "Fidus Achates," Dr. E. Thurneysen, has written one (No. 8) on "The Power of Weak Things"; Martin Wolf, a Lutheran, wrote one to explain the Lutheran basis for much of Barth's teaching (No. 6); a theological student, Max Lackmann, voiced (No. 11) the position of difficulty the student-world feels in this strife of tongues, under the title, "Lord, Whither Can We Go?" Another sympathizer with Barth, Heinrich Vogel, has a piercing examination of the question, "Who Rules the Church?" Another Lutheran, Hans Asmussen, has written on "Church: Augsburg Confession!" Probably the most powerful *Heft* is Barth's vigorous reply to Emil Brunner's tract against Barth. Brunner on "Nature and Grace" was hailed jubilantly

by "German Christians." To this Barth replied (No. 14) "No! Reply to Emil Brunner." Brunner was citing Calvin in support of "Natural Theology." Now (No. 18) Barth's brother, Peter Barth, a great authority on Calvin's works, has replied to Brunner on "The Problem of Natural Theology According to Calvin." Thus a war of pamphlets goes on, very much like the rain of Feuilletons in the Puritan period in England in the eighteenth century!¹

No attempt will be made in this paper to discuss and appraise Barth's distinctive theological contributions to our generation. We confine ourselves to his utterances in these pamphlets, which describe his attitudes during the kaleidoscopic changes of the past two years. His actions, however, are determined by his theological presuppositions. He approaches the problem of the relation of the church to the state as a theologian, pure and simple. Two strands are woven together in Barth's thinking: they make it so strong and unyielding. One is the Calvinist central doctrine of the absolute sovereignty of God; the other, the Lutheran doctrine of "vocation." As a theologian, first, foremost and all the time, he has stood for the policy that the state must take "hands off" the church.

In the first brochure, which gives the title to the series of eighteen, he stated what, as *professor of theology*, he conceived a theologian's duty to be. "We must not abandon our job through becoming zealous for some cause we think to be good." "The theologian has not to become a politician." He protested vigorously against the demand that the church in Germany needed a Leader; such as she has got in Archbishop Müller! He called on the German Evangelical Church to reflect that in Christ she already had the Leader; that he and he alone is such: "only then is there the possibility of theological existence." He reminded the church that "the liberty of preaching and of theology now to be guarded is the sovereignty of the Word of God in preaching and theology." "This single thing I have to say to the Evangelical Church theologians: we have to preserve our life as theologians to-day, to-day more than yesterday. We have to run the plain, straight course set before us, unfettered and without faltering." . . . "We are under obligation to be what *we* are, and true to the mission committed to *us*: namely, to serve the Word of God within this nation."

It must be said that Barth has consistently kept to the line thus laid

¹ The publisher is Chr. Kaiser, Munich, Bavaria. No. 1 in English, Hodder & Stoughton, London.

down. In his Prefaces—as far as No. 12—he made his observations on the shifting phases of the nation's political fortunes as they affected the church's and religion's life. But the main part of his papers were expositions of the Word of God and its application to the individual and national soul. For example, No. 2, on "For the Freedom of the Gospel," was an address on the eve of the fateful elections of representatives of the church in the fall of 1933. "A church election," he said, "is an act of confession of faith: our concern is about what believing means to-day, and what is implied by the word Gospel. Gospel means that we have a Lord, and this Lord stands on our behalf as surety: He cares for us." . . . "And by freedom of the Gospel is not meant that men are free or can be free, but this, that the Gospel is free and will and must remain free and be understood as a free Gospel . . . one that comes to us without our being capable of coming to it. It means a new birth which we cannot make ourselves; it must happen 'from above,' from the free Gospel itself. As the Heidelberg Catechism puts it, 'This Gospel is our one comfort in life and in death.' Our 'one comfort': this message cannot be heard without the other word: 'Thou shalt have no other Gods before me.' "

We must observe that by "soul-liberty" Barth means liberty to serve the One God with one's whole heart. "The Gospel," he says, "has either our whole heart or does not hold our heart at all. To believe in the Gospel, therefore, means having found in the Gospel one's Master, over against whom one is, and can be no longer free, but on the contrary, One to whom all freedom is ascribed, to whom one is subject. *He alone* must have the sovereignty. Only when we have this, its freedom, do we have it really, and only when we interpret it in this, its freedom, are we able to understand it aright."

In this, surely strange, election sermon, Barth laid down the issues which the Gospel's freedom determines. One is that nothing has to be placed alongside of the Gospel as the rule of life, that may compete with the Gospel. "The Gospel as the Word that helps is the Word from God—for mankind, but from God and from nobody else." If the church places other books alongside of the Sacred Scriptures, if she preaches ethics alongside of, or in the place of God's Word, then the Gospel has ceased to be Gospel: she has ceased to be evangelical, and ceased to be a church. There is no "both—and" here: the only thing that applies is "either—or"! Here Barth anticipated with prophetic insight the nationalistic religious tenets of

a Rosenberg! That meeting broke up to the strains of a grand German hymn, "Erhalt uns Herr bei deinem Wort," which may be rendered, "Uphold us, Lord, by Thy sweet Word; And check Thy fell foe's biting sword; Which fain would tumble from His throne, Christ Jesus, Thy beloved Son. Lord Jesus Christ, display Thy might, Thou, Lord enthroned in the height: Shield Christendom, so weak and poor! That she may praise Thee evermore."

The Lutheran Quarter-Centenary celebration in October-November, 1933, furnished Barth with openings—one in Berlin even—for reminding Germany of what Reformation meant. "Reformation as Crisis, Turning-Point" was the theme of an address (No. 3), in which, true to his principles, he denied that Luther's and Calvin's works should be ranked, as enthusiasts did, among apostolic writings. "It was 'the style of the Renaissance' to use such words." (The Preface to the English Bible of 1611 is a good example of such extravagant speech.) The "Crisis of the Reformation" meant "to renounce one's freedom 'in freedom'": a paradox! That is, "One was free to bind himself to God!": this is soul-liberty. "Cui servire est libertas." The Reformers had chosen because they felt called, chosen. There could be no retreat after that. Barth sounded the clarion call to men to withstand the assault on Reformation teaching and practice. With ringing accents he recited Calvin's words, "God wants to have his Word preached. Let us obey this command and go where he calls us! We have no need to ask what the consequences will be."

In Heft 4, we have two studies of Luther: with an eye to the "playing up" by Nazis of Luther as a "German soul." But Barth's keen study leads to what is his own excellence (though he would never admit it), namely: A strong assurance in God through devoted service to God's Word: and an address on "Luther's Knowledge" is really an exposition of Psalm 130, "De Profundis clamavi": a beautiful description of the soul's dire need and the saving act of God. The "Aryan" question—with its exclusion of those of Jewish blood from church office—came up in Heft 5, preached at Bonn. The same month found Cardinal Faulhaber thundering forth in Hitler's own city, Munich, those famous Advent Sermons on *Judaism, Christianity, Germany* (The Macmillan Company). Barth's attitude in preaching on Romans 15. 5-13 was correct. He prefaced the pamphlet with these words: "Something has to be said in principle on the problem of the sermon in these days. This sermon puts forth the Jewish

question, not because I wished to touch it, but because I had to touch on it in expounding my text. As subject set, neither the Jewish question, nor any other of the questions upsetting us to-day, would be listened to from the pulpit. But," he adds, "the preaching of Luther and Calvin was exposition of Scripture, which dealt with questions affecting themselves and their audiences, but these were not the theme. Indeed, as ministry to the Word of God, their preaching was applied to actual life, but was kept from attacking it directly. The utter misery of modern Protestantism, that costs us so much to-day, can be summed up in this, that its preaching has become 'preaching of a topic set.'" All this is abhorrent to Barth: his scruple about the purity of preaching the Word makes a sermon from his lips, notwithstanding his searching, probing lancet, a "comfort to the weary." That lancet touched the spot when he dwelt on Paul's claim, "Christ has made me a minister of the circumcision for the truth of God. . . . This means that Christ belonged to the people of Israel. In his veins ran the blood of this race, the blood of the Son of God!" And then he proceeded to show why Jesus Christ became a Jew.

A year ago the report was spread abroad that Barth had been suspended from his chair. This was expected because of his bold leadership of the section that refused to accept Reichsbishop Müller as Leader of the church. Heft 7: "God's Will and Our Wishes," contains the "Explanation of the Correct Interpretation of the Reformation Confessions in the Present German Evangelical Church." Here the "Dissenting Church" exposed the "German Christians" and Barth's forcible speech helped to bring Lutheran and Reformed dissidents into agreement. Barth's Preface did not shrink from strong words against "the German Christians." "They, with their advocates, try to smother the voice of 'the Word of God by the voice of a stranger.' The German Christians' affair is wrong and utterly foul. There can only be an Either-Or with regard to it. In order to call on them to separate from this wrong and foul affair we are obliged to be stern and icy against it. Anything else would not be love." Very moving is Barth's reference to the hymn, part of which has been given above. "Luther's hymn, 'Sustain us, Lord, with Thy dear Word,' " he says, "has been a special comfort, at this time, to many Calvinists and Lutherans. . . . Protest thy poor Christendom! not, Lutheranism or Calvinism! And again, 'God, Holy Ghost, Thou Comfort Dear! Grant that thy folk agree on earth!' Not sustain the blockhead for his Lower-Saxon or Lower-Rhenish men-

tality. . . . The concern to-day between our churches is not about the Lord's Supper but it concerns the First Commandment, and to-day we have to testify. . . . To-day the question is about the *Sola Fidei*, like *Soli Deo*, as against the idolatry that has broken in, and against justification by works."

This pamphlet also contains an address, often given to large audiences, in which Barth expounds the absolute claim of God's will upon us. And it closes with a reprint of the article that appeared in "Zwischen den Zeiten," explaining why Barth had parted from Brunner and Gogarten and suspended the publication of that journal, because those former colleagues were putting philosophy alongside of the Word of God as an authority over human life. In this pamphlet Barth rejoiced that problems often read about in books had become actual in life. An "either-or" was presented to men: a decision had to be made: an ambiguous situation was clearing up. It may be useful to give the "either-or's" Barth sees. (1) "Whether we really have to seek for God's revelation elsewhere than in Holy Writ. (2) Whether the Old Testament is really inferior to, or perhaps not sacred scripture parallel with, the New Testament. (3) Whether blood and nationality are really factors to which the church has to grant a regulating influence upon church preaching and order. (4) Whether a baptized Jew is really "a Christian of another sort," and therefore is only put up with in a German church and is not fit to preach the gospel in a German church. (5) Whether the inner life and the outward regulation of the church have to be shaped in separation from each other, and consequently the external ruling of the church to be molded by the present arbitrary power. (6) Whether in the church there is not only an office of service but one of leadership as well. (7) Whether according to the mission entrusted to it in Romans 13, the state should claim rule over the whole of a man's life and exact forced submission. (German, mit Beschlag belegen). (8) Whether, therefore, we are first of all Germans and only then and as Germans are Christians." . . . "In this way the old questions are put to us to-day."

In that passage we see how vividly and powerfully Barth states the issues involved in our own day; not in Germany alone: the issues which till lately were thought to be

"old, unhappy far-off things
And battles long ago,"

and his standard by which to settle the questions is the Will of God. His theme is "God's will rules, and our wishes are in his hand." Barth calls in Paul's word, Romans 12. 2f., that without a renewing of our minds through the Spirit men know not "the good, acceptable perfect will of God." It is at this point that the difference that has arisen between Barth and his former allies, Brunner and Gogarten, can be understood. Barth sticks rigidly to the Reformed Church tenet: "The Holy Christian Church, whose only Head is Christ, is born of the Word of God, abides in it and hears not the voice of the stranger." Barth abides in the Word of God: only in the Bible do we hear God's voice and so come to know his Will. His prophetic insight discerns that the erection of other sources than the Word of God not only endangers soul-liberty but even "limits the Holy One of Israel." "Without his Word," says Barth, "God's will is more hidden to us than the most hidden thing that may exist elsewhere." Quoting the Paternoster, "Thy will be done, as in heaven, so on earth," he says, "If the event of God's will on earth in the sphere of mankind is the granting of a prayer, then it is a free act of God to his creature, and all the more so is the *knowledge* of this fact!" . . . "God is not the essence, and not the principle of the world or of our reason related to the world, so that we are able to know his will in world happenings. God is the free sovereign of the world. And the free happening of his will is the free entrance of this sovereign into the world: an entering by which, so to speak, he leaves all the rest of the world as shadows behind him."

This view of revelation not only separates Barth from Brunner; it accounts for his saying that the Nazi views, that Herr Hitler is God's new Messiah, and the events of two years ago are revelations of God's will, are paganism and heresy. Barth feels that to co-ordinate natural theology with revealed theology, that is, philosophical speculation and political interpretation of race and blood as on the same plane with God's Word and Will as revealed in Scripture, is to infringe God's sovereignty. To use his own expression: "It is the fatal 'and.'"

In all this vigorous speaking and activity Barth is discharging his function as a theologian. That function he has described as "the testing of the church's preaching by the meaning of the Word of God." "The task of theology is to test how the Word of God is spoken in the church, what is meant by the term 'God' in the church's speech, and what is put forth there as being God's will and God's work." The theologian is a "watch-

dog," a "sentry" challenging all comers. Speaking a year ago in Paris, Barth clearly defined these relations of Revelation, Church and Theology (Heft 9). Emil Brunner recognized Barth's vigilant watchfulness, for in "Natur und Gnade," he said, "Barth came forth as a loyal soldier on sentry-go by night, who challenged everyone not giving the right pass-word, shot him down, and occasionally 'went for' a good friend whose pass-word, owing to his zeal, Barth had either not heard or not rightly understood!" Brunner charged Barth with being too one-sided. With admirable clarity Brunner stated what fine service Barth has rendered. "Within a few years Barth has completely changed the aspect of the Protestant theological situation. Even where it is not acknowledged he has worked powerfully. To-day the fight is no longer concerned, as it was fifteen years ago, about 'religion,' but about the Word of God, no longer about the *deus in nobis*, but about the revelation of God in Jesus Christ. In a word, no longer about the themes of the 'Illumination' but about the theme of the Bible itself. We others who have helped Barth in this fight are collectively and individually those for whom he took the cataract from our eyes, even though some have never been found to say a word of public acknowledgment on Barth's behalf (p. 5, 'Natur und Gnade')."

There is not space enough within the limits of one article to present the arguments of Brunner against Barth, and the heated reply of Barth to Brunner's forty-four page booklet, "Nature and Grace," given in Heft 14, "No!" It would require a full statement of the reasons why Barth "broke" with Brunner, as given by Barth, first of all in an article in 1933, in *Zwischen den Zeiten*, No. 4, on "The First Commandment as Theological Principle," and secondly, the article in which he suspended publication of that journal. Brunner's brochure was written to vindicate himself. The student who wishes to master the meaning of this controversy cannot dispense with the above-mentioned articles. It must suffice to state the main subjects involved.

Brunner formulates six theses from Barth's writings, which but briefly deal with the following consequences of Barth's insistence on "by grace alone" and the Bible alone as the last court of appeal for Christian truth. The first thesis concerns the view that man is a sinner who has entirely lost the image of God in which he was originally created; that his rational nature, capacity for culture and humanism are not vestiges remaining from the lost image of God. The second view held by Barth is (according to

Brunner) that all attempts to find a general revelation of God in nature, conscience and history are to be utterly renounced: there is, to Barth, only one revelation, the special one in Scripture. The third is that the saving grace of God is only manifest in Christ, but is not to be deduced from the creation, and maintenance of the world by God, and fourthly, to seek to find saving grace of a knowledge of God's will from the "law of nature" is heathenism. Fifthly, as a consequence, there is no "point of contact" of God's redeeming work save in the grace of Christ which is the center of the biblical, Reformation theology. Sixthly the new creation is the annihilation, not the perfecting of the old man. Brunner's counter-theses take up the problem of "natural theology" which, he says, is directly touched in the first four of Barth's statements; indirectly, in the fifth and sixth. He offers a "correction" to them which takes up the rest of the brochure. In section IV Brunner takes in a hundred and twenty-six passages from Calvin, which he cites as Reformation doctrine justifying natural theology and survivals of man's original God-like image. In a sentence Brunner said, "The task of our theological generation is to find again a right 'natural theology.'"

Barth's reply is trenchant. He gives what he calls an "Angry Introduction," then states where each stands and proceeds to examine Brunner's "Natural Theology"; challenges Brunner's quotations from Calvin, contrasts the Brunner as he was and as he is now. Barth announced that his brother, Peter, an acknowledged authority on Calvin's writing, would deal with Brunner's misinterpretation of the Calvin passages. A few days ago (in Heft 18) Peter Barth, a Professor in Geneva, issued "The Problem of Natural Theology According to Calvin." This brochure of sixty pages takes up the four main themes: The knowledge man has of the Creator; Man as image of God; The "Law of Nature"; and lastly "The Ordinances," that is, the great orders of life which Brunner expounded in his large book on "The Commandment and the Ordinances" (to give the title in English. A translation of that book into English is arranged for). It will be interesting to see what Brunner has to say in reply to the exhaustive quotations from Calvin's various works massively presented by Peter Barth. A first reading leaves the impression that Brunner's invoking of Calvin is an action he will deeply regret!

However much one may deplore this controversy between Barth and Brunner, it must be acknowledged that the subjects under discussion go

right down to the bottom of the great upheaval in the world's thinking to-day. We are driven back to the fundamental questions, Has life any meaning? Can man, out of his natural, national resources, make a world "fit for decent people to live in"? Is there a God, and if so, how can we know his will? And Barth smites our facile optimism and belief in progress by reminding us that there is the Word of God which we have so fatally neglected. That "God is on the field" seeking to save men, is the great message of hope for a ruined world, which Barth has heard.

What a comforter Barth can be to troubled souls with life all shattered about them, can be learned from his addresses contained in other brochures. "The Good Shepherd" (No. 10) shows how he helps us against the "fell foe"; the second sermon in that issue sees the urge for church union that the Good Shepherd, through his Spirit, is fostering in sundered Christendom. "The Christian As a Witness" (No. 12) takes the reader back to the original witness God has given in the Bible and in Christ and provokes self-questioning as to whether we really do bear witness. "Three Sermons" (No. 17) is full of tender feeling and sympathy: one expounds Peter's walking on the sea and why he failed: "he took his eyes off his Lord, looked at the storm," and quailed! A second expounds Jeremiah 17. 5-10, applying it to the world state now. The third, an Advent sermon, takes up 2 Peter 1. 3-11. All three are simple, yet deep, expositions of biblical passages. Mighty though the dethroned Professor may be as a theologian and as the foremost champion of soul-liberty in our generation and as a doughty controversialist, he is mightiest when in simple speech like Luther's he expounds the Word of God, for by it souls can live, and only through God's grace revealed therein, is there hope for our tormented generation.

***The Mediator*—A Study of the Central Doctrine of the Christian Faith¹**

REVIEWED BY E. G. HOMRIGHAUSEN

THE title and sub-title of this thick, but not pedantic, volume of some six hundred and nineteen pages gives us the clue to its point of view and its argument. The doctrine, or the definition, of the central person in, with, through and from whom came the movement in history we call Christianity, is indeed the central reality of its nature and its peculiar power. The qualifying element in the Christian faith, which is the interpretative spectacles through which every other phase of reality is interpreted, be it God, or man, or nature, is Christ. The Christian theologian is always a Christologian.

But the main title of this book is *The Mediator*. Mediator signifies a middleman between two parties who confront each other. In this case it is God on the one side and man on the other. Between these two, there must come a mediator so that the middle "wall of partition" can be broken down. The dualism which has arisen in the world because of man's unrighteousness must be overcome in a new creative unity. Brunner claims that this doctrine of the mediator is an essential part of Christian faith and tradition, and that modern theological thought has had the tendency to obliterate that dualism by viewing man in terms too optimistic, and God in terms too monistic, or, at least, too naturalistic.

One cannot do justice to a book of this size and importance in a comparatively brief review. Professor H. R. Mackintosh, of Edinburgh, is right in saying that this is a "book of the times." It is difficult to name any recent major work in its field which is comparable in direct relevance and power. And there is no doubt but that those who profess to be leaders in Christian thought and practice in these days of many messiahs, will need as never before to be equipped with a thorough knowledge of the reason for their Christian faith and the power of its historic tradition and expression. It must become a day when ministers read thick books on theology such as this. If one cannot afford many books, one like this, to-

¹ *The Mediator*—A Study of the Central Doctrine of the Christian Faith. By Emil Brunner. Translated from the German by Olive Wyon. New York: The Macmillan Company. \$6.50.

gether with Barth's new *Dogmatics*, Wobbermin's *The Nature of Religion*, and Brunner's *The Commandment and the Orders*, is a mine of information and a wealth of solid reading. One might even include Schleiermacher's *The Christian Faith* and Bultmann's recently translated *Jesus and the Word*.

The book is written in simple and vigorous style, both in the original and in translation. The preface gives one a feeling that he is reading more than a dry theological treatise upon Christology. Brunner has intellectual acumen and skill on his side, and in addition he is a crusader, a soul aflame with his message, which is nothing less than an exalted and challenging and decisive Christ. He says there is more "religion" to-day in the world than ever. But in Christ we do not have a "religion," we have something decisive and challenging. Christ is not mere "feeling," he is the personal and ethical God confronting man. The church exists to proclaim this Christ, to summon men to face him and make a decision about what he faces them with. When she just argues about him, she has lost her saltiness. Of course, such a church which did not proclaim the true Christ might be active, *but* under such a conception of Christ nothing would *happen*. And without this Name, the world will rot, and no social reform can arrest the process of disintegration. Only one element can arrest that decay: the divine seriousness of faith in Christ.

The purpose of this book, as Brunner says, is not to say anything new, so much as it is to remind the church of her historic task. The fundamental reason for the impotence of the church is her ignorance of the power of Christ. Theological reflection on what the gospel means, or does not mean, is *not* that power. As such, this book is not intended to create faith; it cannot. Theology, as such, only criticizes and eliminates that which is false in one direction or another in the vital life of the church. Brunner feels that the error of the church in recent years has obscured the real power of Christ. This book wants to make the Christian church again conscious of the power of Christ which has been obscured by a false lead. When that is accomplished, then this book will no longer be necessary! Therefore, Brunner does not claim that this book is either "prophetic," or that it presents a "doctrine of Christ," or that it is peculiarly "scholarly."

The main body of the volume is divided into three parts. The first deals with preliminary considerations, which involve the distinction between "general" and "special" revelation, and how this distinction has

dropped out of our modern theology by the impact of a monistic philosophy which was taken into the Christian faith and thought to be Christian in its foundations. Brunner then gives the modern concept of Christ, set in the background of this modern idealism. But he is no longer a mediator. He has become a mere symbol for the innate and immanent God-force and God-idea within nature and man. Man and God have been united in a mystical or idealistic or voluntaristic sense and the original dualism of Christianity, which is not metaphysical dualism but a peculiar biblical dualism, has been obliterated in favor of a monism. It is here that we see the real difference between Catholicism and Protestantism. Catholicism, in its Thomist theology, grants that there is a natural theology, and to climax it the special revelation in Christ gears into this natural theology as the apex of a triangle gears into the lower strata of it. Protestantism, true to a phase of Augustinianism and Paulinism, has always claimed that in Christ something new, once-for-all, and opposed to nature was proclaimed, because it broke into the world from without. As a result, salvation by "grace" and "faith" means a salvation coming from a sovereign God through miraculous grace and faith; while Catholicism conceives of salvation as partly man's action, with the help of God, of course. Therefore, Catholicism has never accepted Augustine or Paul exclusively; it has always remained vaguely semi-Pelagian. Now Brunner does not deny an incipient general revelation in nature (which Barth would not admit as a specific data), but Brunner finds the understanding of this divine revelation in nature only through a decisive faith (ethically tinged) in Christ.

Brunner shows the great division that exists between the thinking of our age and that in which the Bible is set. Many reasons are given for our different point of view. Science, with its new world-view, the doctrine of evolution, biblical criticism, positivism, liberalism, the doctrine of the goodness of man, the basic premise of idealism that the world and its life is a constant and ever-higher expression of the philosophic Absolute, the idea of history as evolutionary growth—these, and many more ideas, have given us a point of view which denies the difference between general and special revelation, and which strikes at the doctrine of a mediator who works between two entities which confront each other. Every modern thinker feels the contradiction there is between the world as it is and the perfect idea, but not one of them thinks the contradiction, or antithesis, is radically great. They feel it can be overcome either by rational thought

(the idealist), or by mystical inwardness (the mystic), or by moral action (ethical theist). And there are some who deny the contradiction altogether and thus have no need for a mediator (humanism or neo-paganism). But true Christianity knew the radicality of evil and its irreconcilability from man's capacities out. Therefore, radical skepticism has always been inherent in Christian faith—in the cross. The name of that contradiction in the world is "sin." The modern man tries to explain it away, because it blocks his way to self-assertion and self-assurance. To admit evil's radical and real nature would rob him of his intellectual consistency, and that consistency is the modern man's pride! The mystic, in the end, believes that man "at bottom" is divine, hence he has the tendency to slight the reality of evil. Others explain it as a necessary part of development. To Fichte, evil was inertia; to others a lack of the divine.

Kant had a concept of evil as radical and as possessive of a resisting power. And Kant comes to the position of "inborn guilt!" But this phase of Kant has been suppressed! Like Goethe, many feel as if the great philosopher allowed his "cloak to be stained by that doctrine of radical evil, in order that even a Christian might be drawn to kiss the hem of his garment!"

But Kant could not allow radical evil to shatter his idealism and human autonomy. Therefore, Kant said the deepest part of man is divine and capable of overcoming that evil! So Kant is forced by the pride of his idealism to deny his near-Christian concept of evil—to save his own self-assurance! If Kant would have maintained his doctrine of radical evil, *he would have needed a doctrine of a radical Good from beyond to overcome it.* But like the modern man, his will to self-affirmation was stronger than his will to see the truth. Had he remained true, his philosophy might have collapsed! Then nothing within the sphere of man or of history would have been able to bridge the chasm. Even Schleiermacher's definition of sin falls short, since he puts it in the "flesh," and flesh to him is not the biblical idea of the *whole* man, but of the *animal* side of man. Sin is the non-existence of the spiritual element. It has no positive ring. And original sin is the after-effect of our animal past. Even Ritschl, because of his historical idea of progress, does not give sin that radical meaning which the Bible gives it. Brunner says the general idea of sin to-day is thoroughly Pelagian. To-day, we think of sins, and not of *sin*, of acts and not a corrupt human nature.

The Christian idea of sin means a fall, not, however, in the sense of a Jewish *theologumena*. Sin is more than moralists and pietists would have us believe. Sin is the human being himself, human nature. Pelagianism and Manichæism (which said sin was an evil substance from all eternity) are both wrong. Man does not sin, he *is* a sinner; he sins at whatever he does! This is radical Christian evil, sin against the will of the Creator. Evil is, therefore, positive and not negative. Sin means a certain difference, it means that a man has torn himself away from his origin.

Further, Kant's idea of radical evil, while approximating the Christian view, is too impersonal (not related to the Creator's will) and too individualistic. Christian evil is personal and social, for the whole fabric of history and society is shot through with it. So a man is a sinner to the end of his Christian days! But man knows that he is a sinner only in the light of the fact that he is God's. To separate ourselves from God is atheism and sin, to separate ourselves from our fellowman is unlovely Pharisaism. European rationalism has given us this moral individualism. The modern optimistic idealism has given us the optimistic notion of sins. Sin, in the Christian sense, is a totality, and everything we do is done in it. The original man who was created good, has now been corrupted and the *good creation now lies beyond, deep within, this visible world*. (Therefore when God comes to men in Christ, his divine nature is seen only in faith; he comes *incognito*, and never as a theophany.)

Therefore, sin is that which cuts a rent through the *whole* of existence. Manichæanism says the whole existence is evil—which Christianity does not say. Nor does Christianity hold that existence is an innocent or neutral condition. In faith, the Christian knows he is created in God's image, so also by faith he knows he has fallen from God. And this sinfulness means a broken relation with a personal God, which involves us in guilt and God can no longer admit man into his presence. The wrath of God is the new attitude of God toward a disobedient humanity. This rift between God and man runs through everything, and it is the cause of all the other rifts of the world.

Knowledge of sin in this realistic sense is the first point which leads man to despair of a way out. *This is the basis of faith in a mediator. Through divine intervention there comes help to the despairing soul.* Repentance and faith are the receptivities of this mediatorial gospel that bridges this mighty chasm and brings man into a new relationship with an

estranged God. Not a new creation, but a new edition of what God created we find in Christ. There is some truth in the mystic way, the rational way, the ethical way—but their concept of sin is too shallow and their synthesis too cheap. No wonder the Reformers said that knowledge of God through reason always leads to the God of wrath! When the wrath of God is ignored, and the distinction between God and “world” is obliterated, then there can be no meaning in the central conception of the Gospel: the uniqueness of the revelation in the Mediator!

From this fundamental preliminary consideration Brunner goes on to a study of the Christian faith and of historical research, which deals with faith and facts, faith and historical science, faith in Christ and of the results of historical research. All of which indicates his free critical method in the use of the records and an up-to-date knowledge of the most recent New Testament criticism. And Brunner is convinced that the historical problems raised a generation or more ago do not concern us to-day as much as the central *objective fact of Christ himself*. Scholarship is fast wearing thin those old distinctions between Paul and the Synoptics, and other differences. And the possibility of a paradox between the historicity of Jesus and the Christ of faith will always be there—and rightly will be as long as Christianity is the paradox it is! And so the denial of the historicity of such a man as Jesus always will be a possibility! And Brunner feels it is a false antithesis to say: *either* believe in the Jesus of historical construction, *or* in the God-man of faith! They are both true paradoxically, while the incognito Christ of faith is the real Christ which saved the Jesus of history for us. Brunner does not wave historical problems aside. He has much to say about the liberal reading into Jesus of a false idealism of the last century. Jesus *had* a messianic consciousness; he proclaimed forgiveness not as a general truth of religious revelation but as a factual something coming through him at the end of a revelatory process; he did perform deeds at which a modern psychologist would be astonished. And, in spite of the fact that the primitive portrait of Jesus is quite different from the portrait of faith, who could say that this Jesus cannot be the Christ of the church—be he historian or scientist? And the records are not biographies. And Jesus' ethics are not moral teachings, but the proclamation of the eschatological and unconditioned law of God. And to-day the “stumbling block” in Jesus is essentially the same as it always was—it is an offense against the autonomous man. Brunner is frank to

confess that the Greek language of the New Testament naturally involves Greek concepts, but that does not involve that the myth of the dying and rising Saviour of the mysteries could have been used of Jesus who died and arose but *once!* Suffice it to say that the unity between Jesus and the faith of the primitive church in and through him is being propounded more and more by scholars. Thus ends Book One, the first part.

Book Two deals with the person, and Book Three with the work, of the Mediator, both of which are based upon the premises laid down in Book One. Such interesting themes as: the deity of the mediator, the incarnation (involving the self-movement of God), the fact of the incarnation and the humanity of Christ are treated, together with the knotty problem of the eternal basis and the temporal event of the incarnation. All of which involves the meaning of the Word of God and the nature and essence of revelation, which is to be found in Christ. Here we face the different meaning which Christianity puts into the words "revelation" and "God." Thus revelation is not mere knowledge, nor is God a mere philosophic static being. Revelation is not purely a mystical feeling, nor a theophany, nor an irrational emotional experience, nor an intellectual conception. It is rather a call, a confronting of man with responsibility in the personal, decisive God. It is not a packet of knowledge which explains the nature of the physical universe. The Word of God is the fact behind revelation. This Word is real, sensible and a mentally concrete thing, a personal communication. Through that Word and the fellowship established through it, the Creator makes it possible for the creature to have fellowship with him. This Word is unique in the history of religions. This Word, again, is not the Greek Idea, nor the Hegelian Idea. Nor is it the theological Mind, nor is it the World Will.

In Christ this Word was communicated to us as a mystery from God. This Word is the object of faith—but again, it is the rock of offense, because it does not suit the human who desires this Word to come from within him. The human does not like to *believe*, he would rather *possess* it through rational or mystic or moral achievement. But the Word is a real tribunal, which judges us sinners, and forgives us, or we will not be forgiven. In Christ, Person and Word (the essential Word) are one. This gives him God's authority. He does not usurp God's authority, he is *the* authority. He is not a human religious genius. If that were the case he would usurp his authority. Therefore, we are not concerned about the

"value" of Jesus, but with his nature. But this divine Word is always behind the historical reality, the real mystery of God in him comes to us through faith, and "flesh and blood" do not give them to us. So the "divine nature" is not interpreted in the sense that divinity is infused into our humanity as that the divine nature, the divine will and purpose and call confront men decisively. Brunner maintains the "two nature" idea of the creeds, because every other attempt destroys the mystery in Christ which is there in lieu of the distinction between the sinner and the righteous God. Therefore, Christianity always lives in that one tension, which rationalism and mysticism and moral monism try to dissolve, and in doing away with the offense of Christianity they deal it a death blow by making it into something too smooth, less radical than its true nature permits.

Brunner deals with the arguments against this interpretation of Christ offered in modern times, such as the ancient magical concept of Christ, the physical implications of salvation in the old Christology, and the doctrinal complex of Irenæus.

Space forbids delving into this book any deeper, except to make a few comments upon the "work" of the mediator. This Jesus is not a rabbi, he is a witness to reality. For him the Will of God and the Law of God belong together. He is not the philosophical Logos, but the eternal Son who reveals himself to us in Jesus Christ. His whole life is determined by his consciousness of Sonship. But there is more in the work of the Mediator. Guilt has crept in to mar man's relation with God. The wrath of God is real, and one who is conscious of it, is conscious of the reality of sin. How can God forgive, without losing his holiness?

All modern approaches to this problem do not face the reality of this problem, nor the reality of sin to God. Forgiveness, then, can only be a divine act, which we cannot claim. Thus a perfect revelation must include an expression of the reality of guilt, the reality of divine wrath, and yet, at the same time, the overwhelming reality of forgiving love. That is why the Cross is so central in Christianity, and why the Reformers said that the true interpretation of Christianity must always interpret the Cross aright. In the Cross we have a true estimate of the cost of forgiveness, the cost of guilt and the awfulness of wrath. In the Cross we see our real selves. While Brunner knows the grief caused by the use of legal terms in the atonement concepts, such as law, lord, sovereign, property, guilt, judgment, and the like, he thinks we must get at their mean-

ing, for the men who used them have none other to use. But he sees in all theories great truths, in Anselm's a singular reality. Jesus' Cross is voluntarily assumed, not as a martyr's death, but as a way he *must* travel, if he would consummate his mission as the one, true Mediator. He suffers with the conviction that he is doing an "ultimate act." He atones for man's sins; he endured the wrath of God; he set things right at the center.

Brunner closes his great book with a chapter on the manifested King, the Risen Christ, without whom the life and Cross would be an enigma. The final chapter sums up what the Mediator-idea of Christ does. Only in the Mediator does man know his real self and what he is. Only in the Mediator does he know the Will of God, the Good, Love. Only in the Mediator is it possible to see and know one's neighbor. Only in the Mediator is our arrogant self-will broken and God honored. Only through faith in justification does the Good, instead of being a postulate, become a reality. And only through faith in Christ, the Mediator, does man gain a really ethical relation to historical reality.

Critics of Brunner's viewpoint have already pounced upon what they feel is Apollinarian, illogical, dialectic, scholastic, a view of Christ that in its eschatological aspect makes Christianity impossible to actualize! But let the critics provide a more adequate and truer solution!

Certainly, he is confronting us with the church's central reality, and, perhaps, her weakest spot, namely, her lack of a fulcral Christ of God whose person has about it the sovereignty of God's love and righteousness. As such, his person will always baffle logical definition. The true nature of Christ is made known only by the Holy Spirit, and, as such, Christology is a unique brand of knowledge; it is never science. Some would feel that Brunner had trespassed beyond his introduction limits, and by his love for systematic rationalization attempted to define that which evaporates when it is defined! For that reason Barth prefers the early prophetic, inconsistent and paradoxical Christology of Paul!

But the real merit of this book is in the fact that it raises the main issue, and it is extremely suggestive. Yet—while we always need to make our faith respectable at the bar of reason in apologetics—we can never escape the fact that intellectual apologetics always lands one into inconsistency, and proves itself to be a necessary evil! At least, historic Christian experience always defined Christ's person in terms of inconsistent paradox! Is Brunner a little too eager to prove the paradox?

Book Reviews

The Story of the Bible. By WALTER RUSSELL BOWIE. New York: The Abingdon Press. \$3.00.

SELDOM has this oft-repeated story been so well told; nowhere to our knowledge does it appear in such an attractive setting. Of Jesus Doctor Bowie writes: "He had a way of making religion seem a blessing and not a burden." Too often the Bible story is a burden which would-be tellers cannot deliver, while they themselves go into captivity. Here, on the contrary, is a blessing.

For this particular story-telling, at least three qualifications are necessary: a complete and sympathetic mastery of the story to be told, the ability to tell it in a style worthy of the theme, and, since this is "in the light of present knowledge," an appreciation of the work of modern scholarship on biblical problems.

On the first point, let it be said only that any man whose Bible has grown cold can hardly afford to miss this book. Because it is a story, comparatively little is said about the Epistles or the Psalms, but no passages of religious significance, no great moments, almost no great texts between Genesis and Revelation are overlooked. To a surprising degree, moreover, the hidden treasures are mined and brought to the surface. Rare is the man who knows his Bible; rarer still one like Doctor Bowie who goes so directly to the points of importance for the reader seeking spiritual nourishment.

As to Doctor Bowie's style, it is no whit below what we have learned to expect of him from his other works. We almost regret that he effaces himself so much in favor of the biblical writers. For in the introductory chapters (to both

Old and New Testaments), in his discussion of the nature of inspiration, of Messiahship, of miracles, and frequently in almost parenthetical remarks, there is a true literary artist at work. "It is a long way from Joshua, son of Nun, to Jesus, son of Mary." "Just as later painters of great battles or other high exploits of history fill their canvases with gorgeous color, so these writers of the Hebrew chronicles wove the purple of their interpretation into the threads of the old accounts which from generation to generation had been handed down." What a wealth of suggestion there is in this brief word about the Pharisees: "For them people belonged in classes." Where in the Bible itself literary excellence is marked, as in Ruth, the Song of Songs, or the infancy narratives of the Gospels, deep calls to deep, and the result is one of exquisite literary beauty.

Here and there the biblical technician may be disappointed that some of his critical stock in trade finds no larger place; for example, it would have been comparatively easy to point out the two strands of narrative in the first book of Samuel and to have cleared up the difficulty in Saul's failure to recognize David after the battle with Goliath. But on the other hand, "what we are listening to now is not a commentary on the Bible, but the story of the Bible itself." The broad lines of critical study are carefully followed, and occasionally, as in the tentative ascription of the David story to Abiathar, Doctor Bowie's technical knowledge is surprising.

The most serious defect of the book is a defect of the Bible itself, a lack of proportion. The stories of Genesis oc-

cupy almost as many pages as the story of Jesus. The unedifying prophets of 1 Kings 13 bulk as large as Hosea. The Gospels, so admirably presented, are too condensed; and we miss the non-narrative parts of the New Testament. But it is the story with which Doctor Bowie is concerned. A list of suggested books at the end of his volume will carry the reader to the other matters. Not since Dean Hodges wrote that valuable and highly interesting book, *How to Know the Bible*, has a work appeared so likely to stimulate knowledge of Bible stories or to awaken appreciation and love for the Book of books.

CHARLES L. TAYLOR, JR.

Episcopal Theological School,
Cambridge, Massachusetts.

American Jesuits. By JAMES J. WALSH. New York: The Macmillan Company. \$2.50.

To the forty books from his prolific pen, Doctor Walsh, of Fordham University, adds this tribute of friendship to the members of the Catholic order in America to which he himself for a time belonged, the Society of Jesus. "It is always the men who know the Jesuits the best who think the most of them," he remarks, and on that basis he proves that he has known them exceptionally well, since he credits them with every Christian virtue. If they have faults or limitations the reader will not find them recorded here.

"The Jesuit idea is the cultivation of unselfishness and devotion to others," he declares, and he illustrates that devotion with a moving story of hardship, incredible toil and sometimes martyrdom in missions to the Indians and in an obscure ministry in asylums and prisons from colonial days down to the present hour.

He sets forth the Jesuits as early and consistent champions of religious toleration in this country, a movement in which they were "everywhere prominent except in Rhode Island." Such tolerance, of course, extended only to Christians of other names. Atheists and Jews had no rights in the eyes of either Protestant or Catholic in the early days. Doctor Walsh is a champion of Jesuit methods of education, perpetuated with little change of form from the Middle Ages, and instances the pupils in Revolutionary days who won distinction as evidence that "Jesuit education and patriotism go hand in hand." The Jesuit contributions to science, particularly in astronomy, meteorology and seismology, are passed under review.

Speak of the Jesuits in Protestant circles and inherited prejudices, stereotyped in derogatory phrases, are likely to obscure a true perspective. It is time we got rid of them. Setting aside differing definitions of piety, divergent theological formulas and unacceptable ecclesiastical assumptions, the narrative of spiritual experience and Christian service which Doctor Walsh unfolds, though it may take unfamiliar forms, is of profound and abiding interest and significance. It speaks a universal language of the heart, intelligible to both Catholic and Protestant. If there is a hard job or an obscure one in which there is no glory, within the gift of the Roman Catholic Church, a Jesuit seems to be elected to it and to assume it without hesitation or complaint and to carry to it the resources of scholarship for which the order is distinguished. The author, who has a host of friends outside his own communion, tells the story with a tender and admiring sympathy.

ROBERT A. ASHWORTH.

New York City.

Christianity as History and Faith.

By ARTHUR CUSHMAN MCGIFFERT. Edited by A. C. MCGIFFERT, JR. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. \$2.50.

WHAT gives distinction to this volume is the name of its author—Arthur Cushman McGiffert. To have a book by this eminent church historian, in which Christianity is interpreted in terms of history and faith, whets the reading appetite.

A glance at its pages indicates that more space is given to faith than history. This is unexpected. A scholar usually emphasizes the importance of the field in which he works. But, although from the pen of an historian, less than one third of the space is devoted to history and more than two thirds to faith.

Moreover, the chapters on faith are more interesting than those on history. Again this is unexpected. A scholar is usually at his best in his chosen field. But in this instance the historian excels as an interpreter of his own mind rather than as an interpreter of ecclesiastical manuscripts. This does not mean that the six historical chapters in this book lack value. For it would be difficult to imagine the late President McGiffert touching historical material and not giving value to the material he touched. Still, there are no chapters in this book that really bite and sometimes draw blood, until those on faith are reached.

How explain this? One explanation is, that while the author is widely known through his many books as an historian, this is the only book known to the writer of this review, in which he reveals his religious faith. And the reader turns eagerly to these chapters on faith to learn about the convictions of this great scholar. And this suggests another explanation, namely, the chapters on faith

have what those on history necessarily lack—the personal element.

McGiffert belonged to the modern school that insists upon rigid impartiality in the handling of historical material. Unlike Harnack of a generation ago, and Ranke of a still earlier generation, who occasionally paused in the midst of their lectures to express personal convictions, these modern scholars believe it to be unscientific to be anything else than strictly impersonal.

In his teaching days at Union Theological Seminary, the students sometimes complained of the way in which their teacher eliminated himself in his teaching. Often they wished that he would break loose and tell them about his own beliefs. This complaint, of course, was a compliment. For they felt that he was so much of a man, that along with what he taught them Basil, Augustine, and Luther believed, they wanted him to tell them what he believed.

Well, those who know him through his books on history, and those who knew him as the teacher in the class-room, by reading the chapters on faith, can know Doctor McGiffert as the clear-headed, warm-hearted follower of Jesus Christ. For in these chapters he lets himself go. And this is the charm of the book.

ROBERT W. McLAUGHLIN.

Brooklyn, N. Y.

Education for Life With God. By

WILFRED EVANS POWELL. New York: The Abingdon Press. \$2.00.

IN this, his latest book, Doctor Powell has done real service to the cause of Christian education. Leaders in this field have had for some time a sense of restlessness because of the indefiniteness of underlying principles and philosophy. This indefiniteness has been the cause of much criticism of the religious education

movement by leaders in other fields of the church's work.

After analyzing the more important current conceptions of religious education which identify it either with teaching a common religion acceptable to all or with moral training and social education, Doctor Powell discovers a great lack of emphasis upon the relationship to God. This is indeed an essential lack. It is comparable to Hamlet with Hamlet left out. Doctor Powell rightly points out that religion as an attitude toward God must be made explicit. This must be the central fact in all the program of religious education.

The culmination of religious education is Christian education. Christ, the revelation of God, is the center of the Christian religion, therefore, "Christian religious education will seek to make effective ideals of life that reflect the spirit of Christ. It will help the pupils toward an idea of God that is in harmony with the revelation of God in Christ. And it will guide their experience, by the use of Christian materials and methods toward the kind of relation to God that is made possible through Christ, and the kind of relation to their fellows that Christ inspires" (p. 241).

This quotation summarizes the position which Doctor Powell reaches as he concludes his book. There will be many leaders who will disagree with him in his interpretation of the place which Jesus Christ must have in the process of Christian education. Many more, however, will welcome the book as meeting a long-felt need. Christian education is essentially education for life with God. That life is possible only in and through Jesus Christ, the Son of God. Too long we have been interested exclusively in human techniques and methods. Now we must recognize again the power of a God who is both immanent and transcendent, who

has revealed himself in his Son, Jesus Christ, and who through his Son is seeking to open up a way whereby man may find the reality of life with him.

HAROLD IRVIN DONNELLY.
Princeton Theological Seminary.

Form Criticism. A New Method of New Testament Research. Including **The Study of the Synoptic Gospels**, by RUDOLF BULTMANN, and **Primitive Christianity in the Light of Gospel Research**, by KARL KUNDSEIN. Translated by FREDERICK C. GRANT. Chicago: Willett, Clark & Company. \$2.00.

A TRUE historical portrait of Jesus depends upon a correct evaluation of the early Christian records. Hence, synoptic criticism is of primary importance to every minister who believes that intellectual integrity is essential to "spirituality." Dean Grant has rendered notable service in providing an English translation of two "popular essays" on the essentials of the new "form criticism." It is indicative of our backwardness in scientific New Testament study that they may appear quite technical to American readers.

Form criticism is defined as the history of the tradition through insight into the laws governing its development. In his introduction Dean Grant says, "It is the promise of Form criticism that it will give us a better understanding of Jesus' own authentic words, as well as a clearer test for distinguishing his own veritable utterances from later accretions and interpretations, added in the course of handing down the tradition." The only previous American book on this subject is Easton's *The Gospel Before the Gospels*. As that work follows the classifications used by Dibelius, it is fortunate that the first essay translated is by Bultmann, the other leader of the movement.

The forms into which Bultmann divides the Gospel material are clearly and simply set forth. Instead of the exhaustive analysis in his larger book, we have only a few illustrations under each. It suffices, however, to show the method and point of view. The basis of the tradition was "not long unified accounts, but small single pictures." The Gospels arose to meet "the needs, aspirations, hopes and aims of the early church." Bultmann is noted for his historical skepticism and Kundsins stands markedly under the influence of Bousset's "Kyrios Christos." But they do not deny the historical basis of the tradition. As Kundsins insists, Palestinian conditions before the destruction of the Temple are presupposed in the Lord's Prayer, the Sermon on the Mount, and in the Galilean controversies.

If anything, Kundsins's essay will appear the more novel, and his results must be recognized as tentative. He attempts to trace from the synoptic records the historical development of the apostolic age. The Gospels show that the point of view of James was not the only one in Palestinian Christianity. The tendency to universalism goes back to the early community in Judæa, as the book of Acts indicates.

Kundsins sees the first stage of Christianity as almost exclusively an eschatological expectation. This was followed by a realization that salvation was already present. He believes that both of these developments have their root in Jesus. Likewise Bultmann affirms, "According to the testimony of the earliest Christians themselves, they owed their eschatological enthusiasm to the prophetic appearance of Jesus." But Jesus himself united the eschatological and ethical. Bultmann explains the union of these two in Barthian terms. Though some of us may feel that this explanation is an anachronism,

the fact remains that no interpretation of Jesus can be true to the facts which does not deal with the indissoluble union of ethics and eschatology in Jesus.

Again may we thank Dean Grant for presenting such a valuable summary of the results of form-criticism to American readers. May it help to lead American ministers away from the current modernized portraits of Jesus, not simply to the Jesus of history, but to the Christ of the Gospels.

CLARENCE T. CRAIG.

Oberlin Graduate
School of Theology.

Preaching and the Mind of To-day.

By GAIUS GLENN ATKINS. New
York: Round Table Press, Inc.
\$2.00.

DOCTOR GAIUS GLENN ATKINS, Professor of Homiletics and Sociology at Auburn Theological Seminary, has rendered the church and its ministry a distinguished service by writing this book. Drawing upon many years of observation and experience, he has brought together in a notable way just those matters which the Christian ministry needs to face if preaching is to be anything more than the promulgation of harmless moralities. "The book does not end," says its author, "it just stops"; but before it stops it says many great things greatly. It begins with a succinct and stimulating survey of preaching through the centuries and ends with a chapter on "The Preacher's Forgotten Word." Between the two are eight striking chapters which are concerned chiefly with the modern mind, and the preacher's understanding of, and approach to, it. What we get here are not fringes, but essentials.

It is Professor Atkins' conviction that the Christian Church and Christian pulpit are charged with a double task: "to

re-think themselves and to furnish the individual and society the ruling ideas under whose illuminating control they may creatively re-think all the meanings, values, and ends of life." He recognizes frankly (do not we all?) that preaching is "under fire," as in the opinion of this reviewer it ought always to be under fire. He believes the greatest foe of the church to be secularism; indeed, the chapter captioned "The Challenge of Secularism" is one of the most forceful in the book. And yet, somewhat paradoxically, he insists that the times, for all their seeming coldness to preaching, are on the preacher's side, simply because the mind of the time, being less sure about more things, is potentially more teachable.

Whatever else preaching is and does, "it must meet life at some point with some creative message for life"—a conception of preaching, by the way, which is worth conjuring. Its creative message is the reality of religion, which in Christian terms is to be mediated through the Way, the Truth, and the Life of Jesus Christ. The "baselines" (or Christian attitudes, or approaches) of that message are good will, human well-being, ethical integrity, fullness of life, and the redemption of our stained and broken human estate.

Such, in brief, are the salient positions of the author. The greatest danger in a book on preaching is not what may be said, but what is left unsaid. But the author, within the limitations of his self-imposed field, has done his task well. Content and form, insight and style, combine to make this study a significant contribution to the already vast literature on preaching. Ministers long in the service, as well as those who are on the thresholds of their high calling, would do well to get the book and read it. It may compel many to re-think their posi-

tions and conceptions, which is just what Doctor Atkins would most desire.

HAROLD W. RUOPP.

Boston University.

The Old Testament as It Concerns Women. By MARIE WELLES CLAPP. New York: The Methodist Book Concern. Fifty cents.

The Old Testament as It Concerns Women is an admirable textbook for women's study groups. This is the kind of interpretation of the Bible that will produce intelligent attitudes and provoke fruitful discussion. The strength of this little book derives from its author's rich background of study and experience. She has had a thorough technical training under excellent masters of biblical criticism. Her knowledge of Hebrew has stood her in good stead in her interpretation of the text and her fine historical understanding has given her true perspective upon her material. In addition to this more formal training, she has had residence in Palestine of sufficient length and with sufficient penetration into Near-Eastern ways of life, to enrich her study from the side of living experience. Thus, the major virtue of this study is that its author has understanding in rich, full measure of the material with which she deals.

But this is not the whole story. Mrs. Clapp also understands the audience for which she writes. Interpreting the Bible with the interests of women central has given her a really fresh approach to the material. She brings out many values not often stressed in biblical study, and with deftness and skill makes the interests of the biblical characters reveal the larger issues of life to-day. Her book, which includes the time from the beginning of the exile to the life of Mary, the Mother of Jesus, is a consecutive histori-

cal study. It concerns itself with the developing thought and experience of the Hebrew people, and makes an excellent outline study for the period. While women's interests are central, these are never artificially constructed, nor is the text strained to produce them. They merely figure as an interesting point of view from which to examine the developing process of history.

In the matter of suggestions for study, Mrs. Clapp shows herself to be a real teacher. Each lesson contains, in addition to the interpretation of the text, a suggested task designed to help the student to make the material her own possession, and also a series of questions for discussion. The author has been very happy in her selection and phrasing of these topics. They grow naturally out of the situations discussed in the text, but they point thought toward the present and bring before the student issues that are vital in life to-day.

One rejoices to see so effective a handling of the biblical text as this book affords. It is popular in the best meaning of that term, and will really interest and challenge modern church women. But it rests back, as all good popularization must do, upon a sound and adequate scholarship.

MARY ELY LYMAN.

Union Theological Seminary.

Realistic Theology. By WALTER MARSHALL HORTON. New York: Harper and Brothers. \$2.00.

PROFESSOR HORTON offers us a constructive contribution toward the development of the new theology which is taking the place of a declining liberalism. Defining realism as "a resolute determination to face all the facts of life candidly, beginning preferably with the most stubborn, perplexing and disheartening

ones," he undertakes to set forth realistic views of the human predicament, of the providence of God, of the work of Christ, of the church and the plan of salvation. In this endeavor he appraises liberalism, "with a view of carrying over and incorporating into our realistic theology whatever genuine values may be rescued from the wreck." The two interests, in tough-minded realism and in conservation of the values of liberalism, are characteristic of our contemporary Protestantism and the volume is highly representative of the present situation in theology.

Criticism must begin at the point of the author's intention. Does this theology conserve the values of liberalism? Does it do so upon the basis of a realistic facing of the human problem? The answer to the first question is doubtlessly affirmative, if liberalism means emphasis on moral endeavor, the fear of fatalism, the assumption of human freedom, the high evaluation of the spiritual life, the priority of morality to faith; these values, if they be values, are conserved. There is, to be sure, another kind of liberalism, which is interested primarily in the freedom of scholarship in the study of Scriptures and history, and in the mutual tolerance of antagonistic fighters for the truth or the rights of conscience—values which need to be conserved by other means than the support of the liberal dogmas. With this type of liberalism Professor Horton seems less concerned. The answer to the second question cannot be as confidently affirmative. The book begins realistically enough, but the later chapters in which the work of Christ, the church and the plan of salvation are discussed seem to face less candidly the stubborn, perplexing and disheartening facts about Christ, the church and human plans for self-help. Were the crucifixion less disheartening and the

resurrection less perplexing, the church less stubbornly secular, and human moral endeavors less disastrous, then we might be able to put our faith in a Christlike community endeavoring to save the world. But history being what it is, and the church being what it is, and our plans to end war, to establish justice, to promote universal benevolence resulting as they do, can we be tempted to put our faith in one more trial of the spiritual man "to do better this time"? And is our human predicament faced wholly "realistically," when it is acknowledged that unaided man is unable to master the evil forces in his society and that there is judgment or catastrophe as well as progress in history? When it is not recognized that the righteous endeavors of man, aided or unaided, come to their end in new injustices, and that even if victory were possible it would be futile in the face of death, individual, social, planetary?

Professor Horton has corrected the liberal theology by including some of the sterner elements of experience? But he has not given us a realistic theology in the sense in which he defines realism.

H. RICHARD NIEBUHR.

Yale University.

The Re-Discovery of the Spirit. By WILLIAM OWEN CARVER. New York: The Fleming H. Revell Company. \$1.50.

WHAT makes a new book valuable? It must show intimacy with the masterminds of the past. It must courageously face the disturbing intellectual problems of the present. It must frankly estimate the vagrant moods, the pitiful aberrations of the ultra-radicalism of our day. It must victoriously point the way to the supreme values in possession of

which mankind makes progress into its divine destiny.

All of this Professor Carver does, skillfully and convincingly, in his notable book. This refreshing series of four Norton Lectures is likely to become one of the widely-read messages for our distraught period. Abounding in sentences and paragraphs that flash like lightning, the volume validates anew the majesty of personality, the spiritual sovereignty of Christ, the sublime purposes of God for mankind.

With joyous assurance, he maintains that a surprising intellectual change is sweeping over us. After the blatant and disgusting "jazz-age," our creative thinkers confidently re-affirm the spiritual verities. Professor Carver understands radical modernism in its shallowness, its conceit, its threat, its cynical disregard of all sanctities. He demonstrates that even during the last several years, there have been many indications of a growing disillusionment about the moral, ethical and religious disillusionment that followed the World War. Familiarity with Mencken and his noisy ilk has bred boredom if not contempt even among college groups where was most prevalent the attitude of destructiveness toward the kingdoms of tradition, convention, morality, and religion. Manifestly there is the readiness to investigate what a true philosophy of life and a vital religion would mean in the reconstruction of our shattered world. Overboastful science, materialistic naturalism, shallow behaviorism, inadequate humanism have been vanquished by a deeper metaphysic, a warmer social passion, a wiser theology. Freud, Watson, Dewey, Ames and many others, yield the field to a host of philosophers, scientists and moralists who are the flaming evangelists of the spiritual interpretation of life.

In his chapter on "Finding the Self in

a Scientific World" the author deals in a fascinating manner with Personality, human and Divine. I do not know of a more illuminating and inspiring statement in brief compass regarding the supreme values of the spirit. We learn and achieve our freedom by learning, obeying and using the laws of the spiritual order, for the individual and for society.

Professor Carver displays a fervent loyalty to Christ. He affirms that the philosophers cannot solve the problems of the Cosmic God, the God of history and of spiritual revelation; nor find the power to arouse humanity to the task of creative co-operation, until they take full account of the Christ of God. Committed to the way and the work of God, as the meaning and the calling of our life—thus do we become acquainted with God in experience. He is our intellectual necessity, our ethical resource, our spiritual goal.

For eager ministers, this enriching book will decisively help to re-establish their convictions. For earnest laymen, it will convincingly point the solution to many of our disturbing problems.

PHILIP L. FRICK.

First Methodist Episcopal Church,
Cohoes, N. Y.

The Church and Civilization. By
LYNN HAROLD HOUGH. New
York: Round Table Press. \$2.00.

ONE of the notable features of American Protestantism has been that although its ministers at certain periods may have been somewhat provincial, there have ever been leaders whose interests have remained as wide as the universe. Jonathan Edwards was a great theologian and a college president, while Mark Hopkins, being a great preacher, pioneered in education. Lynn Harold Hough holds membership in this same society, for he too is

a cosmopolitan of the church. His recent volume, *The Church and Civilization*, is evidence of this, since it contains sermons and essays on themes as wide apart as the sermon preached in the Cathedral of St. Pierre in Geneva in 1934, entitled "The Church and Civilization," and another sermon entitled "Laughter."

Elbert Hubbard with care produced a Scrap Book which is filled with anything except scraps! In the same sense this volume may be said to be Dean Hough's Scrap Book. It reflects not only some of the multitudinous interests of one of the deans of Drew University; but also proceeds like some pageant, scene after scene, to illustrate what is going on in the world of ideas and things. Consider some of the matters it lifts:

There is a chapter entitled "The Book for Such an Age as This," in which the question is frankly lifted, "Can a pre-scientific literature show the way of life to a scientific man?" I defy any preacher of any shade of theology whatsoever to read that chapter without getting the homiletical machinery of his mind into high gear for the purpose of planning a sermon of his own on some like theme. One of our brilliant preachers, Halford E. Luccock, somewhere gives us a picture of the American college student aping Rodin's statue, The Thinker, but who in reality is rather "leaning upon his tennis racket and gazing sadly at the ground." This phenomenon of the over-sophisticated contemporary college student is nothing about which any college preacher goes into ecstasy. But here is a chapter on "Vital Enthusiasm" which may well prove a sort of compass to any university parson cast down in spirit.

It is open season for any attack upon the believers in civil liberties in the

United States these days. Violations of such liberties are all the vogue and both laity and clergy may as well make up their minds that no intentional immunity will be granted to the field of religion. The simple fact that some pompous defender of an outworn orthodoxy, like Hearst, can bedevil so many of our educators, speaks volumes as to what may occur when some kindred spirit arises in America to make the American pulpit his happy hunting ground. The day is soon to come, if not already here, when the church is going to be brought to the realization that a free pulpit is not the gift of the gods, but a thing purchased with tears and sacrifice. In this matter of freedom it is rather easy for an incumbent of a pulpit to get a martyr complex. Some very needful interpretations of the whole idea of an unfettered pulpit are contained in a chapter entitled "The Freedom of the Pulpit," which I think one of the most rewarding of the whole volume.

In certain sections of the church is the spirit of defeatism. This is sin. As Cromwell and his ironsides rode through Ely Cathedral upon their steeds, with ruthless maces knocking the heads from the statues and wreaking vengeance upon priceless carving, so has this spirit of defeat wrought disaster in the church. Over against this emotion one might well set the chapter on "A Clan of Gallant Gentlemen," for the working of a great healing.

Lynn Harold Hough excels in so many ways. He is great in his capacity for friendship and human comradeship. He is notable as a preacher. In his ample mind are the furnishings to enrich the classroom. He shares the evangelical tradition so deeply as to be a humble lover of Jesus. When such a man writes, an intelligent reader ought to be curious

enough to want to read what is put down.

ROBERT LEONARD TUCKER.

Indianola Methodist Episcopal Church, Columbus, Ohio.

Testament of Love. By HUBERT L. SIMPSON. New York: The Abingdon Press. \$1.00.

It is a little book, but a great one.

It deals again with "that strange Man upon his Cross," and with the words he spoke there. An Introduction, an Epilogue, and a short chapter for each of the Seven Words make up the book. It is easy to summarize but not easy to review.

It is a book of Lenten addresses. The evidences of the spoken word are many. A crispness and directness, an intimacy of approach and appeal, adds to rather than lessens both interest and effectiveness. But the vividness, the glow, the passion and power cannot readily be captured and committed to the cold print of the reviewer's page. For it is one of those rare books in the reading of which there is constantly the impression of the tones and inflection of the human voice.

Yet one is glad that these addresses have been put into print. It is possible to re-read, to go back and get the full effect, to have the whole treatment in hand. For that treatment, though of so old and so familiar a theme, has wonderful freshness and real originality. Yet there is no unworthy striving after effect. The writer's deep reverence forbids that. There is, however, a frank and fearless facing of present-day cynicism and skepticism and an answer thrilling in eloquence and soul-quickenings in faith.

It is magnificent writing, illumining exegesis, and spirit-thrilling interpretation. There is Christian comfort here, but something deeper than mere consolation. It is the comfort of the Cross.

The terror and tragedy of Calvary are revealed anew that the victory and peace there won may be appreciated and received.

For it is not a book that one may read unmoved. It has in it the piercing and penetration of the Word. It has in it the sobbing and the song. It is a book of the Cross, but the "cross which is the world's throne." Understanding of the human heart in its sin and suffering and sorrow is here. And deep thoughts upon the mystery of redemption, and high thought upon the wonders of grace.

It is a book for preachers, not only as preachers but as men, as themselves needy recipients of undeserved mercies. And many a sermon will be more helpful because he who preaches has here been brought face to face with the meaning of the gospel for his own soul. Any minister who can read this book without tears may well weep. And any minister who can read it without being driven to his knees may well pray for a contrite heart. But when he has wept and when he has prayed he will have words of comfort and power to speak. For, withal, it is a tender book, dealing with the divine strength which could be gentle. "All Seven Words are words of love. Faith may seem to waver, hope to be at low ebb; but love is always at full tide in the soul of Jesus. Victory remains with love."

J. PERCIVAL HUGET.

First Presbyterian Church,
Shelter Island, N. Y.

Unfinished Cathedral. By T. S. STRIBLING. New York: Doubleday, Doran & Company. \$2.50.

Unfinished Cathedral, by T. S. Stribling, has already become a widely read and much discussed novel. The book, the third in Mr. Stribling's trilogy of the new South, is in the realistic tradition

and possesses undoubted merit as a social document. But part, at least, of its wide reading, and perhaps more of its heated criticism is due to its treatment of the manner in which the church responded to the hectic financial fevers which characterized the recently deceased boom times.

The story is based upon data sufficiently accurate to justify its use. Literal accuracy is not common with either novelists or poets; nor do we expect it from them. If we did, pretty nearly all the social novels from the days of Dickens down to the present would have to go by the board. Objections to *Unfinished Cathedral* on the score that it is not accurate in its descriptions of the detail of ecclesiastical organization and methods, seem to us beside the point. The book at least reflects the impressions made upon a sensitive and intelligent mind by the functioning of our involved ecclesiastical machinery, and is near enough to the facts to reflect their character.

Echoes of such news sensations as the Scottsboro trial, the Ku Klux Klan, and some distinct repercussions to the generally flamboyant and frequently humane eloquence of Clarence Darrow are utilized as part of the plot and incident of the story. This too we think is entirely legitimate, if it is well and honestly done; and in the latter particular no fault can be found with *Unfinished Cathedral*.

The real criticism of the book lies, it seems to us, much deeper; and is of much greater consequence in determining the final place of the work in our literature.

To put it bluntly, Mr. Stribling has given to us a sort of screen photography of a number of interesting characters, and has succeeded in getting inside of none of them.

In *The Store*, we do have a more or less convincing exposition of Colonel

Milt Vaiden, and in some sense he does come alive. In *Unfinished Cathedral* he is scarcely more than a shadow of the mentally tortured, ghost-ridden figure of the earlier book.

Nor does the author fare better with his other characters. This is a pity too; for in Doctor Blankenship, and especially in the Rev. Jerry Catlin, he has characters worth interpreting.

How it can, and often does come about, that men who begin their careers with definite ideals of service to their fellow men in the spirit and name of Christ, under the impact of ecclesiastical institutionalism become so altered that they measure their own spiritual effectiveness by material standards, and compromise their ethical insights for the glory of God, is a story that desperately needs to be told. And none of our American novelists seem equal to it. From Sinclair Lewis's opera bouffé to Stribling's pontifical shadows, they all miss the note of conviction. Why is this? Can't the thing be done? Or has too hasty generalization on insufficient data betrayed those who have attempted it?

As a social document that has a timely message for our generation, we commend the reading of the book. With its undoubted worth from this angle, it is unfortunate that we cannot go further and feel sure that it is great literature.

WALLACE H. FINCH.

Chester Hill Methodist
Episcopal Church,
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The Reason for Living. By ROBERT RUSSELL WICKS. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. \$2.00.

DOES any one know the student mind of America better than does the author of this book? For ten years he has been devoting himself to dealing with their

problems. Here he has set them forth, and the very style evidences his earnestness to give that expression which will convey his meaning to any willing mind.

The book is divided into two parts, the first dealing with the materials out of which one may forge a faith rather than accept one ready-made, the second outlines the practical questions which faith confronts.

Two quotations may suggest the governing ideas of a book which is rich with a hundred centers. "Our civilization has drilled us in the idea that we are worth what we outwardly possess. Instead our capacities are our only real possessions and our real joy is in the exercise of our capacities." "One unmistakable impression which Christ's life has left upon the world is that of intelligent love devoted to excellence and seeking at any cost to impart life—by that more can be done than by any other means."

There is a characteristic compactness about the writing which does not becloud the clarity. Consider for examples: "Originality is one of the areas of living into which we can neither argue ourselves by reason, nor shove ourselves by selfishness. When anyone tries to be original, he produces no more than a strained peculiarity. One discovers how original and unique is his personality only when he gives himself over to following out the beauty of perfection in some line of activity." Again: "We are not the originators of all that we live by but are the organs of something greater than ourselves. We are enveloped and suffused and partly actuated by some self-like principle in the universe. Love is a furnished power just as truly as gravity is provided." Still again: "Union with God is such a variable matter with individuals and so untransferable that it is better understood by experiment than by explanation. We do not add God to a sincere life, we only

realize more fully that he is at the heart of it."

The illustrations are as elemental as they are understanding, like the woman in the tenement who threw her apron over her head to get the only solitude she could have for her devotion, or the lost boys who were found in the pigsty, which was the place they had been warned not to go, or the child trying to put the wasted tooth-paste back into the tube as a picture of the confusion consequent upon reckless misdoing, or the difference in social obligation between rowing your own boat and rowing in a shell, and in life we row in shells.

Realistically he pushes his mind through the most difficult problems. In considering the sources of good and evil he comes out—"We have evidence that there is enough of love in God's universe to make a selfish condition forever unsafe and a loveless arrangement finally impossible to maintain." In this commercialized world, he likens the average man to the cormorant who is not allowed to swallow the big fish he obtains but must surrender it to his master who compensates him with a minnow. He protests against the control of industry and the right to work by two hundred industrial firms with their two thousand directors. He holds that a great struggle is gathering around the moral issue as to whether ownership or workmanship shall be the ruling factor in self-government. Nor does he pass by the very latest problem of how in a managed world the freedom of the human spirit can be preserved.

JOHN W. LANGDALE.

Book Editor,
The Methodist Episcopal Church

Psychology and Life. By LESLIE D. WEATHERHEAD. New York: The Abingdon Press. \$2.00.

THIS book has had such high praise

from eminent authorities in this field that additional comment seems unnecessary. Doctor William Brown, Wilde Reader in Mental Philosophy in the University of Oxford, says, "Mr. Weatherhead is a sound psychologist and can render powerful help in the unifying and harmonizing of the mind on the highest spiritual level." Sir Henry B. Brackenbury, M.D., Vice-President of the British Medical Association and a distinguished psychiatrist, writes a very thoughtful and discriminating "Foreword," in which he says that "for non-technical readers of the modern outlook and method of psychology in relation to conduct it would be difficult to better it."

Mr. Weatherhead is most generous in his reference to progress in psychological techniques in America, but many of us are convinced that ministers and teachers of religion in Great Britain are facing the practical implications of psychology with much greater seriousness than we do here. Perhaps it is because there is no general agreement, on this side of the Atlantic, as to what "psychology" really is. Our embarrassment is accentuated by the fact that with a few conspicuous exceptions such as Doctor H. A. Overstreet and Doctor John J. B. Morgan, who are eminent scholars in this field, much of our so-called "practical psychology" is in the hands of pseudo-scientists and facile popularizers.

The parish minister needs just such a book as this. In plain, untechnical language and with a wealth of concrete case records, Mr. Weatherhead indicates how a minister may make himself effective in the field of spiritual healing. At the same time he makes a clear distinction between the function of the minister and that of the trained psychiatrist.

In a day when there is such a careless

use of Freudian terms, the chapter on "Repression and Self-Control," with its fine discrimination between "repression" and "suppression," is invaluable to every one who is interested in problems of personality adjustment. It is also a rich mine of homiletic material for all ministers who feel the need for frank discussion of this matter in the pulpit. The doctrine of forgiveness phrased in terms of psychology will reach hearts that would not be touched by the traditional theological approach.

What pastor has not wrestled with what is called "the inferiority complex" in some parishioner without knowing exactly what to do about it? Mr. Weatherhead deals with this difficult matter with clearness, and is so practical in his suggestions that almost any one of us may treat these cases with insight and with confidence.

The remarkable chapter on "The Mind of a Child" should be used as a text for discussion classes made up of parents and teachers. It is the most sensible treatment of this subject that this reviewer has seen for many years. It is being used with inspiration and profit in a number of churches. In the same way, the final chapter on "Depres-

sion and Irritability" will yield material for a series of sermons or for a course of lessons in the church school.

Many of Mr. Weatherhead's readers in America may have certain reservations concerning the part which the unconscious mind plays in the game of life. Among us, there is a rather decided swing away from Freud, and even from Jung and Adler. We may not be able to go all the way with Mr. Weatherhead in his optimistic hope that these forces of mental healing may check even such dread diseases as cancer—but as Sir Henry Brackenbury makes clear, these occasional matters of disagreement do not, in any way, invalidate the total significance of the book. We do not use hypnosis as frequently as Mr. Weatherhead and we have some doubt as to the ultimate efficacy of this particular therapy. But all of these small matters of difference are quite incidental. *Psychology and life* is one of those books which one cannot get along without if he wants to render the largest possible service to those who look to him for counsel and guidance.

McILYAR HAMILTON LICHLITER.
First Congregational Church,
Columbus, Ohio.

Bookish Brevities

LOUIS UNTERMAYER defines poetry as a description of the indescribable in unforgettable words.

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Wilbour E. Saunders of the Advisory Council of RELIGION IN LIFE has become Headmaster of Peddie School.

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Ten thousand libraries in the United States serve some twenty-four million people. It is estimated that forty million people have no local library service.

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President Charles Nelson Pace of Hamline University wishes there were more ministers with whom one may talk happily and with more intelligence about books. Despite burdensome administrative responsibilities he manages to read about fifty books each year.

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By the death of George Herbert Betts, General and Religious Education has lost an author of first rank. In the Abingdon Texts he was one of the earliest writers to apply the standards and techniques of general to religious education. He was also one of the first to recognize that techniques are being over-emphasized, and his last book, *Teaching Religion To-day*, contains several chapters on the Christian message.

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In the capacious White House there never has been a library room. When the Hoovers took up residence, the only library consisted of a set of bound volumes of *Blackwood's Magazine*. Four years ago the American Booksellers' Association presented a library of five

hundred books to the White House. Two hundred more were presented recently, and not a religious book in the list. President Roosevelt has chosen a room to be prepared to shelve a permanent collection of books, which it is hoped will be regarded as a symbol of the place of the personal library in the homes of America.

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In his book, *Intolerance*, Winfred Ernest Garrison portrays the saddening tale of prejudice and ill-will in the annals of the race. He shows how disposed is man by nature to bring others into conformity with himself by persuasion or by pressure and if he succeeds not, to separate himself from others or see that they are separated from him. He points out that we have come far enough along the path of civilization to render race prejudice disreputable. Prejudice now assembles itself in secret halls and seeks to masquerade behind the raiment of patriotism or traditional loyalty. We have become more willing to let people be themselves, without alluding to diversities of opinion and conduct as vagaries and oddities.

This book avoids the customary inflating compliments. Intolerance is put under the spotlight to be seen for what it is. Sometimes it is unenlightened selfishness, sometimes a pretension to superiority which is a compensation for a conscious inferiority. As such it often merits a withering laugh.

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A beautiful tribute to books, originating in Vienna, is translated in a leaflet of Northwestern University Library.

"There they are, waiting and silent. They neither urge, nor call, nor press their claims. Mutely they are ranged along the wall. They seem to be asleep, yet from each one a name looks at you like an open eye. . . . A hundred eyes, a hundred names, silently and patiently meet your searching glance, as the slave women of a seraglio look to their master, humbly awaiting the call and yet blissful to be chosen."

"When you find the right book for the moment, suddenly you are seized and you breathe rapidly as you carry it away to the lamp. The happily chosen volume glows, dazzles with an inner light. Magic has been done. From delicate clouds of dreams there stalks forth phantasmagoria. Broad vistas open up and your vanishing senses are lost in space."

The distribution of books is increasing. Some think this is due to the skillful promotion of securing recommendations from famous reviewers. The phenomenal popularity in the United States of *Good-Bye, Mr. Chips* is credited to the endorsement of Alexander Woollcott.

A score, more or less, of reviewers of religious books have become influential because of their intelligence and impartiality in stating wherein a book achieves its purpose and whether it carries a style that is likely to make it more than ephemeral. Poor, however, is the book that cannot wring an enthusiastic introduction from somebody. Even the childish faith of a famous movie star has been exploited into a sale of some proportions.

Yet, eventually, every book must undergo the test of competent examination. If it fails under such scrutiny the ability of the reviewer is discredited.

Even the motive may be tarnished as affected by pressure.

In the main, books travel upon their merits at a rate of speed which is modified by the relation of the book to the mood and need of the times. Some books of quality continue to be undiscovered by the purchasing public. One of the most accomplished literary critics pronounces a volume to be "an extremely good book" of which, after several years since publication, only ninety-seven copies have been sold.

The eminent financier, Thomas W. Lamont, in a letter which he permitted to be published in the *Saturday Review of Literature*, describes his early life in the scattered towns along the Hudson River in Methodist parsonages, where books came in importance close behind Godliness and cleanliness.

He renounces the pernicious conscience that produces the wretched habit of reading every word in a book. He tells of reading the Bible through twice before he was fourteen, only omitting portions of the Kings and Chronicles on the second reading. "What a wicked waste!" he exclaims. "How much better had I learned great passages of John, Jeremiah, the Psalms and the New Testament."

Mr. Lamont guesses that youth nowadays does not read the Bible much aside from prescribed courses at school and college. He wonders how many persons in these years of depression have been able to follow the example of Jacob, "and he took of the stones of the place and put them for his pillow, and lay down in that place to sleep"? He wishes he could hear a sermon from the text, "he took of the stones . . . for his pillow."